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ABSTRACT 
My thesis tracks the human body in cyberspace as a popular cultural construct, from its 
origins in cyberpunk fiction in the 1980s to the pervasion of cyberspatial narratives in 
contemporary fictions, along with its representations within wider cultural texts, such as film, 
the mainstream media, and on the Internet. Across the two respective sections of the thesis, 
I focus upon six recurring literal-metaphorical characters, entities or motifs which serve as 
points of collision, entanglement and reiteration for a wide variety of discourses. These 
figures—the avatar, the hacker, the nanotechnological swarm, the fursona, the caring 
computer, and the decaying digital—have varying cultural functions in their respective 
representations of the human/technological interface. Informed by theorists such as Donna 
Haraway (1991, 2008), N. Katherine Hayles (2001) and others, I trace both their origins and 
their shifting and (often increasingly prolific) representations from the 1980s to the present. 
This allows me to uncover these figures’ registering of contextual discourses, and permits, in 
turn, an interrogation of the extent of their normative character, along with measuring how 
and to what extent, if any, these figures may offer alternative visions of human (and other) 
subjectivity. It also permits a rethinking of “cyberspace” itself. 
Section One analyses three figures that depict the human/technological interface as a space 
for reinscribing and reifying Cartesian dualistic views of human subjectivity, along with the 
exclusive and marginalising implications of the remapping of that dualism. The figures in 
Section One—the avatar, the hacker, and the nanotechnological swarm—have their roots in 
the 1980s, and have stratified over time, commonly deployed in describing the 
human/technological interface. These figures function in first evoking and then managing 
the threats to the unified masculine subject posed by the altering human/machine 
relationship, policing rather than collapsing the subjective boundaries between them. They 
maintain and reiterate their attendant logics of identity, recapitulating an image of technology 
as the object of human invention, and never a contributor to the substantiation of the human 
subject. Science fiction–especially cyberpunk—has at least partially set the terms for 
understanding present-day relationships between humans and technologies, and those terms 
are relentlessly humanistic and teleological, despite their putatively postmodern and 
fragmentary aesthetic. The threat of the technological other is almost invariably feminine-
coded, and my work in this section is explicated particularly in the light of Haraway’s work 
and feminist theories of embodiment, including the work of Elizabeth Grosz (1994) and 
Margrit Shildrick (1997, 2002).  
Section Two analyses three emerging figures—ones not so clearly and widely defined in 
fiction and popular culture—that depict the human/technological interface as fundamentally 
co-substantiating, rather than the latter being the product of the former. Acting as nodes of 
connection and constitution for various phenomena both depicted in fiction and 
enacted/performed at the human/technological interface itself, these three figures—the 
fursona, the caring computer, and the decaying digital—demonstrate potential ways to 
understand the human/technological interface outside of conventional, dualistic discourses 
of transcendental disembodiment of a bounded subject-self. Deploying theoretical work on 
concepts such as Alison Landsberg’s notion of prosthetic memory (2004) and Brian 
Massumi’s reading of the “real-material-but-incorporeal” body (2002), as well as Haraway’s 
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later work on companion species (2008), I position these figures as representative visions of 
technologically-mediated subjectivity that allow us to imagine our relationships with 
technology as co-operative, open and materially co-substantiating. I argue that they recover 
the potential to rupture the unified and dualistic mind-subject that is both represented and 
contained by the figures seen in Section One, while reflecting a more recognisably prosaic, 
ongoing transformation of subjective participants in human/technological encounters. 
In opening up these two respective clusters of human-technological figures, I map two 
attendant visions of cyberspace. The first is the most common: the smooth, Euclidean grid 
into which the discrete unified consciousness is projected away from the body, which is 
conflated with (a reductive understanding of) virtuality, and to which access is allowed or 
denied based on highly conventional lines of gender, race, sexuality and so on. The second 
vision is emerging: it is possible to view cyberspace as less of a “space” at all, and more of a 
technologically-mediated field of material implication—one which is not discrete from the 
putatively offline world, which is implicit in the subject formation of its users and 
participants, and accounts for, rather than disavowing, the physical, bodily substrate from 
which it is explicated. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The question of what happens to understandings of the human subject, at a point in time 
when all categories previously taken for granted are undergoing a fundamental 
reconfiguration as a result of the global capital-driven permeation of increasingly 
advanced information technologies, is one that has been asked countless times in the last 
few decades. Prompted by the need to react politically, theoretically and philosophically 
to the contested condition of postmodernity in the West, a strategy of scrutinising the 
fluxing intersections between the putative categories of the ‘human’ and the 
‘technological’—and trying to determine what subjective transformations (if any) take 
place on and across that stage—has proven a recurrent theme throughout scholarly work 
in a variety of disciplines. The tenor of the response has, of course, varied. For instance, 
frequently cited in descriptions of the turn to interrogating the putatively postmodern 
technologically-engaged subject is the work of Jean Baudrillard. His analysis of the 
dissolution by electronic media of the Platonic real into an endless circulation of 
simulacra signals the more apocalyptic end of the spectrum of opinions on the matter.1 
On the other end of that spectrum are the radical, occasionally bombastic dreams of a 
‘cyberpunk’ future, its shape demarcated by the science fiction subgenre of the same 
name that emerged in the 1980s. While it was not in itself, of course, the only reason that 
such concerns entered the popular imaginary, ever since William Gibson’s hugely 
influential Sprawl Trilogy of novels (1984-1988) generated a dizzyingly complete 
vocabulary for doing so, a supposedly new (cyber)culture has arisen.2 This culture is 
typified by its near-fanatical celebration of the aesthetics and ideas of a human being 
                                                 
1 Baudrillard’s work has been well accounted-for, and it is not my intention to dwell 
upon it extensively here. The core of Baudrillard’s argument about the reality-diminishing effects 
of the media can be found in Simulacra and Simulation (1994). 
2 The Sprawl Trilogy consists of the novels Neuromancer (1984), Count Zero (1986) and 
Mona Lisa Overdrive (1988). The “Sprawl” in question is the “Boston-Atlanta Metropolitan Axis”, 
a fictional extension and intensification of the Boston-Washington “Megalopolis”—a cluster of 
densely populated urban/metropolitan areas. 
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retrofitted and reconfigured by electronic prostheses, implants, biomechanics, 
xenotransplantation, cloning, genetic engineering and so on, constituting a wide array of 
liberatory promises for the increasingly posthuman subject.  
 
The explosion of fascination with the posthuman subject represented by the genre of 
cyberpunk marks the culmination of an ongoing transformation of the human that 
began, as N. Katherine Hayles argues, with projects of cybernetics research emerging 
from the Second World War, and the reshaping of interactions with technologies 
marking a shift from the human use of ‘dumb’ tools, to the integration of two (or more) 
agents in a virtual feedback loop of circulating information patterns.3 Alongside the 
excitement of the cyberpunks, cultural theorists have moved to produce accounts of this 
changing relationship, trying to determine whether or not there lies any real potential for 
subjective reconfiguration at this fluxing interface. While a delineated discipline of 
‘cybertheory’ arguably never emerged fully-expressed, many scholarly fields developed an 
arm the function of which was to theorise the implications of this changing relationship 
with technology. Hayles’ work is just one example of these kinds of approaches, most of 
which owe a debt to the work of Donna Haraway, whose “Cyborg Manifesto” (1985) 
constituted an incredibly powerful—and incredibly seductive—theoretical methodology 
for seizing upon encounters with increasingly-advanced digital technologies and 
interrogating them to determine whether they may offer possibilities for breaking down 
various harmful normative logics of identity, and particularly those boundary logics of 
the liberal humanist subject, or the “historically specific” construction of the human 
which is extraordinarily exclusive in nature and scope, but whose parameters are 
universalised, given to be those against which all viable human subjects must be judged 
                                                 
3 As Hayles points out this happened even as the same developments marked a steady 
and problematic conceptual decoupling of information from its material bases (1999: 2). 
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(Hayles 1999: 2).4 This liberal humanist subject has been held partly responsible by 
feminist theorists (amongst many others) for underpinning many—if not all—logics of 
domination and exclusion along the lines of sex, gender, race, class, sexuality, able-
bodiedness, and so on. The human/technological interface has, partly through the work 
of people like Hayles and Haraway, become an important staging point from which to 
interrogate that category and undermine it. 
 
Hayles’ posthuman and Haraway’s cyborg are, in fact, representative of two absolutely 
key formulations of the human/technological interface in postmodernity. In addition to 
these well-theorised frameworks, another of the central locations for imagining the 
multiple meetings between the human subject and the advanced technologies of the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries is the metaphorical grid of cyberspace. Just one 
of the many terms that Gibson both coined and popularised (appearing first in the 1982 
short story collection Burning Chrome, and popularised by the Sprawl Trilogy), and which 
has since become a highly recognisable everyday word (used mainly nowadays to refer to 
the Internet), cyberspace has embodied both excitement and disappointment in almost 
equal measure. Gibson’s formulation of cyberspace—the “consensual hallucination” 
(1984: 12); the “transparent 3D chessboard extending to infinity” (52), accessed by the 
virtuoso “console cowboys” of his novels by way of a direct neural connection—is the 
one that has taken hold as the main fictional image of a ‘pure’ cyberspace. Inspiring 
countless other writers and filmmakers (versions of Gibson’s vision of cyberspace re-
emerge in texts like Neal Stephenson’s Snow Crash [1992], the film The Lawnmower Man 
[dir. Brett Leonard, 1992] and the Matrix film trilogy [dir. Andy and Larry Wachowski, 
1999-2003]) young real-life hackers who went on to become the coders who would 
                                                 
4 Haraway’s “Cyborg Manifesto” was originally published in a 1985 issue of Socialist 
Review, and was later developed into its final and most-cited version in her 1991 monograph 
Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. In this thesis, I refer to the latter version. 
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become the architects of the present-day Internet and other systems of 
human/technological interface.5 
 
Gibson was, though, responding to a wider set of cultural changes when he distilled them 
into his vision of cyberspace.6 The appearance of cyberspace in science fiction is bound 
up with the rapidly changing nature of Western life in the late twentieth century, a change 
which is inextricably linked to the pervasion of digital technologies, but also to the 
changing perceptions of the urban (mostly American) landscape. Vivian Sobchack 
identifies a distinctive shift in American SF cinema, for instance, at the end of the 1970s, 
which reflects a conception of both space and time altered by “the popularisation and 
pervasiveness of electronic technology” (2004: 222). Sobchack produces an account of a 
nascent conception of space that, in opposition to the depth and urgency of conventional 
understandings of the same, is concerned with reconciling a postmodern emphasis on 
surface and play—something consolidated by the experience of electronically mediated 
images: 
[the] traditional perception of ‘depth’ as a structure of possible bodily movement 
in a materially habitable space has been challenged by our current and very real 
kinetic responses to – but immaterial habitation of – various forms of ‘simulated’ 
space (from flight training to video games) [...] Fragmented into discrete and 
contained units by both microchips and strobe lights, space has lost much of its 
contextual function as the ground for the continuities of time, movement and 
event. Space is now more often a ‘text’ than a context. (223) 
                                                 
5 Chapter Two unravels the function of the hacker figure, which has its own implications 
for the understanding of the interface. 
6 Indeed, apart from its appearance in the Sprawl Trilogy, cyberspace features heavily in 
some other major (science fiction) texts produced at around the same time: the film TRON (dir. 
Steven Lisberger, 1982) is one such example: the action of the film takes place in a space that is, 
ambiguously either the literal material “insides” of a computer system or the conceptual 
electronic space produced by the operations of those components. 
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For Sobchack, digital technologies (and the globalisation of capital; the two things, 
amongst many, co-substantiated in the 1980s) helped to fragment this “traditional” 
understanding of space as three-dimensional. What replaced it, Sobchack argues, was the 
“superficial electronic ‘dimensionality’ of movement experienced on – not in – the 
screens of video games, music videos, and movies like TRON” (ibid.).  
 
Sobchack goes on to argue that the weightlessness of this new non-dimension helped to 
make redundant fears of penetration and invasion (most vivid in 1950s culture), and that 
this new concept of space also simultaneously focused and obscured the distribution of 
corporate power and capital, placing multinationals themselves into this intangible, 
“other” plane (224). The ambivalence in this conception of space is productive, and 
while Sobchack’s analysis resists coding either politically liberatory possibility or 
repression exclusively into the phenomenon, the sense of spatial reconfiguration is 
illustrative of the putative power of human/technological interfaces to mutate and shift 
that space (and its inhabitants) beyond the clear objectives of conventional rational 
control. Scott Bukatman’s rich account of cyberspace in cyberpunk fiction reads it as a 
simultaneous celebration of and resistance to the distribution of the subject across 
electronic interfaces; it is a space that disrupts conventional geometry and any division 
between text and experience—and yet still embodies a way to comprehend this mind-
bending multiplication of information: “cyberspace is a method of conceiving the 
inconceivable—an imaginary solution to the real contradictions of the Dataist Era. In 
this sense, Neuromancer itself represents a ‘consensual hallucination’—an abstraction and 
reduction of the complexities of cybernetic culture to a kind of reckless, but sensible, 
cognitive experience” (152, emphasis in original). While both Sobchack and Bukatman 
resist polemic, producing thorough readings of this electronic space, both show 
agreement on the fundamentally inexplicable dimensions of cyberspace, and its inherent 
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resistance to discourses of totalisation. For both, cyberspace—in its most well known 
fictional formulations, at the very least—is both focusing and intangible, and always 
inseparable from the ‘real world’ conditions of its conception. 
 
As well as being a well-known entity in fictional formulations though, cyberspace is, of 
course, a much more complicated phenomenon, with implications for and material roots 
embedded in the changing experiences of explicitly technologically-mediated life in the 
West. As David Bell writes, cyberspace  
has material, symbolic and experiential dimensions. It is machines, wires, 
electricity, programs, screens, connections, and it is modes of information and 
communication: email, websites, chat rooms, MUDs. But it is also images and 
ideas: cyberspace exists on film, in fiction, in our imaginations as much as on our 
desktops or in the space between our screens. (2001: 2) 
For Bell, it is necessary to examine (and indeed define) cyberspace via a three-pronged 
attack: “material stories”, “symbolic stories” and “experiential stories” (6). Attending to 
the complex implications of this necessity, he starts to build a working definition of 
cyberspace: 
We can define cyberspace in terms of hardware, for example—as a global 
network of computers, linked through communications infrastructures, that 
facilitate forms of interaction between remote actors. Cyberspace is here the sum 
of all those nodes and networks [...] Alternatively, a definition based partly on the 
‘symbolic’ trope could define cyberspace as an imagined space between 
computers in which people might build new selves and new worlds [...] In fact, 
cyberspace is all this and more; it is hardware and software, and it is images and 
ideas—the two are inseparable. Moreover, the ways we experience cyberspace 
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represent a negotiation of material and symbolic elements, each given different 
weight depending on the kind of experience. (7) 
Bell’s definition gives a very useful overview of what is at stake in theorising the basic 
shape and nature of cyberspace. The culmination of material, symbolic and experiential 
stories embeds cyberspace as a ‘real’ entity; it is a mediation between the material, 
symbolic and the experiential that converges and is condensed into a metaphor with 
considerable currency, even if the ‘meaning” of that metaphor is unavoidably 
multiplicitous and wide-reaching. It is a definition that seeks to ensure that cyberpunk-
inflected excitement does not overwhelm the need to keep a sense of perspective. Bell’s 
work, though, also serves as an indication of why I have chosen not to focus upon 
cyberspace explicitly as the direct object of any single chapter of my study. Firstly, work 
such as Bell’s (and indeed Bukatman’s and Sobchack’s) demonstrates that the task of 
defining cyberspace is already being done, and furthermore can only be done effectively 
from a perspective that accounts for its specific instantiation in the context in which it 
appears (rather than described ‘from the outside’ as a discrete entity). Secondly, Bell’s 
analysis is characteristic of a kind of work that, very sensibly, seeks to build an open 
vision of cyberspace that accounts, where possible, for the full complexity of its material 
instantiation and its constitutive effects on subjects in interaction with it—but this is not, 
unfortunately, the vision of cyberspace that is represented in most cultural texts that 
depict it. Through analysing six interface encounters, I develop in this thesis a series of 
perspectives on the cultural functions of cyberspace which do not disagree with the 
necessity of a subtle, careful analysis of that formation of the interface—but work instead 
from the assumption that these subtle, careful analyses just do not make it into most 
conceptions of cyberspace as they are encountered in the popular imaginary. 
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In other words, cyberspace has necessarily been theorised from a number of quarters, 
and found to be an expression of a certain ongoing series of cultural changes; its shape 
has been determined by scholars to be complex, multiple, and embedded in its material 
conditions. But, as both a conceptual space expressed in fiction and in conventional 
popular cultural representations, cyberspace, when analysed in terms of its depictions of 
subjectivity and embodiment, appears incredibly (and increasingly) normative in 
character. Rather than giving new ways of conceiving of human embodiment, or altering 
our notions of space to better reflect the fractured experience of postmodernity, 
cyberspace itself, as it is generally represented in its most common depictions, is the 
culmination of much older, post-Enlightenment projects of disembodiment. Rather than 
a complex and irreducible flow and counterflow of influences and material circumstances 
that generate qualitatively new modes of embodiment, cyberspace is regularly figured as a 
means of escaping the body altogether. Indeed, its very representation as a “space” at all, 
envisioning the interface as a blank plane of Euclidean dimensions, marks it as 
penetrable, passive, and feminised: this is a space that becomes the object to the rational 
(masculine) subject. A cyberspace is a fallaciously-conceived “blank” zone, within which 
normative values can be reinscribed under the banner of technologically-deterministic 
electronic neutrality; it is an ‘other’ which requires instrumental, unidirectional control. It 
is dislodged and dislocated from the material world, hovering above it, Platonically 
“artificial” but potentially intellectually and subjectively superior in its distillation of the 
deterministic frameworks of rational technoscience into a perfect(ed) new space. This 
space is there to be entered and left at will by a discrete, free-floating mind-self. And, in 
its capacity as a neutral, controllable space, cyberspace in fact functions as a means of 
resisting the fragmentation of human subjects at the interface. While formulations such as 
the posthuman and the cyborg have provided an opportunity (or necessity) to rethink the 
historically-specific construction of the human by reconfiguring it and undermining its 
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mythical cohesion, a number of cultural figures have arisen at the same interface whose 
function is literally to reject those reconfigurations. 
 
In order to  determine the form of this rejection, my thesis tracks the human body in 
cyberspace as a popular cultural construct, from its origins in cyberpunk fiction in the 
1980s to the pervasion of cyberspatial narratives in contemporary fictions, along with its 
representations within wider cultural texts, such as film, the mainstream media, and on 
the Internet. Across the two respective sections of the thesis, I focus upon six recurring 
literal-metaphorical characters, entities or motifs which serve as points of collision, 
entanglement and reiteration for a wide variety of discourses. These figures—the avatar, 
the hacker, the nanotechnological swarm, the fursona, the caring computer, and the 
decaying digital—have varying cultural functions in their respective representations of 
the human/technological interface. Informed by theorists such as Haraway (1991, 2008), 
Hayles (1999) and others, I trace both these figures’ origins and their shifting and (often 
increasingly prolific) representations from the 1980s to the present. I do this in two 
sections of three figures each: the first section deals with more strongly 
delineated/consolidated figures, mainly in fiction, which have a specific set of normative 
functions; whereas the second section is made up of examinations of three figures that 
are still emerging at the interface, and are in the process of being established across 
several varying texts at the interface.  
 
This approach allows me to uncover these figures’ registering of contextual discourses, 
and permits, in turn, an interrogation of the extent of their normative character, along 
with measuring how and to what extent, if any, these figures may offer alternative visions 
of human (and other) subjectivity. It also permits a rethinking of the notion of 
“cyberspace” itself—even while never focusing explicitly upon cyberspace as an object of 
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study. One of the major intentions of my project is, as shown necessary by Bell’s 
argument, to abandon as prescriptive the possibility of a singular totalising definition of 
cyberspace, along with the intention of locking it down to a geographical (or even 
abstract) location and shape. Accordingly, cyberspace haunts every one: each figure 
under examination here is embedded in, emerges from, interacts with, or is in some way 
implicated in the substantiation of some kind of cyberspace. Just what the relationship is 
between each figure and cyberspace is examined through the unravelling of that figure 
itself, but broadly speaking there are, in the two respective sections of this thesis, two 
visions of cyberspace here, and each respective version embodies a considerably different 
function.  
 
My use of ‘figures’ has a firm precedent: I take my methodological cues primarily from 
the work of Haraway. Confounding the drive for (or the possibility of) distance and 
objectivity from (and thus authority and power over), Haraway writes “from the belly” of 
figures (2008: 4). Figures—“material-semiotic nodes [...] in which diverse bodies and 
meanings coshape each other” (ibid.)—have, for Haraway, taken the forms of cyborgs, 
monkeys and apes (1991), the genetically engineered and trademarked cancer research 
animal OncoMouse™ (1997), and, most recently, dogs and other “companion species” 
(2008). Focusing upon these figures, Haraway uses them as a means to unravel the 
complex ways in which they constitute and are constituted by their informing material 
contexts, along with examining the same in the putative (human) individuals and entities 
in interaction with them. This inspired the approach that I have taken in my thesis: each 
chapter focuses upon a different figure, and each figure constitutes a node entangling a 
set of highly heterogeneous representations of the human/technological interface, and 
the discursive functions attendant to each set of representations. For instance, when I 
examine the figure of the avatar in Chapter One, I examine the way it is represented in 
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fiction—as a means to reverse-engineer both how and why the avatar was established, 
along with determining the nature of its discursive function.7 This mapping of figures 
has, though, a constitutive effect too, especially upon figures that are not as clearly 
consolidated: for example, when I write about the fursona in Chapter Four, or the caring 
computer in Chapter Five, I am partly responsible for tying them together into figures by 
the very act of my writing them. 
 
From Vitamin Pills to Cortical Stacks  
Before coming to a full discussion of my methodology and map of my thesis structure, 
however, it is necessary to outline in full the respective frameworks of the posthuman 
and the cyborg—arguably the two most widely-cited conceptual formulations for 
understanding the putative overlap between human subjects and contemporary and 
future technologies—as well as the reasons why these formulations have struggled to 
resist rejection in mainstream and technocultural representations of the interface. As I 
argue, while the posthuman and the cyborg are both rich sources of inspiration for 
opening up the implications of the interface, both have suffered from having their 
transgressive potential closed down in advance or simply ignored by contrary, normative 
assemblies that emerge at the same interfaces—and which emerge specifically to resist 
any such alterations to the parameters or boundaries of the conventional human subject. 
Both the cyborg and the posthuman are complex, careful accounts of the 
human/technological interface, and both thinkers use their work to problematise the 
notion of the liberal humanist subject.8 Both accounts, however, offer versions of 
                                                 
7 This is, as I show in Chapter One, to provide a means for an offline user to interact in 
cyberspace without fear of subjective pollution. All of the figures under examination in Section 
One have, at their base, a number of discursive structures the function of which are to police the 
boundary between the human subject and the technological other, keeping each category separate 
by animating their disruption and then recoupment.  
8 By the liberal humanist subject, I mean the post-Enlightenment idea of the human as 
an essentially rational, thinking subject, inspired by philosophers such as René Descartes, 
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interface encounters that have been either ignored, resisted or rejected outright by many 
cultural representations of such encounters—in favour of reductive reiterations of the 
liberal humanist subject. These more complex former models are contained as discursive 
constructions arise that police the boundaries between the human and the technological. 
While Haraway’s cyborg figure predates (and informs) Hayles’ reading of the posthuman, 
I begin with an account of the posthuman. This may seem counterintuitive, but I do this 
because of the differing nature of the two frameworks: Hayles’ reading of the posthuman 
both gives a specific historical background to the shifting nature of the 
human/technological relationship and does so in the context of critiquing the liberal 
humanist subject. The cyborg, on the other hand, is a manifesto-figure that is developed 
in order to react to much the same issues, but is better explained with those contexts and 
critiques already defined. 
 
Hayles’ How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature and Informatics 
(1999) is a detailed cultural history of the ongoing interpenetration of human embodied 
subjectivity and technology, focusing in particular on an interrelated series of conceptual 
shifts taking place as a result of cybernetics research emerging from the Second World 
War. For Hayles, the arguable “posthuman” condition signals an opportunity to rethink 
fundamentally the historically-constructed condition of humanity as it is viewed in the 
West: 
                                                                                                                                            
Immanuel Kant and others. Descartes’ influential ontological statement cogito ergo sum–“I think 
therefore I am”—is demonstrative of both the privileging of rational thought and the reduction 
of selfhood to the bounds of an essentialised mind (and not to mention the implicit denigration 
of the body as unimportant to the fundamental nature of that mind). This vision of a human 
subject with a stable centre or core, standing in opposition to both its own body and the outside 
world (both of which can, theoretically, be known, ordered and controlled) is at the basis of most 
conventional logics of identity in Western societies. I discuss this more fully when looking at 
feminist critiques of the liberal humanist subject, which judge its dualistic underpinnings to make 
categorisation as “human” exclusive to a tiny minority of subjects. 
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What is the posthuman? Think of it as a point of view characterized by the 
following assumptions [...] First, the posthuman view privileges informational 
pattern over material instantiation, so that embodiment in a biological substrate is 
seen as an accident of history rather than an inevitability of life. Second, the 
posthuman view considers consciousness, regarded as the seat of human identity 
in the Western tradition long before Descartes thought he was a mind thinking, 
as an epiphenomenon, as an evolutionary upstart trying to claim that it is the 
whole show when in actuality it is only a minor sideshow. Third, the posthuman 
view thinks of the body as the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate, so 
that extending or replacing the body with other prostheses becomes a 
continuation of a process that began before we were born. Fourth, and most 
important, by these and other means, the posthuman view configures human 
being so that it can be seamlessly articulated with intelligent machines. In the 
posthuman, there are no essential differences or absolute demarcations between 
bodily existence and computer simulation, cybernetic mechanism, robot teleology 
and human goals. (2-3) 
 This overview of the extremely complicated nature of the posthuman (which, she also 
points out, is “suggestive” rather than prescriptive [2]) is demonstrative of the kinds of 
reconfigurations made possible by an altered relationship with “intelligent machines”. 
Furthermore, detailing how information “lost its body” as a result of the mathematician 
Claude Shannon’s 1948 “Mathematical Theory of Communication”, Hayles identifies 
both the possibility of conceiving of information as something that can exist across 
human and non-organic (technological) bodies, bringing them into a co-constituting 
feedback loop that confounds originary will or identity, and the problem of this now-
disembodied information being treated as a kind of essence, a quasi-spiritual entity given 
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coherence and credibility by the mathematically-proven nature of its metaphorical 
function.9 
 
In showing how it is undermined, Hayles’ work also constitutes a robust articulation of 
the normative subject that has been reconfigured or retrofitted by technological 
intervention, and the ways in which it has already come under attack: 
The liberal humanist subject [has] been cogently criticized from a number of 
perspectives. Feminist theorists have pointed out that it has historically been 
constructed as a white European male, presuming a universality that has worked 
to suppress and disenfranchise women’s voices; postcolonial theorists have taken 
issue not only with the universality of the (white male) liberal subject but also 
with the very idea of a unified, consistent identity, focusing instead on hybridity, 
and postmodern theorists such as Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari have linked it 
with capitalism, arguing for the liberatory potential of a dispersed subjectivity 
distributed among diverse desiring machines. (4) 
Aligning her work with that of those others who have called for a deconstruction or 
rethinking of the bounds of the ‘I’ subject of Western terminology, Hayles positions her 
analysis as one whose focus is upon ensuring that the plurality of material experience and 
context is not overlooked in the constitution of posthuman subjectivity. The posthuman 
here is not as much of a ‘figure’ as the contextual and many-tendrilled form assigned to a 
vastly complicated cultural history: Hayles does not sublimate the posthuman into a 
cohesive (if deliberately transient) shape in a manner reminiscent of Haraway’s cyborg 
metaphor, assigning it some kind of inherent potential as a tool for picking the locks of 
the dominating logics of identity. Hayles’ project, in contrast to Haraway’s (self-
                                                 
9 For Hayles, Shannon’s mathematical theory of communication allowed for an 
abstraction of the notion of information, occluding its material bases as interchangeable, and the 
technical applicability of Shannon’s work was instrumental in stabilising this dualistic myth (1999: 
2). 
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described) “manifesto”, has a cultural prescription that only goes as far as a warning 
against the threat of a reductive, essentialist, hyper-Cartesian view of posthumanism as 
some kind of deterministic ‘next stage’ of human evolution. For Hayles, ‘posthumanism’ 
describes a means of reviewing understandings of subjectivity vis-à-vis shifting human 
relationships with information, rather than a generational, inevitable, grand narrative roll 
towards a teleological endpoint of scientifically-mediated subjective perfection.  
 
Indeed, if anything, her book constitutes a passionate defence against the latter 
conception of posthumanism, which she sees as nothing less than a “nightmare”: 
If my nightmare is a culture inhabited by posthumans who regard their bodies as 
fashion accessories rather than the ground of being, my dream is a version of the 
posthuman that embraces the possibilities of information technologies without 
being seduced by fantasies of unlimited power and disembodied immortality, that 
recognizes and celebrates finitude as a condition of human being, and that 
understands human life is embedded in a material world of great complexity, one 
on which we depend for our continued survival. (5) 
Hayles’ primary concern is that the metaphorical power of the posthuman does not 
simply get grasped and deployed as a way to extend the myth of the unitary, bounded 
liberal humanist subject, which denigrates the importance of the body, and tries to forget 
that it is even embodied in the first place. She describes how she had read Hans 
Moravec’s speculative science text Mind Children (1988), which, amidst a collection of 
careful, well-thought-out speculations about the future of artificial intelligence and 
cybernetics, contained a fantasy whereby in the future, the human “consciousness” could 
be transferred from the meat of the human brain to a new computer body (1). “How,” 
she asks herself, “was it possible for someone of Moravec’s obvious intelligence to 
believe that mind could be separated from body? Even assuming such a separation was 
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possible, how could anyone think that consciousness in an entirely different medium 
would remain unchanged, as if it had no connection with embodiment?” (ibid.) These 
kinds of “fantasies of unlimited power and disembodied immortality” that she describes 
are the logical conclusion of a linear teleology of generational “improvement” that so 
often goes hand-in-hand with reductive understandings of an essentialised human subject 
that (deliberately) forgets its historical and material contingency—and not to mention of 
history and scientific development (and the interactions between the two).  
 
Hayles’ simultaneously delicate and robust formulation of the historically-situated 
posthuman does not seem to register in the thoughts of those whose voices are loudest 
in the debates about our possible posthuman futures. Rather than our interpenetrating 
relationships with information technologies giving us the tools and the impetus to 
perceive the human body as “the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate”, popular 
perceptions of posthumanism seem instead to celebrate overwhelmingly the idea of 
moving radically beyond the putative constraints of the physical human body, fulfilling 
final mastery of technology and our bodies, and achieving omnipotent immortality with 
the aid of those technological developments and augmentations in order to eventually 
escape the flawed finitude of material embodiment altogether. One example of this can 
be found in the writings and activities of Raymond Kurzweil, a widely-noted and 
respected inventor, pioneer of optical character recognition, amongst other technologies, 
and a high-profile member of the Scientific Advisory Board of the Lifeboat 
Foundation—an organisation dedicated to “helping humanity survive existential risks” 
from technologies that threaten to reshape or undermine the conventional image of 
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humanity (Lifeboat Foundation 2010).10 An extensive interview by the Boston Globe with 
the wealthy American inventor, who is possibly one of the most vocal proponents of the 
posthuman “movement”, describes his daily routine:  
Every day, Kurzweil takes hundreds of nutritional supplement pills, and once a 
week he takes several others intravenously. He is, as he puts it, “reprogramming 
my biochemistry” and claims in so doing to have conquered his Type 2 diabetes. 
More importantly, he insists, he is stretching his natural lifespan until either 
genetic therapies, microscopic “nanobots” (hypothetical robots on the scale of 
single atoms and molecules that Kurzweil believes will be able, among many 
other things, to take over some of the vital functions of the human body), or 
simply the ability to download one’s mind onto a computer make immortality a 
reality. (Bennett 2005: par. 13-4) 
Kurzweil’s approach is one example of what Hayles might term posthumanism gone 
wrong. Downloading one’s mind as if it were a little ghost living inside an empty skull 
betrays once again that age-old Cartesian assumption that the mind can even be so neatly 
located, and that the consciousness can exist as a free-floating entity that can be passed 
around from body to body and remain intact as a singular presence.  
 
Kurzweil apparently awaits the day when “he will be billions of times more intelligent 
than he is today, able to read minds, assume different forms, and reshape his physical 
environment at will” (Bennett, par. 4). For Kurzweil, technologies mobilised supposedly 
for the benefit of humanity have the effect of closing down discussion on politically 
important issues: He finds it “surreal” when people talk of “the social security shortfall of 
2042” because he believes that by then “advances in nanotechnology will allow us to 
                                                 
10 The Lifeboat Foundation’s mission statement is indicative in itself of an organised and 
systemic resistance to the idea that any relationship with technology involves a fundamental 
reconfiguration of the human subject in interaction with it. 
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ward off disease and senescence and to manufacture all the goods we want for a 
pittance” (Bennett, par. 17). The same discourse—that  future technological advances 
will inevitably eventually allow for the unproblematic disembodiment, storage, transfer 
and re-homing of some kind of essentialised version of the mind-self—occur in science 
fiction just as commonly now as it did in the era of the Moravecs text that gives Hayles 
such cause for concern. Richard Morgan’s novel Altered Carbon (2002) is one such 
example: it dramatises a distant future universe where human consciousnesses are stored 
on a memory chip called a “cortical stack”, installed directly in the brain stem. When a 
body dies, the consciousness can be uploaded either into storage, or into a new body—
irreverently known as a “sleeve”. “Real death” ( “RD” in the novel) is only possible if the 
cortical stack is destroyed.11 Here is the Cartesian dualism writ large: the true essence of 
the self resides in a body, but that body is an arbitrary shell, with only marginal 
implications for the subject formation of the individual possessing it. Killing the body is 
not “real” death; real death only comes when the mind-self is lost or destroyed (or 
deleted). Indeed, the language of bodily commodification in the novel marks the body as 
a possession rather than a fundamental component of being or becoming. 
 
The approaches of Kurzweil and of fiction like Altered Carbon represent a mode of co-
existence with technology based rather selfishly in an idea of subjectivity that is limited by 
very particular notions of what constitutes a politically viable agent—notions that 
absolutely must not be disrupted, or even revealed to be materially contingent, but are 
reproduced flawlessly by digital (re-)instantiation in a technological material base. Again, 
what is unsettling is that this kind of narrative is still arguably the dominant discourse on 
posthumanism and human interactions with technology. People like Kurzweil, an 
influential thinker with exceptional scientific credentials, continue to propagate the 
                                                 
11 Altered Carbon is discussed more fully in Chapter Two, on the figure of the avatar. 
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singular, teleological myth of disembodied omnipotence when it comes to the 
relationship between human beings and machines. This reliance upon the narrative of a 
kind of progressing, disembodied relationship with technology that will eventually just 
solve all of our problems ‘somehow’ is just the kind of feverish re-appropriation of the 
far more complex notion of posthumanism that Hayles argues against.12   
 
As mentioned, instrumental in motivating and informing Hayles’ project of theorising the 
posthuman is work by Donna Haraway. Haraway’s cyborg metaphor is an attempt to 
break a perceived limiting identity politics of socialist feminism, but has had wider scope 
for theorising subjectivity in terms of affinity instead of essence; terms that do not only 
elevate artifice to the status of nature but break down the distinction between the two 
completely. And Hayles’s work with the posthuman shows it to be a much more 
complicated term than just an intensification of ‘human’—or ‘humanist’—approaches to 
selfing. The figure of the cyborg—a compounding of “cybernetic organism”—has, by 
now, a very firm place in the (science-) fictional imaginary. Cyborgs are syntheses of 
organic and technological (‘natural’ and ‘artificial’) components. They range from the 
fusions of meat and metal embodied by the iconic android killing machines of the 
Terminator film franchise (1984-2009), to the “razorgirl” Molly Millions in Gibson’s 
Sprawl Trilogy who has mirrored sunglasses embedded into her skull and razorblades 
under her fingernails, to the port-augmented bodies of the “freed” humans of the Matrix 
film trilogy (1999-2003). The cyborg, however, has also taken on a powerful and 
                                                 
12 This is also a fundamentally technologically deterministic view of the way in which 
technologies develop: i.e., “technology” is seen here as a independent agent that develops in a 
kind of a vacuum rather than as the result of complex social and economic changes, and its 
relationship to “the human” is a kind of power struggle: either we “keep up” with technology and 
control it, imposing the will of our discrete selves upon it, or we are left behind (or even 
destroyed). Bell sums it up neatly, remarking that this viewpoint constitutes “a mode of 
understanding that prescribes a one-way relationship between machines (technology) and people 
(society), in which technologies change, and that change impacts on people. In this formulation, 
technology and society are kept separate, even held in opposition to one another: technology 
causes social change” (66). 
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provocative character as a theoretical figure, developed by Haraway. The “Cyborg 
Manifesto”’s titular figure has been deployed frequently in considerations of 
human/technological interaction. Its function, for Haraway, is to take socialist feminist 
thinking beyond dualistic logics of identity, and reconfigure human agency in terms of 
changing relationships with machines, in a world where technological developments 
(taking care not to see these developments as deterministic) lead to more and more 
discoveries that destabilise the distinction between nature and culture. The cyborg 
functions as a persuasive attempt to discover a means of accounting for a postmodern 
kind of partial selfhood without recourse to universalising (and thus exclusive) binary 
frameworks, and to account for the growing influence of technology on Western culture 
without rejecting it out of hand as inherently androcentric and misogynistic.  
 
The basic premise of the manifesto is that the way we are co-evolving with machines 
makes us subjectively equal to them; the conventional humanist conception of the 
subject-to-object relationship of “human” to “invention” is overturned: we are found to 
be in an encounter with technology that is fundamentally and continuously co-
substantiating. The “cyborg” is the metaphorical half-human, half-machine figure; it 
confounds the possibility of originary authenticity, disrupts a false delineation between 
the natural and the artificial, and exists for Haraway as a method for destabilising the 
strict boundaries between several other such problematic binary subject categories: 
[The cyborg is] an argument for pleasure in the confusion of boundaries and for 
responsibility in their construction… Nature and culture are reworked; the one 
can no longer be the resource for appropriation or incorporation by the other. 
The relationships for forming wholes from parts, including those of polarity and 
hierarchical domination, are at issue in the cyborg world. (1991: 151) 
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In the manifesto, written in the context of a society swamped with new technological 
modes of altering the body and interacting with machines and other agents, Haraway 
identifies “crucial breakdowns” between humans, animals and machines that constitute 
and contribute to cyborgic bodies, brought about or exposed by the changing face(s) of 
technology and our relationships with the same (151-3). She asserts that these boundary 
“breakdowns” allow for the possibility of a “cyborg world” that, rather than being 
“about the final imposition of a grid of control on the planet”, as many might assume 
given the Western capitalist-orientated bias of conditions of technological production, 
can be about “lived social and bodily realities in which people are not afraid of 
permanently partial identities and contradictory standpoints” (154). This “blasphemous” 
figure of the “monstrous and illegitimate” cyborg in effect challenges what Haraway sees 
as inadequate, essentialist strategies in existing socialist feminisms—it renders certain 
things discussable that were previously seen as prohibitively male-orientated and 
controlled, such as technoscience—and in this capacity is a rich basis for many 
theoretical and interdisciplinary narratives (ibid.).  
 
While Haraway’s vision of the cyborg has been one of the most widely-deployed 
theoretical tools for interrogating the human/technological interface since she published 
the essay, it has come under no small amount of scrutiny.13 Criticisms of the manifesto 
vary from the ways it has been (mis-)used, to its putatively limited scope, to the very 
logical underpinnings of its theoretical project of hybridity. Vicki Kirby, for instance, 
takes on those logical underpinnings. The larger project of Kirby’s work is to revisit 
some of the major postmodern, putatively non-dualistic approaches to corporeal 
                                                 
13 I account for some of the more substantial criticisms of Haraway’s work here, but do 
not perform the equivalent for that of Hayles’ work on the posthuman. This is because of a 
difference in format between the two models: the “manifesto” nature of Haraway’s figure invites 
its application as a problem-solving model. Hayles’ project is more of an extended cultural 
history—with conceptual implications for the understanding of the human and posthuman 
subjects, certainly—but not a manifesto that encourages as direct a “use” as the cyborg.  
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subjectivity, and uncover what she believes to be an unwitting reiteration of the very 
boundary logic they are designed to overcome. Addressing Haraway’s cyborg, she judges 
it “utterly dependent on the calculus of one plus one”: for Kirby, the constitution of the 
cyborg is a linear but reversible operation that conjoins discrete entities, whose seams 
remain visible even after the moment of hybridity (1997: 147). The vaunted collapse of 
the nature/culture divide here is made impossible by the cyborg’s retrospective 
reiteration of the categories it has supposedly made obsolete. Sceptical of some of the 
cyborg’s possibly overenthusiastic supporters, Judith Squires produces a critical account 
of some of the “fabulous feminist futures” that have been propounded as a result of 
Haraway’s metaphor-model (2000: 360). “While there may be potential for an alliance 
between cyborg imagery and materialist-feminism,” she writes, “this potential has been 
largely submerged beneath a sea of technophoric cyberdrool” (ibid., emphasis in original). 
Squires demonstrates the form that this “technophoric cyberdrool” has taken by 
examining the writing of self-professed “cyberfeminists” such as Sadie Plant, whom she 
judges to have stripped the cyborg metaphor of its politicised character, as well as to 
have used it as a means to re-establish a reductive and essentialist vision of femininity 
that runs counter to the cyborg’s logic of deliberate, unabashed postmodern partiality 
(358).  
 
Squires also takes issue with the excitement surrounding the cyborg’s liberatory 
possibilities given both the prevailing discourses in which it was first articulated as a 
figure outside of Haraway’s work (those of cyberpunk and cyberculture) and the very 
limited number of people worldwide who have real access to the kinds of transformative 
technologies being celebrated: the “dreary dreams of Texan boys” both set the terms for 
discussion of cyborgic embodiment and constitute the majority of those who have access 
to and control over it (363-4). Finally, and more recently, Joanna Zylinska has outlined 
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that while the cyborg’s (and cyberfeminism’s) importance cannot be underestimated “in 
the world in which information sciences remain one of the dominant scientific 
paradigms”, yet another series of shifts in the specificities of scientific research make the 
meat-and-metal cyborg seem rather obsolete (139). Identifying the turn to the smaller, 
“biotechnological, transgenic, soft hybrids [such as] OncoMouse™, Dolly the sheep, 
inhabitants of the SimLife computer game designed as a ‘genetic playground’”, Zylinska 
suggests that the predominant vision of the cyborg “has become an ‘old model’, slightly 
gauche in its military origin and machinic pathos” (140).14 She remarks that more “soft 
cyborgs”, represented by OncoMouse™ and the like, are both more representative of the 
current state of scientific intervention into the nature of the human body-subject and a 
way of figuring the wider need to account for bioethics in the practices of technoscience 
(ibid.). Haraway’s cyborg needs, for all of the above critics, to be very carefully rethought 
in order to deploy it to any useful effect. 
 
My concern with the cyborg figure’s potential for theorising interface encounters in the 
twenty-first century is less with any kind of fundamental contradictions in its logic, or 
even that a kind of overuse (or indeed misappropriation) weakens the scope of its attack 
on conventional, normative logics of identity: even despite the provisos identified by the 
theorists above, I believe that the cyborg remains a tremendously powerful and 
subversive figure. Squires, for instance, is more cautious than outright critical, (rightly) 
denoting the need to ensure the cyborg is used rigorously and not feverishly: as she 
points out, overenthusiastic deployment of the cyborg does not necessarily preclude the 
possibility of useful application (369). Similarly, Zylinska’s deconstruction-inspired 
“softening” of Haraway’s metaphor-model underscores, rather than undermines, the 
                                                 
14 Haraway has written extensively on OncoMouse™, in 
Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium (1997). Zylinska acknowledges and refers to Haraway’s work 
on this figure in her own formulation of “soft” cyborgs (142). 
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ongoing relevance of such rupturing conceptual hybrids, and the attendant power 
represented by the potential of mobility beyond the meat-and-metal fusion that typified the 
character of 1980s and early 1990s representations of the cyborg. Kirby’s concerns are, 
perhaps, more troubling given their intervention in a perceived fundamental logical 
fallacy—but they recede somewhat given the very mutability and adaptability of the 
cyborg figure that are demonstrated by Zylinska’s alterations, as well as those of others 
who have made similar reconfigurations (including reconfigurations that address those 
very logical concerns and yet leave the cyborg’s overall shape and project intact).15 I do 
not share the view of the cyborg having some kind of basic deficit in viability as a 
metaphor-model for understanding the human/technological interface. While patterns 
and figures perhaps more resistant to normalising forces are outlined presently in Section 
Two of this thesis (incorporating, amongst other things, more recent work by Haraway), 
the cyborg figure itself, either in its ‘original’ instantiation or rebuilt/renegotiated by 
ensuing theorists, remains striking and potent as a means of overturning instrumental, 
subject-object relationships between humans and technologies that reinscribe those fatal, 
Cartesian, binary logics of domination.  
 
The focus of this thesis, though, is less about showing any kind of fundamental failure in 
cyborgic (or posthuman) metaphorical models of the relationships between humans and 
technologies. Rather, my argument here is that the subjective disruptions equivalent to 
the cyborg’s politically optimistic visions of the blasphemous concatenations of the 
                                                 
15 An example of this is Dianne Currier’s work, which addresses directly Kirby’s 
interrogation of the cyborg. Like Zylinska, she retrofits the cyborg, but produces a Deleuzean 
rather than Derridean adaptation of Haraway’s figure, maintaining its productively blasphemous 
aims while seizing Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s notion of assemblage. She does this in order 
to produce a “Deleuzean feminism” that supposedly does not fall foul of the logical short-circuit 
identified by Kirby (2003: 334). The approach I develop in Section Two of this thesis—
particularly in the chapters examining the figures of the Decaying Digital and the Fursona—has 
some resonance with this Deleuzean trajectory: assembling (cyber)bodies at the interface that do 
not reiterate instrumental dichotomies of subject and object can benefit to some degree from this 
trajectory. 
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conventionally human and the technological are rejected explicitly by the most common 
cultural representations of human/technological intersections. In other words, revisiting 
some of the key texts—particularly the fictional texts—that animate the perceived shift in 
the human/technological interface towards the end of the twentieth century and into the 
twenty-first, and even (or especially) some of those which are cited by Haraway, Hayles 
and others as exemplars of the possibilities of that interface, it is possible to locate the 
origins of a normative project that raises the subversive nature of the interface—but does 
so, at least partly, in order to animate its being brought under control. The cyborg and 
the posthuman have suffered from their mainstream cultural counterparts spawning their 
own antibodies against those figures’ disruptive infections.16 These antibodies emerge as 
robust, strongly-delineated figures in themselves, appearing in texts depicting the 
human/technological interface, apparently complementing the cyborg even as they 
embody a normative function that contains the hybridising potential of that figure.17 
Figures representing the major and apparently disruptive encounters between the human 
and the technological—such as the avatar or the hacker—have not proved more and 
more disruptive to the liberal humanist subject over time: if there is a chronological shift 
in their potential to disrupt, it has got less and less since they first appeared. As these 
figures have consolidated and stabilised, they can be seen to have become more acute in 
                                                 
16 Of course, the fact that certain rigorous theoretical models have not become the de 
facto basis for all popular cultural representations of a certain phenomenon is not cause to claim 
its failure or some kind of inherent inadequacy. The politics of the interface are not a zero-sum 
game: that such interface representations still largely adhere to dualistic frameworks is no more a 
failure of Hayles’ or Haraway’s observations than the continued proliferation of systemic 
misogyny and sexism is a failure of feminist theory. The specificity here, though, is that even 
some of the very examples Hayles and Haraway deploy are also used to resist their ideas of 
overcoming dualism: as the cyborg and the posthuman become clearly defined, a number of other 
figures rise up from the same textual/cultural milieu to defend the normative logic under threat. 
Three of those figures—the avatar, the hacker, and the nanotechnological swarm—are the 
subjects of the first section of my thesis. 
17 As Squires argues, the dualistic, hard-bodied cyborgs of the military-industrial complex 
are “winning out in the cultural battle against the semi-permeable hybrid cyborgs of Haraway’s 
lexicon” (369). 
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their normative function, performing first a narrative of the threat to the stable liberal 
humanist subject-self, and then the neutralisation of that threat.18 
 
Fictions, Figures, (dis)Embodiment 
This thesis interrogates the cultural functions of six figurative representations of the 
human/technological interface. By the “human/technological interface” (or, as I refer to 
it often throughout the thesis, “the interface”) I mean the literal or metaphorical point at 
which an embodied, human(ist) subject—as it is conventionally understood in Western 
culture—encounters, affects, and is affected by a putative technological object or agent. 
More specifically, I examine encounters with digital (often information) technologies. 
The shift to digital technologies is both one of the most significant technological 
paradigm shifts in recent history and one which has significant conceptual implications: 
digital code represents the absolute distillation of the abstraction of information from its 
material bases and, as a technoscientific product of late capitalism, also often stands in 
for the flow of global capital in the form of an interchangeable, transmissible 
essence.19As there is so much potential ground to cover in a consideration of the 
relationships between humans and digital technologies, I pause here to delineate the 
circumference of my project’s remit. While it would be impossible to try to account for 
everything that my thesis does within the limited space of this Introduction, it is at least 
pertinent to outline what I am not trying to do. Firstly, I am not intervening specifically in 
the many long-standing philosophical questions surrounding the definition of 
                                                 
18 The ‘threat’ as it is articulated by these figures also, as I argue, tends to take on a 
‘feminine’ encoding: the character of the threat is reminiscent of threats posed to the rational 
masculine subject by putatively unstable or unruly female bodies. I examine this tendency 
through theory emerging from the relatively recent feminist turn to the body. 
19 I come to an explanation of this ‘conventional’ subject presently, when I raise Hayles’ 
work on the liberal humanist subject and how the posthuman may disrupt this. Hayles also 
focuses in great detail upon the “disembodiment” of information, as I also outline presently 
(1999: 5). The conflation of the digital with capital-as-code (and the implications this has for the 
subject) are examined in Chapter Three on the nanotechnological swarm. 
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‘technology’.20 I hold ‘technology’ here to be an always-contested term, with its highly 
unstable meaning nevertheless held in tension by the complex discursive formations 
under examination in each chapter. In each case, the term’s meaning can only be 
articulated in the context of that argument. Secondly, my thesis does not comprise a 
comprehensive analysis of any particular branch of ‘cybercultures’ as such (that is, the 
wave of cultural formations that emerged alongside, as part of, and in response to the 
changing relationships with technology in the late twentieth century). Cybercultures do 
loom in the histories and contexts of many of the figures I analyse, but, broadly speaking, 
the interface encounters under scrutiny in this thesis overflow containment in these 
categories.21 Thirdly, while my targets for examination range from books, to films, to 
video games, to web sites and online forum posts, I treat each item as a cultural text: I 
read them as components of cultural discourses that converge upon and aid the 
constitution of the shape of each figure under interrogation. This is not, then, an attempt 
to make impossibly discrete field-specific readings of very different media. While I am 
clearly informed by literary and cultural theory, rather than taking an approach informed 
by one specific theoretical framework, I assemble theoretical, critical, philosophical and 
other approaches in order to examine and unpick the seams of figures that serve as the 
collision points for discourses that enact and reflect a range of cultural functions. While 
the methodology is informed solidly by Haraway’s strategy, there is a slight difference in 
focus in my own approach. Haraway’s concern is very much with the 
political/social/economic/otherwise material histories of each figure, whereas my own 
aim is based around decoding the implicit cultural functions of each figure as a text: how 
the figure is constituted, what historical moments, social concerns/anxieties or discourses 
register in and converge upon those figures, and how these are expressed in the texts.  
                                                 
20 See Samuel Weber (1996) for an engagement with this question that goes through the 
work of Martin Heidegger and others. 
21 A useful resource on cybercultures can be found in David Bell’s An Introduction to 
Cybercultures (2001). 
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Section One analyses three figures that depict the human/technological interface as a 
space for reinscribing and reifying Cartesian dualistic views of human subjectivity, along 
with the exclusive and marginalising implications of the remapping of that dualism. The 
figures in Section One—the avatar, the hacker, and the nanotechnological swarm—have 
their roots in the 1980s, and have stratified over time, commonly deployed in describing 
the human/technological interface. These figures function in first evoking and then 
managing the threats to the unified masculine subject posed by the altering 
human/machine relationship, policing rather than collapsing the subjective boundaries 
between them. They maintain and reiterate their attendant logics of identity, 
recapitulating an image of technology as the object of human invention, and never a 
contributor to the substantiation of the human subject. Science fiction–especially 
cyberpunk—has at least partially set the terms for understanding present-day 
relationships between humans and technologies, and those terms are relentlessly 
humanistic and teleological, despite their putatively postmodern and fragmentary 
aesthetic. Here is also where I make my strongest appeal to the outstanding theoretical 
work represented by the feminist turn to the body: the threat of the technological other is 
almost invariably feminine-coded, and my work in this section is explicated particularly in 
the light of Haraway’s work and feminist theories of embodiment, with a particular focus 
upon the work of Elizabeth Grosz (1994) and Margrit Shildrick (1997, 2002).  Section 
Two analyses three emerging figures that depict the human/technological interface as 
fundamentally co-substantiating, rather than the latter being the product of the former. 
Acting as nodes of connection and constitution for various phenomena both depicted in 
fiction and enacted/performed at the human/technological interface itself, these three 
figures—the fursona, the caring computer, and the decaying digital—demonstrate 
potential ways to understand the human/technological interface outside of conventional, 
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dualistic discourses of transcendental disembodiment of a bounded subject-self. 
Deploying theoretical work on concepts such as Alison Landsberg’s notion of prosthetic 
memory (2004) and Brian Massumi’s reading of the “real-material-but-incorporeal” body 
(2002), as well as Haraway’s later work on companion species (2008), I position these 
figures as representative visions of technologically-mediated subjectivity that allow us to 
imagine our relationships with technology as co-operative, open and materially co-
substantiating. I argue that they recover the potential to rupture the unified and dualistic 
mind-subject that is both represented and contained by the figures seen in Section One, 
while reflecting a more recognisably prosaic, ongoing transformation of subjective 
participants in human/technological encounters. 
 
Between the two sections is an ‘intersection’, which acts as a vestibule for moving from 
one section to the other, and manages the relationship between the two respective 
groups of figures. In opening up these two clusters of human/technological figures, I 
map two attendant visions of cyberspace. The first is the most common: the smooth, 
Euclidean grid into which the discrete unified consciousness is projected away from the 
body, which is conflated with (a reductive understanding of) virtuality, and to which 
access is allowed or denied based on highly conventional lines of gender, race, sexuality 
and so on. The second vision is emerging: it is possible to view cyberspace as less of a 
‘space’ at all, and more of a technologically-mediated field of material implication—one 
which is not discrete from the putatively offline world, which is implicit in the subject 
formation of its users and participants, and accounts for, rather than disavowing, the 
physical, bodily substrate from which it is explicated. Moving beyond the vision of 
cyberspace as a kind of a plane into which a disembodied consciousness can be 
projected, it is possible—perhaps necessary—to understand it as a context, an enabling 
field of material connections that form part of the subjects in interaction rather than an 
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empty space in which they can interact. Cyberspace, here, then, is more a framing 
metanarrative than a figure to be uncovered in itself: it is almost never the focus, but 
always implicated, lurking at the periphery and inflecting and infecting the argument, in a 
manner similar to how music producers use high-shelfing frequency equalisers to 
produce tones beyond the range of human hearing to psychoacoustically influence the 
mix of a song. Some figures have obvious cyberspatial implications (such as the avatar), 
whereas others may seem less implicated (the nanotechnological awarm). In Section Two 
of the thesis, the figures being mapped explode the possibility of cyberspace as a “space” 
at all. But in all cases, cyberspace is there, either as the repository/vessel/staging ground 
for the continuous discursive reconstruction of the discrete subject, or as a material 
milieu of potential from which subjective experience can be explicated. 
 
The Avatar, The Hacker and the Nanotechnological Swarm 
The figures under examination in Section One—and especially the avatar and the 
hacker—have their origins as interface-policing figures rooted within the science fiction 
(sub)genre of cyberpunk. Those chapters spend some time re-opening some of the key 
cyberpunk texts to discover the origins of those figures. My argument would not benefit 
from offering an exhaustive account of cyberpunk literature as a genre, nor a 
comprehensive rendering of its overall remit, reach or influence—cyberpunk literature 
has been written upon and theorised extensively.22 I do, though, make a broad 
delineation of two “waves” of cyberpunk literature, straddling the early 1980s to the 
present, to help chart the (non-)alteration of each figure over time. The first wave I 
cluster together is that beginning and maturing in the decade where the term was coined. 
While Gibson’s Sprawl Trilogy is perhaps the most important cluster of texts for the 
popularisation of the movement, along with the Mirrorshades short story collection edited 
                                                 
22 See p49 n30 for a short overview of some of the key work of this nature. 
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by Bruce Sterling (1988), the term cyberpunk was coined by Bruce Bethke in the title of a 
short story published in a November 1983 issue of the magazine AMAZING Science 
Fiction Stories.23 This first wave of cyberpunk generated a slew of writers fascinated by the 
putatively cyborgic interfaces that may be offered in the future (John Shirley, Rudy 
Rucker, Pat Cadigan, James Tiptree Jr. and others), continued up until around the end of 
the decade. After the turn of the 1990s, though, a number of distinct shifts or 
reconfigurations of cyberpunk took place: the genre moved more explicitly into film (as 
evidenced by films like Lawnmower Man, Johnny Mnemonic [dir. Robert Longo, 1995] 
Hackers [dir. Iain Softley, 1995], Virtuosity [dir. Brett Leonard, 1995] Strange Days [dir. 
Kathryn Bigelow, 1995], and The Matrix [1999]), and started to converge and co-evolve 
with growing awareness and use of the Internet. Stephenson’s Snow Crash, for instance, 
popularised many terms and concepts that would go on to inspire several real-world 
Internet media technologies. In the chapters dealing with cyberpunk texts explicitly, I 
chart some of the (very) broad differences between these two waves—which do, of 
course, overlap in many ways too—in order to establish that formal changes were taking 
place over time, but also that, as I show, the conceptual shape and function of the figures 
deployed and consolidated across that period do not change.  
 
While the three novels of Gibson’s Sprawl Trilogy (named after “The Sprawl”, the 
massive decaying urban space against the backdrop of which much of the novels’ action 
takes place) are key correspondents in the constitution of the figures I explore here—as 
are some of the second wave cyberpunk texts I outline above, interface representations 
are not limited only to cyberpunk. For instance, in Chapter Three, I examine Wil 
McCarthy’s Bloom (1998) and Michael Crichton’s Prey (2002) for their depictions of the 
                                                 
23  The term’s compounding of “cyber” and “punk” demonstrated both the genre’s 
arguably postmodern tendency to mash together previously disparate categories (indeed, 
including other genres) into new wholes, and the fascination with advanced human/machine 
interface technologies, along with a generalised distrust for authority and the norm. 
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“grey goo” scenario: the idea that microscopic, artificial machines could run amok and 
dissolve everything in their path, turning it, literally, into grey goo. These latter texts 
reveal a putative relationship between human subjects and technologies which animates 
fears of an ‘overspill’ from the latter into the former, and the character of this overspill is 
the subject of examination in that chapter. Almost all the primary texts in Section One, 
then, are fairly conventional novels and films. My approach to them, though, is informed 
by a number of theoretical frameworks. Because one of the primary objects under 
consideration here is the body of the human subject, I am concerned with the ways in 
which that body is represented, recrafted and reconsidered in light of interface 
encounters. To this end, informing my examination of the figures under scrutiny in 
Section One is work produced by feminist scholars whose primary concern is with 
theorising the body. The liberal humanist subject that Hayles critiques in her account of 
the posthuman, and which Haraway tears to pieces and reassembles as a gloriously 
monstrous hybrid, has come under heavy and sustained attack by these theorists, for a 
number of reasons. 
 
Elizabeth Grosz’s Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism (1994) is instrumental in 
informing the embodiment-aware approach that I take towards unravelling the figures in 
Section One, as well as in informing my understanding of the normative subject that 
these figures work so hard to recoup in the face of dissolution by the interface. Grosz 
describes her project as being intended  
to displace the centrality of the mind, the psyche, the interior, or consciousness 
(and even the unconscious) in conceptions of the subject through a 
reconfiguration of the body. If subjectivity is no longer conceived in binarized or 
dualist terms [...] then perhaps other ways of understanding corporeality, 
sexuality, and the differences between the sexes may be developed and explored 
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which enable us to conceive of subjectivity in different terms than those provided 
by traditional philosophical and feminist understandings. (vii) 
This attempt to overturn “the centrality of the mind” and theorise the body (a call that 
has resonance with both Hayles’ and Haraway’s desire to re-ground posthuman/cyborgic 
subjectivity in its material contexts) is rooted in a number of limitations with focusing 
too heavily on the mind. For Grosz, feminists have often been guilty of demoting the 
body to being merely a supplement to the mind or the psyche, not informing subjectivity so 
much as being its life support system, an irksome but necessary burden (ibid.). Moreover, 
she writes, these approaches treat the body as a given, stable object instead of something 
literally inscribed or constructed by the (largely patriarchal) medical and biological 
discourses of its definition, which obscure their discursive processes under the auspices 
of their “discovery” of the body as a precultural object (x). Contrary to this, she writes, 
bodies are active; they “are not inert; they function interactively and productively. They 
act and react [...] it is this ability of bodies to always extend the frameworks which 
attempt to contain them, to seep beyond their domains of control” which constitutes 
their value as the bases of a theoretical framework for re-understanding subjectivity (xi). 
 
Grosz also produces an account of the “dichotomous thinking” of mind and body, 
which “bifurcates thought” and ranks aspects of the dyad hierarchically. In this structure, 
the mind is privileged as the seat of subjective selfhood, and the body denigrated as a 
necessary supplement to that mind (and not much else) (3). As she points out, the 
problematic truth is that dichotomous thinking remaps onto other binaries:  
The mind/body relation is frequently correlated with the distinctions between 
reason and passion, sense and sensibility, outside and inside, self and other, depth 
and surface, reality and appearance, mechanism and vitalism, transcendence and 
immanence, temporality and spatiality, psychology and physiology, form and 
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matter, and so on. These lateral associations provide whatever “positive” 
characteristics the body may be accorded in systems where it is the subordinated 
counterpart of the mind. These terms function implicitly to define the body in 
nonhistorical, naturalistic, organicist, passive, inert terms, seeing it as an intrusion 
on or interference with the operation of the mind, a brute givenness which 
requires overcoming, a connection with animality and nature that needs 
transcendence. (3-4) 
This makes evident the need to overcome this kind of dualistic thinking, the reliance on 
the mind as a marker of selfhood, and the specific need for this to happen in order to aid 
feminist projects; the “coupling of mind with maleness and the body with femaleness” 
means that these discourses reproduce a patriarchal connection of women to the body 
(4). The overall advantage of thinking through the body, for Grosz, is an increased 
potency in corporeal specificity that confounds the overt inscriptions of discourses of 
otherness and inferiority, reclaiming that body from those dualistic attacks: 
The subject, recognized as a corporeal being, can no longer readily succumb to 
the neutralization and neutering of its specificity which has occurred to women as 
a consequence of women’s submersion under male definition [...] it helps to 
problematize the universalist and universalizing assumptions of humanism, 
through which women’s—and all other groups’—specificities, positions, and 
histories are rendered irrelevant or redundant; it resists the tendency to attribute a 
human nature to the subject’s interior; and it resists tendencies to dualism, which 
splits subjectivity into two mutually exclusive domains (ix-x). 
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This need to account for the embodied “specificities” of individuals and groups which 
are traditionally elided pushes Grosz’s project beyond the limits of a dualistic, Descartes-
informed approach.24  
 
In a framework that builds upon Grosz’s work (and others’), the body is rethought again 
in Shildrick’s Leaky Bodies and Boundaries: Feminism, Postmodernism and (Bio)ethics (1997). In 
her project to construct a “postmodern feminist ethic”, she uncovers, like Grosz, what 
she believes to be an inherent inability for women to achieve agency in Western 
discourses because of the way that those discourses privilege the subject most “distant” 
from the body: the male subject (3). This is because women, she writes, are denied full 
objective agency due to the way that certain ontological investments place them closer to 
‘nature’; specifically because of certain bodily processes, such as menstruation and the 
much larger female role in reproduction—both being seen as somehow polluting to the 
rationality of the humanist self: 
In being somehow more fully embodied than men, women have been 
characterised simply as less able to rise above uncontrollable natural processes 
and passions and therefore disqualified from mature personhood. It is as though 
bodies could somehow interfere with moral thought, instructing the mind, rather 
than the other way round as is the case with men. Losing control of oneself is to 
a large degree synonymous with losing control of, or having no control over, 
one’s body. (26-7) 
This fear of “losing control” of the body, then, located most strongly for Shildrick in 
medical discourses that place the female body as simply an “underdeveloped” version of 
                                                 
24 Grosz accounts specifically for Cartesian dualism, which she argues forces corporeality 
to be “reduced to a predictable, knowable transparency; its constitutive role [...] ignored” (10). 
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that of the male with blurred, permeable boundaries (28).25 This dangerous indistinction 
between the mind and the body, exclusively female in phallocentric discourses, unsettles 
the very bases of objectivity and so the operational stage for any kind of supposedly 
rational intervention or interrogation: 
In Cartesian terms, the body is something to be rejected as an obstacle to pure 
rational being… What I have in mind is both the especial immanence of the 
female body, as it is frequently represented in ontological theory, such that it 
enmeshes women themselves; and its putative leakiness, the outflow of the body 
which breaches the boundaries of the proper. Those differences – mind/body, 
self/other, inner/outer – which should remain clear and distinct are threatened 
by loss of definition, or by dissolution… In the male cultural imaginary the 
metaphor characteristically provokes unease, even horror. This is no less true in 
health care than elsewhere (16-17). 
“Leakiness” is again the key here. Phallocentric narratives are extremely wary of assigning 
agency to anything that cannot be mapped onto the mind/body dualism with neatness 
and clean divisions; an attempt to distance the subject from the “polluting” power. While 
Shildrick’s Foucauldian study pays a great deal of attention to the idea of there being no 
accessible material body outside of the discourse that creates it, her reading of the 
masculinist basing of female non-agency on a perceived leakiness of the female body that 
could only supposedly have emerged from the presence of material processes is one that 
describes neither an exclusively pre-social (or essentialist) position nor a discursive one, 
but one rooted firmly in a body that affects its environment even as it changes. 
 
                                                 
25 Indeed, Shildrick writes that the (female) body itself, as the subject of medical enquiry, 
“is a fabrication, organised not according to an historically progressive discovery of the real, but 
as an always insecure and inconsistent artefact”(1). 
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The work of Grosz and Shildrick lurks throughout the readings of Section One. While I 
deploy the work of these theorists explicitly in only a few places, their focus upon the 
ways in which the body (and particularly the female body) has been constructed as an 
inadequate seat for the liberal humanist subject informs the character of all the criticism 
and theorisation that I do in Section One. This whole section, in other words, operates in 
a way that explores each respective interface figure’s tendency to a) dramatise an 
existential threat to the conventionally bounded mind of the putatively “offline” human 
user; b) code that threat as “feminine” by rooting the nature of the threat in discourses of 
feminine permeability (or leakiness); and then c) re-establish the patriarchal normative 
body subject by performing a denigration or rejection of those threatening feminine 
body-traits and an attendant privileging of the Cartesian mind-self. This whole operation 
constitutes a policing of the boundary between the human subject and the technological 
other. For instance, in Chapter One, I show how the figure of the avatar—a kind of 
digital body residing in cyberspace, controlled by a hacker or other offline user—both 
animates the potential disruption of gender-delineated versions of subjectivity by 
enacting the technologically-enabled transformation of women into active figures, and 
then enacts a careful strategy of rejecting or containing the potency of those feminine 
bodies by exacting upon them very conventional normative discourses of feminine 
subjective inadequacy. This, in turn, actually equivocates the bodies of female characters 
with the technologies under the mastery of the active masculine subjects ‘in control.’  
 
 
The Fursona, the Caring Computer and the Decaying Digital 
The figures I examine in Section Two are found across a more wide-reaching range of 
texts, of a variety of different kinds. Fiction suffices well for uncovering the figures I 
examine in Section One—and fiction certainly has a role in Section Two as well—but, in 
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its search for an alternative understanding of interface embodiment, the latter section 
also necessitates tying together unlikely unions of texts. Web sites serve as the primary 
texts for the majority of Chapter Four, which is about the emerging figure of the fursona. 
Rather than approaching them from an anthropological, ethnographic or sociological 
perspective, I read these texts—which vary from LiveJournal blog posts, to posts on 
forums, to websites dedicated to the lives of the users in question—as texts. All are 
published and freely available (though some have since disappeared), and none require 
registration or suchlike to access. I read them through theoretical frameworks which I 
will outline presently. In a more conventional manner (more reminiscent of Section 
One), I also focus heavily upon one film in Chapter Five, which is about the figure of the 
caring computer, reading it through feminist (and other) theories of care, with a view 
towards unravelling the stereotypical view of the ‘cold’ artificial intelligence, which is 
instrumental in keeping machines out of the affective domain. And in Chapter Six, where 
I examine the decaying digital, I pull together the most diverse set of primary texts in this 
thesis: drawing together examinations of digital images, lectures on the problems of long-
term digital storage, and articles on the failure of DNA evidence to link ‘identity’ to the 
body with work on the constitutive effect on the body of analogue and digital sound, I 
trace an emerging vision of ‘the digital’ that does not see it as a transcendental, 
permanent essence. Pulling together such a diverse set of texts requires a solid theoretical 
framework in each case. The theoretical frameworks I deploy in Section Two are all, too, 
united in several aspects: they all confound the notion of an appeal to an authentic, 
unitary human “self” that can be located and transmitted from one field or body to 
another. They all privilege—or at least account for—the contingency and materiality of 
the phenomenon they describe and analyse, either by their explicit appeal to the body (no 
matter how unusual the [a]corporeal form of that body) or by their intention to 
rediscover the full range of the conditions of individuated subjective constitution. And, 
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finally, they all maintain a strong sense of (postmodern) partiality and mobility: none of 
these frameworks provides a prescriptive reading, and all allow for—or indeed 
demand—collisions and collusions between things that might otherwise seem absurd. 
Looking for the emotional character of machines, the physical impact of the Internet on 
the body, the collapse in the bounded preconceptions of touching and seeing—all of 
these things are uncovered as theoretically viable and tremendously powerful tools for 
redetermining our relationships with technological agencies. 
 
Alison Landsberg’s Prosthetic Memory: The Transformation of American Remembrance in the Age 
of Mass Culture (2004) posits a radical rethinking of existing theories of memory, outlining 
a model that provides a way to understand projects of remembering that is not bound by 
generational, familial or essentialised memory, or even the proximity of a subject to the 
event or circumstance being remembered. Focusing both upon fictional examples and on 
the specific real-world technologies of the cinema and “experiential” 
museums/installations, Landsberg suggests that the nature of memory transmission 
(primarily in the United States) necessarily shifted in the face of disruption from mass 
migration, the African American slave experience and the holocaust, and that the 
emergence of mass culture presented the technological means by which this shift could 
take place (2). Arguing that existing readings of memory transmission that focus on the 
familial mode are both essentialist and untenable in the face of the challenges of 
modernity and postmodernity, Landsberg propounds “prosthetic memory” – a form of 
publically assimilable memory that she argues as having emerged in response: 
[Modernity] makes possible and necessary a new form of public cultural memory. 
This new form of memory, which I call prosthetic memory, emerges at the interface 
between a person and a historical narrative about the past, at an experiential site 
such as a movie theatre or museum. [...] in the process that I am describing, the 
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person does not simply apprehend a historical narrative but takes on a more 
personal, deeply felt memory of a past event through which he or she did not 
live. The resulting prosthetic memory has the ability to shape that person’s subjectivity and 
politics. (2, emphasis added) 
This new mode of engaging with memory, mediated by mass culture and other 
“experiential sites”, is not just a means of assimilating representations of other people’s 
memories: it constitutes a means by which events from which a person/subject was or is 
radically absent can still have a material, experiential effect (affect) on that person. 
Traditional memory claims, “premised on forms of authenticity” make appeals to 
ownership and heritage in ways that prosthetic memories do not, and these latter 
memories allow, she argues, “unexpected alliances across chasms of difference” (3). In 
Chapter Four, when determining the emerging figure of the fursona, I read the activities 
and writings of several web and Internet users in a manner inspired by Landsberg’s 
framework. I show how these generate prosthetic memories by way of these media 
technologies. I go one step further here, though: while Landsberg’s work accounts for a 
dislocation of the recipient/user/consumer of the prosthetic memory from the original 
‘authentic’ experience that is its referent, my chapter shows the ways in which ‘memory’ 
can be generated from no original referent, and these memories used to a significant 
degree in building subjective identity. 
 
Another theoretical framework crucial to Section Two is Haraway’s When Species Meet 
(2008). Her most recent monograph, it builds upon the hybridising theories of her work 
on figures such as Cyborgs, OncoMouse™ and so forth, and expands it to encompass 
“companion species”. Warning against the conflation of “companion species” with 
“companion animals”, Haraway offers the beginnings of a definition of the former: 
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Historically situated animals in companionate relations with equally situated 
humans are, of course, major players in When Species Meet. But the category of 
“companion species” is less shapely and more rambunctious than that [...] the 
partners do not precede their relating; all that is, is the fruit of becoming with: 
those are the mantras of companion species. (16-7) 
For Haraway, “companion species” are “a pointer to an ongoing ‘becoming with’ [... they 
evoke] a much richer web to inhabit than any of the posthumanisms on display after (or 
in reference to) the ever-deferred demise of man” (16-7).  
 
Staying with her tactic of reading figures—in this case, primarily dogs—Haraway uses 
them to unravel what she calls the “fantasy of humanist exceptionalism” (11), which 
underwrites Western understandings of humankind’s place in the world. This sense of 
exceptionalism is evidenced in the discourses within which relationships between human 
beings and “the world” are drawn in terms of separation. “[To] be human”, Haraway 
writes, “is to be on the opposite side of the Great Divide from all the others and so to be 
afraid of—and in bloody love with—what goes bump in the night” (ibid.). She goes on to 
reference Freud’s description of “three great historical wounds to the primary narcissism 
of the self-centered human subject”: the “Copernican wound that removed Earth itself 
[...] from the centre of the cosmos”; “the Darwinian wound, which put Homo Sapiens 
firmly in the world of other critters”, and the “Freudian” wound, “which posited an 
unconscious that undid the primacy of conscious processes” (11-12). Haraway then adds 
a fourth wound, one that she herself is implicated rather strongly in inflicting: the 
“informatic or cyborgian, which infolds organic and technological flesh and so melds that 
Great Divide as well” (12). Building upon these attacks on the exceptional human, 
Haraway produces a situated account of humankind’s place in the world that celebrates 
the prosaic and the local, lionising individuals while rejecting the impulse for any 
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individuality to be transcendental, omniscient or disconnected from its environment, 
viewing objectively from the “outside in”. Crucial to Haraway’s project here is the need, 
upon encountering (“touching”) a figure, to account for its momentary, contingent, 
material lines of substantiation. This need to account is the basis for my response to the 
question of whether a computer can “care”, in Chapter Five on the figure of the caring 
computer. 
 
The last major framework I deploy in Section Two is that of Brian Massumi’s reading of 
the “real-material-but-incorporeal” body (2002: 5). In his book Parables for the Virtual: 
Movement, Affect, Sensation, Massumi develops a project aiming to redetermine 
understandings of the body’s relationships with media technologies in terms of a radical 
materialism inspired by philosophers such as Baruch Spinoza, Henri Bergson and Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari. Beginning with a critique of what he terms “ideological 
accounts of subject formation” (2), Massumi laments the focus upon trying to reorder 
the “oppositional framework of culturally constructed significations: male versus female, 
black versus white, gay versus straight, and so on” (ibid.). The body, for Massumi, is 
poorly served by theories that serve to promote plurality or partiality within this grid 
because it only reiterates the “combinatorial permutations” on the same “overarching 
definitional framework” (3). “The aim of the positionality model was to open a window 
on local resistance in the name of change. But the problem of change returned with a 
vengeance. Because every body-subject was so determinately local, it was boxed into its 
site on the culture map. Gridlock” (ibid.). This “gridlock” emerges, for Massumi, from 
the tendency of cultural theory to break down and analyse embodied subjectivity in a 
manner that reveals more categories of possible subjectivity, but, in doing so, “catches 
the body in a cultural freeze-frame” (ibid.). Overcoming such gridlock is a case of 
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discovering a framework that can account for the body’s sense of “movement and 
qualitative transformation” (3).  
 
In a bid to outline such a framework, Massumi propounds as part of his study the notion 
of the “real material but incorporeal” body (5). This is an understanding of the body as 
delineated not by positionality on a grid of predetermined subjects (a grid around which 
one can move, or whose positions can be deconstructed, analysed or broken into smaller 
pieces), but as a continuously unfolding ecological relationship with “the virtual” (30). 
The virtual, for Massumi, constitutes the realm of material experience within and through 
which bodies continuously move, being affected by physical stimuli on levels that are far 
too small, slight or too brief to register consciously. This virtual realm constitutes, for 
Massumi, “a realm of potential” (ibid., emphasis in original): 
In potential is where futurity combines, unmediated, with pastness [...] The virtual 
is a lived paradox where what are normally opposites coexist, coalesce, and 
connect; where what cannot be experienced cannot but be felt-albeit reduced and 
contained. For out of the pressing crowd and individual action or expression will 
emerge and be registered consciously. [...the virtual] is organised differently but is 
inseparable from the concrete activity and expressivity of the body. The body is 
as immediately abstract as it is concrete; its activity and expressivity extend, as on 
their underside, into an incorporeal, yet perfectly real, dimension of pressing 
potential. (30-1) 
The body, for Massumi, is the transducer of this kind of virtual potential into affect: 
moving through the world of irreducibly small encounters with material physicality, the 
body is forced to sort through these encounters—acognitively and aconsciously—
discarding some and allowing some others to register, as affect, according to cultural 
conditioning. He uses the example of the “missing half-second”; the results of an 
Robin Stoate (Student No. 069063233) 
Reading Cyberspace: Fictions, Figures and (dis)Embodiment 
44 
 
experiment by the physiologist Benjamin Libet, which seemed to show that brain activity 
in decision-making centres fires half a second after a decision is made. Far from 
destroying the notion of free will, Massumi suggests that it reorders it as something more 
immanent to the body’s processes of ecological interaction with the world: he suggests 
that “the half second is missed [...] because it is overfull [...] Will and consciousness are 
subtractive. They are limitative, derived functions that reduce a complexity too rich to be 
functionally expressed” (29; emphasis added). In other words, ‘the body’, for Massumi, is 
a highly situated, materially-linked and always-transforming entity. There is no singular 
essential ‘mind’ in control of all of its cognitive functions, and yet the possibility of 
thought and (ethical) action remains. This vision of the body is what inspires my 
approach in Chapter Six, which interrogates the manner in which digital information may 
be seen to possess or influence bodies as an outcome of its tendency to, as I put it, 
“decay”. The combination of the above frameworks helps me map the functions of each 
of the six figures of my thesis.  
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CHAPTER ONE: 
THE AVATAR 
 
The avatar is a figure which resides at the intersection between the human and the digital 
computer, and belongs to a class of entities or metaphors intended to help us understand 
our supposedly intimate relationships with the imagined spaces at (and beyond) that 
interface. Derived from a Hindu term referring to the incarnation of a deity into a mortal, 
earthly body, “avatar” is a word used most commonly in the West to describe a digital or 
otherwise abstracted technologically-mediated representation of a physical or offline 
subject, controlled, puppet-like, by that subject. Avatars in fiction can often take almost 
any form, from simple static pictures, three-dimensional humanoid figures, to 
anthropomorphic animals, to abstractions such as levitating balls of light. Their existence 
as fictional devices has its origins in cyberpunk: they are prefigured in Gibson’s Sprawl 
Trilogy (1984-88), and occur explicitly in The Lawnmower Man (1992), Snow Crash (1992), 
The Matrix Trilogy (1999-2003), Altered Carbon (2002), and Avatar (2009) amongst many 
others.26  Furthermore, there are ‘real-world’ counterparts of these fictional avatars, seen 
most clearly in the context of the present-day Internet: here, an avatar is a ‘virtual’ 
item/object used to represent the online persona of a specific user. This type of avatar 
may take the form of an image or a username on a discussion forum; a video game 
sprite/model (either in a ‘sandbox’ environment such as Second Life [2003- ] or Entropia 
[2003- ], or in a single player game environment); animated or static icons in instant 
messaging clients (AOL Instant Messenger [1997- ], Gaia Online [2003- ], IMVU [2004-]) et 
                                                 
26 Indeed, this definition of the term was popularised by Stephenson in Snow Crash. While 
some texts here predate the use of the term itself, they figure in what I am here referring to as the 
fictional “prehistory” of the avatar. 
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cetera.27 This latter, mundane understanding of avatars is now rather a common currency 
in Internet experience—but avatars are found still in their most radical forms in science 
fiction. I choose these science fiction examples to examine in this chapter because they 
are the texts that most clearly represent, respectively, a kind of ‘prehistory’ of the 
electronic avatar (Sprawl Trilogy), its figurative stabilisation in the 1990s and second 
‘wave’ of cyberpunk (Snow Crash and Lawnmower Man), and its more recent and/or widely-
known occurrences (Altered Carbon, The Matrix and Avatar [dir. James Cameron, 2009]).28  
 
These phases are, though, deceptive: within the nearly thirty years between the first and 
last texts in this list, the conceptual shape and apparent ontological role of the avatar in 
fiction has varied only to superficial degrees, maintaining a largely similar set of 
underlying premises. Much imaginative weight is assigned to avatars and their potential to 
reconfigure embodied subjectivity. The freedom implied by such relationships resonates 
with Haraway’s position: in interaction with these new machines, we purportedly gain the 
opportunity to build or rebuild our identities, to dislodge ourselves from the “informatics 
of domination”, and harness the potential of any alternate subjective configurations to 
overturn the fundamental problems with the liberal humanist subject. The avatar, we can 
reasonably assume, offers unprecedented freedom to sidestep or overcome the 
constraints of normative identity. However, in direct opposition to Haraway’s model, I 
argue that the conventional and most popular understanding of the avatar has an 
insidiously totalising and normative character. While arising in a setting that promises 
                                                 
27 The utilitarian function of player-character avatars in video games in particular requires 
a technically-specific examination which would overflow the remit of this chapter. Works in the 
emerging field of video game studies offer a number of perspectives on these issues: Mark J.P. 
Wolf and Bernard Perron’s The Video Game Theory Reader gives a good survey of this field (2003). 
28 In some ways one could chart the avatar’s growing proliferation as a fictional device 
over time, and this culminating in a film about avatars being, to date, the most financially 
successful film ever made (taking, as of September 24 2010, $2,768,493,594 at box offices 
worldwide [Box Office Mojo 2010]). Altered Carbon won the Philip K. Dick award in 2003; the 
film rights to the novel were sold for a reported $1,000,000 to producer Joel Silver (Bullock 
2009). 
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freedom, unprejudiced difference and, to a certain degree, subversion of physical and 
social norms, the avatar serves to reiterate and reinforce dualistic understandings of the 
human subject, whose own marginalising functions are inherent to the binary logic of its 
formulation. The avatar provides stabilisation of a bounded and exceptional human(ist) 
subject in the face of a dangerously undifferentiated world, arising as a means of 
containing the possibilities of disruption that is represented by the human-technological 
interface, policing the boundary between the two respective categories. It recuperates a 
version of the body that can reconstruct normative body-subjects, with the additional 
potency of their being seen to exist in a putatively neutral (i.e. technoscientific) space. In 
functioning as a clear metaphorical interface between the real and the virtual, with the 
mind discretely transferrable from one vessel to another, it also reinscribes dualistic 
visions of the subject, effecting a reinforcement of the platonic real accessible beneath 
the level of the symbolic.29  
 
This chapter interrogates the normative character of some of the most well-known 
depictions of avatars in fiction, considering the clearest examples from each phase of the 
avatar’s history. The figure of the avatar recapitulates, rather than disrupts, the 
mind/body dualism that maps onto other binary logics of domination. The supplements 
of the avatar are the many subjects who are unable to properly ascend beyond their 
organic bodies, and they become the collateral damage of the avatar’s substantiation and 
                                                 
29 See the Conclusion for a discussion of different ideas of ‘the virtual’ emerging from 
my study. My approach to understanding the avatar is, as outlined in the Introduction, to 
examine its representation in various fictional texts and the attendant registering of certain 
discourses. Empirical studies do also exist that seek to determine the relationships between “real-
world” avatars and users. These, in fact, suggest a more indistinct and bilateral relationship 
between the two than I argue is felt desirable in the texts examined here: a group of studies by 
Jesse Fox of the Stanford Virtual Human Interaction Lab suggests that users will imitate the 
behaviours of avatars that look like them, and that female avatars’ appearances can affect users’ 
perceptions of “real” women (Blackman 2010). This overspill of the ‘virtual’ into the ‘real’ 
confounds distinctions between offline and online in a way that cyberpunk and other 
conventional representations of the avatar work very hard to reject. These kinds of leaks and 
indistinctions are examined further in the Fursona chapter. 
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celebration as the de facto mode of moving through electronic spaces, either through 
being commodified and exchanged, or being written out altogether. 30 Instead of being 
emblematic of a co-constituting relationship between human and technological subjects, 
the ideal avatar is almost invariably narrativised as an empty vessel; it is a hollow shell 
which is filled and given life only when it is saturated by the bounded and discrete 
essence that is the male, white, Cartesian mind-self, and any signs representing an 
exploration of difference are affixed reversibly and by choice. The ‘ideal’ avatar’s ability 
to affect the physical world is limited, and the embodied experience of an avatar’s 
‘offline’ user is rarely at risk of being in any way changed or disrupted. Those subjects 
unable to maintain properly the division between the avatar and the corporeal, organic 
body are marginalised, further stratifying the stability of the masculine white subject and 
the oppositional (non-)valuing function of its other. We can see this in representative 
texts from each of the three phases of the avatar’s instantiation in fiction. 
 
Disembodied Consciousness 
Gibson’s work has been well accounted-for in criticism and theory alike, and my 
intention here is not to move over very well-trodden ground.31 It is, though, necessary to 
                                                 
30 Much theoretical work (especially feminist) exists on the (at least partial) failure of 
cyberpunk to fulfil the potential of Haraway’s cyborgic metaphor-model, as I discussed in the 
Introduction. My focus here is upon the specific role of cyberpunk in prefiguring the avatar, 
though issues of gender representation frame my reading. 
31 The body in cyberpunk has, not surprisingly, been the subject of a significant amount 
of critical and theoretical attention. Notwithstanding the proliferation of fictional cyborgic 
prostheses that, in broad terms at least, resonate with Haraway’s famous metaphor, critics have 
identified cyberpunk’s dramatisation of the organic body’s inadequacy to contain or manage the 
“exteriorised mind” (Csicery-Ronay 1992: 193), and its attempt to recuperate (even “exalt”) that 
body by recodifying it as the embodiment of data, which is the privileged essence of self in 
cyberpunk (Dougherty 2001: 6). Of the wide range of writings available on the topic of 
cyberpunk as a whole, there are three of particular note: Istvan Csicery-Ronay’s abovementioned 
analysis of cyberpunk’s “neuromantics” maps cyberpunk as a genre, positioning it as a specifically 
postmodern phenomenon as well as highlighting its failure to advance a meaningful politics of 
resistance against the corporate/political forces it purportedly rejects (182). Claire Sponsler 
develops both an overview of cyberpunk’s exceptional stylistic qualities and a critique of the 
genre’s apparent inability to reconcile properly its postmodern aesthetic with its rather more 
conventional realist tendencies (1992), and Dani Cavallaro’s work on Gibson’s influence on 
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return to these texts once more in order to discover the origins of the avatar as we know 
it today. The avatar does not appear quite fully-formed in the first cluster of cyberpunk 
fictions, but it is, arguably, prefigured there. Cyberpunk’s obsession with representations 
of a prosthesised and modified organic body—and, I will argue, attempts to escape it 
altogether—at  the very least set the terms of reference for online interaction, mooting 
the need for, if not yet depicting, an idealised cyberspace ‘version’ of the body which 
would, presently, become stabilised as the avatar. While the representation of avatars 
themselves is limited in the Sprawl Trilogy, being embryonic at most, the novels’ 
ceaseless disparagement of the corporeal body, along with their reductive equivocation of 
the same to a literal physical instantiation of data, sets up the body as something 
inadequate for the containment of the rational masculine subject, needing replacement 
with something more easily controllable.  
 
In order to determine this bodily inadequacy, my particular focus here is upon the ways 
that characters from the Sprawl Trilogy enter, inhabit and leave the technological 
interface, what this means for the novels’ vision of embodied subjectivity in relation to its 
technologies, and how these transactions are coded as dualistic, with mind and body 
separate, and the former privileged. The reification of a smooth and ‘clean’ transition 
                                                                                                                                            
cyberculture covers in depth the technological and generic contexts of cyberpunk, along with its 
ensuing cultural legacy (2000). As well as these three well-established studies of cyberpunk as a 
genre, more recent work has focused upon the specifics of cyberpunk’s politics of gender, 
sexuality and race. Extant work on racial representation within the genre as a whole is absolutely 
crucial too, and needs highlighting here. Greta Aiyu Niu, for instance, uncovers what she calls 
“Techno-orientalism” (2008: 73) in cyberpunk: she outlines that cyberpunk often erases the 
material history of technology, and elides in particular the roles of oriental cultures in 
technological innovation and production, in order to establish/defend the myth of singular 
Western ingenuity (75). Similarly, Timothy Yu produces an account of the cyberpunk city in 
Neuromancer as a collusion in what he describes as a tendency to “[displace] postmodernity onto 
the Orient, generating a narrative of postmodern origins grounded in modern orientalist 
anxieties” (2008: 48). These recent works show both cyberpunk’s tendency for political 
conservatism beneath its flashy exterior, and, more generally, the continuing need to return to the 
originary cyberpunk texts, owing to their having generated the terms of reference for many 
present-day real life and science fictional representations of the interface. 
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between the offline and online worlds in this first wave of cyberpunk – and moreover, 
the pejorative ways in which overly bodily interface experiences are treated – creates the 
conceptual space into which the avatar is eventually installed in second wave cyberpunk. 
In short, the Sprawl Trilogy sees Gibson imagining two distinct visions of cyberspace—
the “consensual hallucination”, inhabited by disembodied mind-selves, and “simstim”, 
the inhabitation of another body (or recordings of another body’s experience)—and 
displaying overwhelming preference for and reification of the representation of the 
former, with the latter denigrated as base, retrograde and dangerous.  
 
The cyberspace matrix or Net of Neuromancer, Count Zero and Mona Lisa Overdrive is 
inhabited by the disembodied mind-selves of hackers, as well as those of artificial 
intelligences and, in the latter novels in particular, preternatural spirits.32 This 
“disembodied consciousness” (Gibson 1984: 12) is the “pure” vision of cyberspace; the 
“transparent 3D chessboard extending to infinity” (52) crystallises the notion of a matrix 
of data whose dimensions are comprehensible in Euclidean terms, organised visually.33 
Accounts of cyberspace in Gibson’s novels tend to come from the singular perspective 
of the character inhabiting it at the time; the proprioceptive sensate experience of being 
(in) a body is elided save for descriptions of vision and motion (at great speeds). This 
“powerful controlling gaze” (Bukatman 1993: 48) sets the terms for the ‘pure’ cyberspace 
encounter: the cogito-self is an ethereal projection; sight is privileged as prime (indeed, 
only) means of perception, and for Case and other hackers in the Sprawl Trilogy, the 
“bodiless exultation” of cyberspace necessitates a denial of the flesh (Gibson 1984: 12). 
Gibson describes Case’s first return to cyberspace: 
                                                 
32 The quasi-spiritual nature of some encounters with information technologies is 
explored in depth in Erik Davis’s TechGnosis (1999). 
33 See the Introduction for a fuller examination of the Euclidean mode of representing 
cyberspace. 
Robin Stoate (Student No. 069063233) 
Reading Cyberspace: Fictions, Figures and (dis)Embodiment 
52 
 
This was it. This was what he was, who he was, his being. He forgot to eat. Molly 
left cartons of rice and foam trays of sushi on the corner of the long table. 
Sometimes he resented having to use the chemical toilet they’d set up in the 
corner of the loft [...] he’d go straight to the deck, not bothering to dress, and 
jack in. He was cutting it. He was working. He lost track of days. (76) 
This disembodiment— a “pure subject in a world of pure object” (Stockton 1995: 
589)—is accentuated by the animating of a radical disjunction between the offline and 
online worlds, and this disjunction between the real and the cyberspace virtual is 
compounded in turn by the interface’s relationship to the city.34 Cyberspace has a 
particularly analogous relationship to the experience of postmodern urban sprawls. But 
what is striking here is the particular perspective of the urban landscape offered by the 
abstraction of the online matrix. The vaunted collapse of the distinction between data 
and material (and indeed the fragmentation of notions of spatiality and time) inspired by 
the burgeoning information technology permeation of the 1980s is doubtless depicted 
here, but its reification is confounded by the frequent reiteration of the need for 
ascendance above the grimy concrete world inhabited by Gibson’s characters. The city is 
palatable and comprehensible only when its putative rational essence of data, hitherto 
obscured by the incursion of unwanted other bodies, can be abstracted and protected—a  
task for which cyberspace seems intentionally designed, with its “lines of light ranged in 
the nonspace of the mind, clusters and constellations of data... like city lights, receding” 
(1984: 67). So while cyberspace is analogous to the city, it is not analogous to the on-the-
ground experience of plural cultures and radically modified bodies, but rather the 
experience of a detached observer, a kind of disembodied, floating flâneur. Cyberspace 
                                                 
34 Sharon Stockton’s analysis of the “console cowboy” in cyberpunk traces the ways in 
which cyberspace itself is constructed as a feminine–indeed, “virgin”–territory for colonisation 
and penetration by these male cybernetic pioneers, and accounts for both the gendering of this 
discourse and its material, economic underpinnings, as well as its development from long-
standing discourses of empire (1995: 592). 
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offers a position of escape from and observation of those things; it strips away the dirt of 
bodies in order to minimise the clutter of mediation necessary to represent data itself. 
This disembodied vantage point is the basis for the avatar’s future dominant position as 
the interface between the offline user and cyberspace. 
 
Gibson’s future world provides and celebrates a disembodied model for interactions 
within cyberspace, prefiguring the role of the empty, interchangeable shell of the avatar. 
But this vision’s necessary supplement is a continually-reiterated rejection of alternative, 
non-transcendental visions of technologically-mediated subjectivity. This rejection, in 
fact, colludes with the actual disembodied projections of cyberspace in the establishment 
of the avatar as a normative figure: what we see alongside cyberspace disembodiment is a 
continuous rehearsal of the failure of organic, corporeal paradigms of embodiment to 
account for the pure mind activity of cyberspace, and the implied need to reconstruct 
that body without those putative (and, as I will outline, feminine-coded) limitations. 
There is, in fact, a drive not to allow the same technologies to be colonised by the desires 
of the flesh. While the infinite topological depth of cyberspace, as Case enjoys it, offers 
the possibility to manage and comprehend (indeed, to gaze upon) the digital data that 
both interpenetrates and (re)crafts bodies, the same basic technologies are rendered 
suspicious for their simultaneous (and seemingly more common) function: a means to 
overdetermine or hypermediate fleshy, embodied experience through its being recorded 
or broadcast for remote consumption.35 The gender coding in the expression of this 
notion is telling. In the segment of Neuromancer in which “console cowboy” Case and 
“street samurai” Molly Millions break into the headquarters of megacorporation 
Sense/Net to steal the stored consciousness of a dead hacker (the “Dixie Flatline”), we 
                                                 
35 Bukatman describes this mode of instantiation within cyberspace as “perception 
followed by kinesis” (19; emphasis in original). For a discussion of the notion of hypermediation, 
see Bolter and Grusin (2000). 
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witness Case  (via his cyberspace deck) being patched into “Molly’s sensorium”: he 
experiences, remotely, the bodily sensations that she does, in real time (70). His job is to 
monitor and direct her infiltration of the Sense/Net building, hacking its security systems 
via cyberspace while she does the physical work of retrieving the Dixie Flatline. Writ 
large here is the inscription of Cartesian dualism into gender binary: Case is the mind, 
and Molly is the body. Stacy Gillis outlines this dualistic relationship in her uncovering of 
cyberpunk’s debts to gothic and noir fiction, and in particular its persistent deployment 
and containment of the femme fatale: “[What] is crucial is that Millions’ body here is merely 
one more hacking tool for Case, no different from the consoles he uses to enter 
cyberspace [...] the femme fatale Millions becomes no more than a vessel for both Case’s 
desire and his prowess and her physical ass-kicking abilities are reduced to mere tools for 
the job” (2007: 15).36 Molly’s role as ‘vessel’ is emblematic of a fundamental ambivalence 
between a male heterosexual desire for the female body and the concern that such a 
desire is a distraction or an obstruction to masculine rational interrogation (a recurring 
feature and perceived danger, Gillis also notes, of the femme fatale [13]). Case is frustrated 
by Molly’s feminine body’s “gratuitous multiplication” of embodied stimulation, “the 
abrupt jolt into other flesh” (Gibson 1984: 71).  
 
Essential to note in this scene is the direct comparison—even opposition—made between 
the ascendant joy of cyberspace and the comparative baseness of simstim “riding”, a 
comparison dramatised by the device—both literary and, in the story space, literal—that 
allows Case to “flip-flop” at will between cyberspace and Molly’s simstim input. This 
                                                 
36 Gillis produces here an account of the “hyper-sexualised cyborgic female bodies” of 
cyberpunk, reading these figures in the context of their generic influences from noir and the 
gothic and uncovering an opposition between these women and the “repressed bodies of the 
mirror-shaded male hackers” (2007: 7). For Gillis, the putative “ass-kicking techno babes” of 
cyberpunk pay lip service to empowerment, but are always ultimately “contained by the language 
of sexuality” (12): for women in these narratives, cyborgic enhancement often serves as a means 
of strengthening, not rejecting, their putative role as sexualised embodied others to the masculine 
mind-self. 
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device allows for striking juxtapositions of scenes of cyberspace’s disembodied purity 
with those of remotely-experienced hyper-embodiment: 
Her hands in the pockets of the pink coat, were flexing systematically through a 
series of tension-release exercises. It took him a few seconds to realize that the 
peculiar sensation at the tips of her fingers was caused by the blades as they were 
partially extruded, then retracted. 
He flipped back. He watched as his icebreaker strobed and shifted in front of 
him, only faintly aware of his hands playing across the deck, making minor 
adjustments (78).  
Here, the comparison of respective sensation felt in each character’s hands (by Case) 
makes clear the distinction between the modes of embodiment possible in the cybernetic 
interface, and the respective gender coding of each. In simstim, experiencing Molly’s 
body, Case is acutely aware of every sensation. Switching to the mind-realm of pure 
cyberspace, he is barely even aware of his own body’s existence – as is proper for a 
rational mind in control of its (or rather his) target of active interrogation. 
  
Simstim technology itself is maligned throughout the trilogy for its intensification of the 
undesirable urges of the flesh. Those who enjoy such “meat toy” (71) escapes are 
regularly depicted as inferior, in a manner that highlights their bodies, often subdued and 
slowed by soporific drugs like alcohol (versus the constant speeding on amphetamines 
and coffee by cowboys like Case). The mother of Count Zero’s Bobby Newmark, for 
instance, is portrayed as grotesque, hypnotised by simstim soap operas: 
He knew her, yeah, how she’d come through the door with a wrapped bottle 
under her arm, not even take her coat off, just go straight over and jack into the 
Hitachi, soap her brains out good for six solid hours. Her eyes would unfocus, 
and sometimes, if it was a really good episode, she’d drool a little. About every 
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twenty minutes she’d manage to take a lady-like nip out of the bottle (1986a: 
54).37 
 The gendering of these depictions is, again, vital: simstim is regularly seen as either a way 
for men to access women’s bodies (the biggest name in simstim superstardom is a girl 
called Tally Isham) or for women to enjoy an inferior version of cyberspace on their 
own, more embodied terms (Bobby’s mother). It is not just simstim that keeps women 
separate from the masculine transcendence of cyberspace, though: the only notable 
female hacker figure in the Sprawl Trilogy—Angie  from Mona Lisa Overdrive—is able to 
access cyberspace, but without using a cyberspace deck or any other kind of 
technological intervention. While this implies a privileged understanding of cyberspace, 
and immediate access to ‘pure’ data, and might then seem even to disrupt the masculine 
dominance of cyberspace narratives, Angie’s ability to access cyberspace is thus wrested 
from any sense of rationality or intention. It is beyond her complete control, and 
positioned as a sub- or a-consciously arisen embodied experience. Her talent is 
transcribed to one more befitting her gender in normative discourses.38 
 
The cyberspace encounter of Gibson’s fiction prefigures the transcendental conceptual 
shape of the avatar: it both enacts the need for some kind of cipher for a standpoint 
position in cyberspace, and rejects any version of this cipher that might be in any way 
                                                 
37 This scene also sees Bobby expressing disgust that his mother was immersed in 
simstim soaps even while he was in utero, and that he had somehow been poisoned by the 
experience: Bobby “didn’t like to think about being curled up in Marsha Newmark’s belly. It 
made him feel sweaty and kind of sick” (55). This anxiety over the putatively leaky, infecting 
nature of pregnancy is discussed further in the chapter on the Nanotechnological Swarm.. 
38 This is not to mention the obvious implications of the fact that Angie only has this 
ability because of a neurological intervention by her father when she was still a child. Pointing out 
its fragmentary undermining of the public and private spheres, Jenny Wolmark suggests that 
Gibson’s fiction sets up the Sprawl (the tangled future cityscape of the novels) as a feminine 
space. “The Sprawl,” she writes, “is [...] a feminised spatial metaphor in a way that the other 
central metaphor of cyberpunk – cyberspace – is not” (1994: 116). While this may help to rescue 
Gibson’s work from the charge of excluding women from the future entirely, it still only further 
stratifies the division between the sublime ascendancy of cyberspace and the comparative hyper-
embodiment of the real world, within which women are thus further and further contained. 
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messy, indistinct, or generally too evocative of mundane embodied experience. The 
rejection itself of unclean (e.g. feminine) users is constitutive of the ‘purity’ of the ‘true’ 
avatar by its dramatisation of the failures of these users’ bodies to transcend their base 
desires.39 This pattern continues through the two subsequent phases of the avatar’s 
establishment as a common technocultural figure. 
 
Clints and Brandys 
The second phase of the avatar’s permeation of technoculture is its stabilisation as a 
figure in the 1990s, primarily through its being explicitly named by Stephenson in his 
second-wave cyberpunk novel Snow Crash. This moment sees a crystallisation of a process 
instigated in first-wave cyberpunk: with the notion of explicit Euclidean cyberspaces now 
mooted (and beginning to take on renewed vigour in the wake of development of real-
world virtual reality technologies in the early 1990s), a version of the human body is 
recouped in cyberspace, but that body is rebuilt in the form of the avatar. This rebuilding 
happens in such a fashion as to strip away the pejoratively-coded features of the organic 
flesh, or any danger that subjective indistinctions might incur upon the relationship of 
control between a human(ist) user and their subjected technology.40 In some ways a 
spiritual descendent of Neuromancer, Snow Crash has much in common with Gibson’s first 
novel. Its protagonist (quite literally, Hiro Protagonist) is a samurai sword-wielding male 
                                                 
39 There is cyberpunk writing that works to account for subjective reconfiguration in 
relation to technology, and is less defensive of the masculine unified subject: Laura Chernaik, for 
instance, produces an account of a more complex attitude towards technology than is seen in 
Gibson’s work by examining the “anti-essentialist” writing of female cyberpunk author Pat 
Cadigan, discovering in her writing an argument for a “responsible, and knowledgeable [...] 
approach to technology” (61). However, Gibson’s popularity and the considerable influence of 
his seminal cyberpunk trilogy has arguably made his conceptions of interface encounters the de 
facto basis of almost all ensuing fictional representations. 
40 Snow Crash is considered to have been a major influence on some real-world 
cyberspaces. Margeurite Waller (1997) discusses the influence of the novel on early graphical 
online community AlphaWorld (1996). Another notable online community with clear resonance 
with Snow Crash is Second Life (2003- ), though the creators of this system have denied the 
connection (Dubner 2008). 
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programmer and hacker, and one widely-respected architect of the novel’s version of 
cyberspace, the “Metaverse”. Hiro is accompanied by a fifteen-year-old female tech-
savvy skateboarding “kourier” (a futuristic delivery agent) named only Y.T. (for “Yours 
Truly”), and the story’s material basis is a hyper-corporate future world of privatised 
miniature nation states called “Burbclaves”. Where Snow Crash develops the Sprawl 
Trilogy’s vision of the interface experience, though, is in its establishment of an explicit 
avatar as kind of electronic body in cyberspace, used to stand in for the controlling user. 
Where the Sprawl Trilogy simultaneously celebrates cyberspace and laments the new 
bodily indistinctions its enabling technologies open up (and thus tries to denigrate and 
escape the body altogether), Snow Crash discovers, in the avatar, a kind of online body 
that is both radically mutable and subject to easy, conscious control. The avatar allows 
complete reconstruction of the subject, but in a manner that is always the outcome of 
rational enquiry. Where the narrative encounters moments in which the 
electronic/technological may reach out into the subject and have a 
constituting/influencing effect, such moments are presented as dangerous, and their 
pejorative nature often finds expression in language and figuration coded and reserved 
for the marginalisation/exclusion of non-male, non-white subjects. 
 
In Snow Crash, avatars are the representatives of offline users primarily within “The 
Street”, the fashionable part of the Metaverse where most of the cyberspace action of the 
novel takes place. The Street is analogous to a city street; it is not so much the formless 
topology of Gibson’s cyberspace as a caricature of a kind of perfect simulated city (a city 
that would later appear in The Matrix). Within that space, users’ avatars move around and 
interact in fairly conventional ways: 
As Hiro approaches the street, he sees two young couples, probably using their 
parents’ computers for a double date in the Metaverse [...] He is not seeing real 
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people, of course [...] The people are pieces of software called avatars. They are 
the audiovisual bodies that people use to communicate with each other in the 
Metaverse. [...] Your avatar can look any way you want it to, up to the limitations 
of your equipment. If you’re ugly, you can make your avatar beautiful. If you’ve 
just gotten out of bed, your avatar can still be wearing beautiful clothes and 
professionally applied makeup. You can look like a gorilla or a dragon or a giant 
talking penis in the Metaverse. Spend five minutes walking down the Street and 
you will see all of these. (Stephenson: 33-4) 
The recuperation of some kind of body as a requisite part of one’s place in the world is 
clear here, as is the possibility of alternative, unconventional forms of embodiment. 
However, this is still very much about escaping the organic body, not reconfiguring 
understandings of it. Indeed, the latter is rejected quickly: “most hacker types don’t go in 
for garish avatars” (34). The avatar itself here is a means of ensuring that the body is 
reconstructed in cyberspace according to the parameters of the idealised liberal humanist 
mind-self; that anything except a classically-finished human body is derided as “garish” 
speaks to these very narrow parameters. Snow Crash’s Metaverse, accessed through 
goggles rather than brain-embedded electrodes, represents a clearer delineation of an 
imaginary but desirable boundary between bodily and intellectual activity, with the avatar 
(in its ‘proper’, conventional form) as the proper online representative of that activity, 
and both point of access for—and barrier to—the offline subject.  
 
Stephenson’s version of cyberspace, like Gibson’s, is one based on the abstraction of the 
subject-self onto projected vision; the Metaverse is a comprehensible three-dimensional 
space, with conventional, if exaggerated, laws of physics (indeed, the spatial analogy is 
policed heavily: “you can’t just materialize anywhere in the Metaverse, like Captain Kirk 
beaming down from on high [...] it would break the metaphor” [34]). Accessed via 
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goggles, the avatar-mediated Metaverse reiterates the same quasi-transcendental 
distinction between the base, decaying material world and the cleanliness and potential of 
the online experience. While Hiro is down-and-out in the offline world, he is a demi-god 
in the Metaverse: “As one, they all begin screaming. Not that they have any idea who he 
is—Hiro is just a starving CIC stringer who lives in a U-Stor-It by the airport. But in the 
entire world there are only a couple of thousand people who can step over the line into 
The Black Sun” (38). Hiro’s avatar becomes the marker of his privilege and status within 
the Metaverse; without the grime and clutter of the material world to hold him back, he 
is able to assert his authority based on a display of knowledge and intellectual prowess 
that is affixed to his avatar body. The avatar here is a site of the reassertion of 
conventional prejudices and preconceptions regarding the offline subject, rather than an 
opportunity to recraft understandings of them. Any representation of the body may be 
possible in the Metaverse, but the avatar serves to reiterate and amplify rather than collapse 
the expected forms of and distinctions between individuated subjects and objects. It is 
seen as gauche by the hacker elites of the novel to do anything but build an accurate shell 
likeness of one’s “real” offline self, and those who choose to do otherwise are thus in 
possession of avatars marking them clearly with their (inferior) class or gender status. 
Stephenson is aware of this, but resists any significant commentary on it: in fact, we are 
invited to join Hiro in derision of the “white trash” who use the off-the-peg “Clints and 
Brandys”, the poorly-rendered and identical male and female “bimbo” avatars used by 
those who do not have the money or skill to produce more tasteful online 
representations of themselves (35).  
 
Stephenson reserves particular disdain for the Brandys, the female off-the-peg avatars: 
The user can select three breast sizes: improbable, impossible, and ludicrous. 
Brandy has a limited repertoire of facial expressions: cute and pouty; cute and 
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sultry; perky and interested; smiling and receptive; cute and spacy. Her eyelashes 
are half an inch long, and the software is so cheap that they are rendered as solid 
ebony chips. When a Brandy flutters her eyelashes, you can almost feel the 
breeze. (35). 
While Snow Crash does not perform the same outright and uncloaked loathing for the 
‘meat’ that the Sprawl Trilogy does, it keeps the organic body subjected as a necessary 
supplement to the mind in similar ways, and, like Gibson’s work, makes clear the 
feminine nature of the body’s multiple threats. One of the novel’s central conceits – that 
the human brain can be ‘reprogrammed’ by a computer virus (the “Snow Crash” virus of 
the novel’s title) – dramatises the deadly vulnerability of the organic body to improper 
crossings-over from the (technological) object into the (human) subject realm. As 
Stockton notes, this virus is also feminine-coded: 
This is a disease of pre- or antirationality, infecting all cultures not inoculated 
through literacy, monogamy and other “kosher practices” (230) that exclude her 
random static. Asherah’s disease [Snow Crash] is likened to herpes: “it fucks with 
your actual DNA” (250). The disease of the mother bites back. It is dangerous 
and unclean. It rejects propagation and the safety of the womb; it is syphilis [...] 
The diseased and virulent mother reduces bodies to one substance and language 
to a common babble; she disables agency, amasses all capital for herself, and 
crashes computers. (1995: 596) 
The vulnerability to this virus is a feature of the improperly-guarded body, of which the 
female body is emblematic: the permeability of a feminine version of embodiment is the 
vector by which such eventual subjective indistinctions manifest themselves.41  
  
                                                 
41 The appeal to a fear of pregnancy here resonates with a similar anxiety expressed in 
narratives of ‘grey goo’—see Chapter Three of this thesis for a further discussion of this notion. 
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This concern over the inability of certain subjects to attain suitability for engaging with 
technologies is repeated in the novel’s keeping of women at arm’s length from the hyper-
rational subjectivity achievable in cyberspace. Stephenson reiterates frequently the 
gendered distinction between male mind-centric hacker subjects and female (sexualised) 
body-centric objects in the respective roles of the two central characters. Hiro is, 
arguably, more of an action hero than Case: he does not loathe or mistreat his body in 
the way that Gibson’s hacker does. In this way, the distinction between Hiro as “mind” 
and Y.T. as “body” may appear less tenable than the same distinction between Case and 
Molly. However, the character of Hiro’s embodied action is one defined by rational 
discipline, training and conditioning of the body, being a swordsman: “Hiro does not 
have time to adopt the proper stance, but this is fine since he has already adopted it. 
Whenever he has a katana in his hands he adopts it automatically [...] katana held at groin 
level like an extension of the phallus” (Stephenson: 145). Y.T., on the other hand, is 
chaotic and impulsive, driven by her body and carried by narrative momentum, rather, 
for the most part, than driving events herself (this is literally the case when she 
magnetically harpoons cars for a lift while on her skateboard). In fact, Y.T., as the only 
significant female character in the novel, is in general kept firmly in place in the physical 
world.42 Her peculiar relationship with technology is not the one of disembodied 
transcendence that Hiro experiences in the Metaverse, but rather one that can connect 
her more closely with the physical, embodied world: her skateboard’s “smartwheels” shift 
and reshape themselves to keep her as close and firmly tied to the ground as possible. At 
one point in the novel she says that she does not wear a helmet because it would “affect 
                                                 
42 There is another female character in the novel who does, to some extent, complicate 
the binary between Hiro as “mind” and Y.T as “body”: Juanita, Hiro’s former partner and 
another hacker/programmer who helped write the code for the Metaverse. However, she, too, is 
contained by a peculiarly feminine version of this talent: her role in the design of avatars is 
notable primarily for enabling them to “show something close to real emotion” (59). Hiro thinks 
of himself and Juanita as “the Adam and Eve of the Metaverse” (59), though this is a role she is 
assigned from Hiro’s dominant perspective alone—there is no evidence that she thinks of their 
relationship in the same way. 
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[her] hearing”, which she uses to help keep her bearings (157).43 Y.T.’s role is one of 
physical, active prowess, but the real intellectual work, carried out in cyberspace, is left to 
Hiro. She is also eventually levered into a sexualised role: Gillis writes that at the end of 
the novel, Y.T. is “reduced to a vaginal explosion” in a scene depicting her having sex 
with Raven, one of the novel’s main antagonists (12). 
  
Snow Crash produces a vision of the avatar that is the model for its reiteration in ensuing 
texts: a clear division between the online and offline worlds, with any overlap coded 
pejoratively; a policed set of requirements for access to the online world that excludes 
putatively inadequate body-subjects; and an overriding need to keep technology itself the 
object of enquiry rather than an active agent of any kind, with the avatar the digitised and 
controllable body that serves as the barrier to such overlaps. These features can be 
observed in more recent texts featuring avatars. 
 
The Body Cannot Live Without the Mind  
Despite a manifold expansion in the proliferation of digital technologies into everyday 
life in the West—the Internet in particular engenders a number of fractured and 
unexpected possibilities, and one would expect such to influence the fictional 
representation of the body in cyberspace—fictional texts on the body in cyberspace 
produced in the last decade show the conventional ‘empty shell’ avatar alive and well in 
the popular imaginary.44 The avatar’s conceptual underpinnings remain virtually 
unchanged from its prefiguration and stabilisation: it still idealises the reversible kinesis 
of a unified subject into an abstracted, transcendent other-body as the de facto experience 
                                                 
43 Sound is often perceived as a sense that is ‘closer’ to the body, and Y.T.’s reliance on 
this rather than the ocularcentric tendency of Hiro and other hackers to enhance their vision is 
telling of her putative ‘closeness’ to her own body. See Chapter Six on the Decaying Digital for a 
further discussion of sound and the body. 
44 Section Two of this thesis interrogates ways in which the Internet, along with other 
texts, may disrupt the avatar model of cyberembodiment. 
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of interfacing with cyberspace. Technology remains a subjected other (the object of 
human enquiry), cyberspace itself remains a feminised space for penetration and 
domination, and any compromise of the cleanliness of this transaction remains coded as 
pejorative or even dangerous. To demonstrate this continuity, I examine here two of the 
most successful science fiction texts of the last ten years that depict avatars—the film The 
Matrix, and the novel Altered Carbon.45 
 
In The Matrix, a repressive artificial intelligence regime is battled spectacularly within a 
machine-designed cyberspace (the Matrix of the film’s title) used to subdue humanity. At 
stake are the bodies and minds of the human race, whose organic warmth is used as a 
source of fuel for the machines while they lie sleeping in the permanent fantasy world of 
the Matrix. Protagonist Thomas Anderson—eventually “Neo”, or “The One”—is  
liberated from his soporific life as a programmer to discover a band of real-world 
freedom fighters “freeing minds” and battling the machines within and without the 
simulation of the Matrix. We see a very clear avatar in this film: characters in the ‘real 
world’ project their minds into the virtual bodies of their simulated counterparts, aided 
                                                 
45 Despite the aforementioned success and prominence of the film Avatar, I do not focus 
upon it in this section. This is because while Avatar does, of course, depict avatars, the ‘avatars’ in 
question are actual organic alien bodies, inhabited by the mind-selves of scientists, rather than 
digital representations in a cyberspace. While this is something that does require theorisation—
and many of the conceptual assumptions I outline in the other texts in this chapter also occur in 
Avatar—the broad functional difference between this representation and the others pushes it just 
outside the remit of this chapter. There are some key things to note in that film, though: 
Protagonist Jake Sully’s forays into the alien body which he is charged with controlling are 
technologically-mediated transmissions of the bounded mind-self from one body to another; his 
experiences within the alien body may change his offline attitudes, but those experiences are seen 
to be unsustainable in his prior (paraplegic) body. This is not narrativised as a fundamental 
problem with conventional dualistic understandings of embodiment: in an authorial decision that 
fantasises about a ‘trapped’ mind’s escape from the disabled body into a hardened Amazon 
warrior body (rather than recuperating the valid experience of a disabled person), Jake’s decision 
to transfer his mind permanently into the alien body is the consensual outcome of rational 
thought. Indeed, the body into which Jake’s mind is transferred is marked by a complex tangle of 
significations—combining combining the “noble savage” with a body that is classically bounded, 
strong, rational, and dualistically “spiritual” (with the latter providing access to a “scientifically”-
explained afterlife)—helps to obscure any potential interrogation of the logic underlying those 
significations. 
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by sophisticated computers and via plugging large metal jacks into the bases of their 
skulls. The avatars, appropriately hacked from outside the Matrix, have near-superhuman 
abilities in combat, intelligence and so on, by way of having these qualities downloaded 
into them. This then enables all manner of spectacular stunts and setpieces that defy 
conventional laws of physics. Once the curtain has been raised on ‘reality’–the gritty, 
bodily baseness and visual weight of life on the ship Nebuchadnezzar—the transcendent, 
exciting adventures enactable in the hyperreal cyberspace are not only privileged as the 
most exciting ones, but, importantly, are positioned clearly as separate, contained, and 
carefully bounded. As with Gibson’s vision of cyberspace, the opportunity for examining 
the potential distribution or co-constitution of the subject across bodies is never really 
seized, because it is always so clear which body the self is inhabiting at any one time – 
either the cyberspace avatar body, or the ‘real’ world body. Like many cinematic 
representations of cyberspace, The Matrix takes pains to dramatise the transition between 
online and offline. While the film builds its central premise upon a confounding of 
authentic experience via technological augmentation, the distinction between the offline 
‘real’ and the online Matrix is continuously defended and reiterated. As an audience, in 
other words, we are never left in much doubt as to which world is ‘real’. The primary way  
this is demonstrated visually is by the use of transition effects used in almost all cinematic 
depictions of cyberspace: we are given a first-person view of a digitally-rendered ‘tunnel’, 
through which we travel, with the characters, into the Matrix. In The Matrix, this ‘journey’ 
almost always begins at the end of a telephone line: a macro shot of a telephone receiver 
expands until the holes drilled into the plastic engulf the screen, and through that we 
plunge down the telephone lines as if they were tunnels. The endpoint is awakening in 
the world of the Matrix itself: thanks to this effect, there is very little doubt, as an 
audience, as to where the action is taking place at any one time. Almost identical effects 
are seen in TRON, Lawnmower Man, Hackers, and Avatar. 
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Figs 1-3. The transitions between the real and cyberspace in TRON, The Matrix and Avatar, respectively. 
 
While a significant proportion of the conceit and the appeal of The Matrix is that the 
fabric of reality can be mutated or even called into question in the first place, the films’ 
ability and desire to pursue this confusion are ultimately confounded by their decision to 
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reveal to us—through the kinesis of the subject between discrete bodies—that this 
cyberspace is a world that sits atop the “real”, not immanent to nor co-constituting of its 
materiality. While The Matrix demonstrates a body that can be killed as a result of an 
avatar’s death within the Matrix itself, Morpheus explains rather vaguely that “the body 
cannot live without the mind”. There is never a sense that the opposite is true—that a 
self is a body, not the possessor and master of one, determining its survival by force of 
conscious will. This notion of owning rather than being a body has its roots, as Hayles 
points out, in  possessive individualism. (Re-)reading C.B. Macpherson’s characterisation 
of this aspect of the liberal humanist subject, Hayles notes a shift: the “paradox” 
Macpherson identifies—that  “the liberal self is produced by market relations” even as it 
claims to predate them (i.e. in a state of nature)—is resolved in her reading by both the 
posthuman body’s literally commodified character (she refers to The Six Million Dollar Man 
[1974-1978] as a neat popular cultural exemplar) and its “collective heterogenous 
quality”, undermining the  notion of any selfhood predating those relations (3, emphasis 
in original). However, The Matrix both raises and rejects the possibility of a posthuman 
resolution to this paradox between ownership and being: the film situates its characters at 
the posthuman interface, but it is an interface to be fought against and escaped in favour 
of the re-establishment of the pre-existing ‘true’ self. Indeed, this anxiety of the loss of 
authenticity is something borne out by the film’s constant reiteration of its being inspired 
by Baudrillard’s philosophy of the simulacrum: not only is this demonstrated by 
Morpheus’ paraphrasing of Simulacra and Simulations (“welcome to the desert of the real”) 
but  a hollowed-out copy of the same book features prominently in one scene. There is 
not, in other words, any sense in The Matrix that the human/technological interface 
promises anything other than an apocalyptic destruction of the ideal human subject. The 
possibilities for alternative action or embodiment in the avatar-inhabited cyberspace of 
the Matrix itself are coded entirely within the parameters of omnipotence, immortality 
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and control. Furthermore, those powerful, controlling avatars are, like those in the earlier 
cyberpunk texts, strongly gender-coded. 
 
The Matrix’s Trinity is a strong and active female figure, and despite the “residual self-
image” of their tangibly-gendered offline counterparts, the characters’ avatars’ gender 
within the Matrix itself seems, initially, unusually unconstraining to their action roles. 
Trinity’s body is ostensibly not fetishised in the way that, for instance, that of Molly 
Millions of Neuromancer is: as Balsamo remarks, “Molly’s body implants more fully 
literalize the characteristically threatening nature of her female body” (2000: 129). 
Trinity’s outfit, by comparison, serves to support her active role, and even resist the 
objectifying male gaze (Gillis 2005: 79). Trinity is, also, unlike Molly, a hacker: along with 
her ability to take on dozens of men in combat, she is a member of a skilled, 
intellectually-revered techno-elite capable of comprehending and undermining the 
machines’ simulations. However, by the end of the first film, beginning a process that 
continues throughout the trilogy, Trinity is steadily prised into a conventional feminine 
narrative trajectory: Gillis writes that Trinity’s “transgressive and myth-making job as a 
hacker [...] is increasingly displaced throughout the trilogy by her ‘real’ job, that of taking 
care of Neo so that he can do his work of being ‘the One’” (80). Trinity brings a dying 
Neo back from the brink with a kiss; her role moves from an active and rational one to a 
passive and embodied one. Trinity’s body is, thus, re-anchored to the real world, her 
subjectivity proven inappropriate to the task of occupying the ‘neutral’ body of the 
avatar. Neo’s perfect mind, on the other hand, makes him “the One”: the prophesised 
saviour of humankind, able to move with near-invulnerability and freedom within the 
simulation of the Matrix. 
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There are some balder, more sadistic and misogynistic decisions made in other texts that 
depict avatars: in Altered Carbon, the apparent function of the female avatar body in 
cyberspace is to be the object of torture. Male main character Takeshi Kovacs’ mind is 
loaded into a ‘female’ avatar for an extremely violent interrogation scene, a decision 
rationalised editorially thus: “To be a woman was a sensory experience beyond the male. 
Touch and texture ran deeper, an interface with environment that male flesh seemed to 
seal out instinctively. To a man, skin was a barrier, a protection. To a woman it was an 
organ of contact. That had its disadvantages” (Morgan 2002: 168). Given the extreme 
nature of the torture—the interrogators burn Kovacs’ female avatar’s feet off with a 
blowtorch, amongst other things, as I will outline—the claim that women feel pain more 
keenly seems a rather flimsy reason for this choice to have been made. The misogynistic 
character of the torture speaks clearly to the depicted rational inadequacy of a ‘female’ 
avatar: 
What d.h. [digitised human] storage has done is make it possible to torture a 
human being to death, and then start again. With that option available, hypnotic 
and drug-based questioning went out the window long ago. It was too easy to 
provide the necessary chemical or mental counterconditioning in those for whom 
this sort of thing was a hazard of their trade.  
There’s no kind of conditioning in the known universe that can prepare you for 
having your feet burnt off. Or your nails torn out. 
Cigarettes stubbed out on your breasts. 
A heated iron inserted into your vagina. 
The pain. The humiliation. 
The damage. (172; emphasis in original) 
Perhaps even more significant than the violence itself is the implication that if one wants 
to ensure that mental conditioning be overcome by torture, the best way to do so is to 
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ensure the tortured body is female. The “conditioning” that Kovacs might have been 
able to appeal to as a male avatar is diminished by his being sleeved in this digital version 
of a woman, reconstructed from a culturally biased, masculinist blueprint of female 
bodily experience. 
 
Even outside digital avatars, we see examples in the novel of technologically-
reconstructed female bodies that have the same overdetermined physical experiences, 
and which are marked as inadequately rational—or even dangerous—as  a result. Miriam 
Bancroft, the two-hundred-year-old wife of Kovacs’ employer, at one point seduces the 
protagonist while sleeved in a genetically-engineered, custom designed female body. This 
custom-designed sleeve, commissioned by the impossibly-rich Bancroft, is constructed 
with the specific purpose of intensifying sexual experience, and she uses it in order to 
disrupt Kovacs’ mission46: 
Miriam Bancroft pushed herself off the window shelf and set her hips against it. 
She set down the glass with exaggerated care and leaned back on her hands so 
that her shoulders lifted. It changed the shape of her breasts, moving them 
beneath the sheer material of her leotard. 
‘Do you know what Merge Nine is?’ she asked, a little unsteadily. 
‘Empathin?’ I dug the name out from somewhere. Some thoroughly armed 
robbery crew I knew back on Harlan’s World, friends of Virginia Vidaura’s. The 
Little Blue Bugs. They did all their work on Merge Nine. Said it welded them into 
a tighter team. Fucking psychos. 
‘Yes, empathin. Empathin derivatives, tailed with Satyron and Ghedin enhancers. 
This sleeve...’ She gestured down at herself, spread fingers brushing the curves. 
                                                 
46   This is, of course, a familiar function of such femme fatales; Altered Carbon is 
unashamedly hardboiled in its narrative style. 
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‘This is state-of-the-art biochemtech, out of the Nakamura Labs. I secrete Merge 
Nine, when ... aroused. In my sweat, in my saliva, in my cunt, Mr Kovacs.’  
[...] 
I met her halfway across the room. Merge Nine was already in the air, in the scent 
of her body and the water vapour on her breath. I drew in a deep breath and felt 
the chemical triggers go off like plucked strings in the pit of my stomach (131-2) 
Merge Nine, the chemical designed for enhancing (the conventionally feminine) 
emotional character of empathy, is judged by Kovacs to be both useless as a form of 
“working”—he considers the Little Blue Bugs’ use of it to enhance their work to mark 
them as “fucking psychos”—and a threat to his own ability to work rationally. As his 
“chemical triggers” are tripped, Kovacs’ ability to think clearly is endangered. As 
Bancroft’s impossibly seductive embodiment shows, even a technologically-reconstructed 
female body will be radically leaky, and accordingly radically poisonous to male 
rationality.47 
 
In other words, Altered Carbon’s depiction of female avatars uses both digital and 
technologically-fabricated physical bodies in order to reassert well-established gender 
myths of women being “more embodied” than men, rather than in any way disrupting 
this logic.48 Kovacs’ being sleeved in a female avatar for torture (whose simulated skin, if 
mirroring that of a ‘real’ female body, is an “organ of contact” rather than a “barrier” to 
invasive entities) recapitulates the putative vulnerability of the feminine subject, couching 
said vulnerability in the quasi-neutral language of science, and, thus, ratifying it to an even 
                                                 
47 An alternative later reading may also investigate the possibility that such depictions of 
the ‘rebuilt’ female body actually animate the tendency for male-dominated discourses of 
technoscience to recreate the normative female subject in the putatively neutral space of scientific 
invention.  
48 See Shildrick (1997) and Grosz (1999) for more on this idea of women being seen as 
“more fully embodied” than men. This is also examined through these writers in the Introduction 
to this thesis. 
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greater degree. Miriam Bancroft’s hyper-feminine embodiment forces the female body 
into a position of rational inadequacy and threat to the subject by its very inability to 
separate mind and body. Women are inadequate or inappropriate minds for the 
occupation of avatars because even in cyberspace or in neutrally-crafted collisions of 
technoculture and embodiment their ‘bodies’ will let them down; they would not be able 
to maintain the separation between mind, body, and other that the masculine subject 
maintains by default.  
 
The Kinesis of Conciousness 
Far from bearing out promises of novel and liberating possibility, the user/avatar 
relationship in fiction is almost always used to close down in advance any disruptive 
potential in the online experience. The postmodern pastiche aesthetic is accompanied by 
a postmodern crisis in the boundedness of the Cartesian subject, which then registers in a 
need to continually rehearse a clear and intransigent division between the offline and the 
online, with, ideally, no permanent overspill of either into the other. Within these 
fictions, the human subject is not in a relationship of co-substantiation with the machine: 
each narrative and practice rehearses the process of re-subjecting technology and an 
essential division between the human and the other, whether the technological other or 
the ‘inadequate’ marginalised, too-embodied other. Within these discourses, the self does 
not emerge from the contingencies of its body or bodies; the body is an interchangeable 
possession of a self, which must always maintain its mastery of avatar bodies, their signs 
of otherness where appropriate, and the very cyberspaces they inhabit, which are passive 
spaces in themselves. The essence of selfhood remains a bounded and discrete entity, 
transmissible between bodies coded as recipient vessels, whose material base does not 
invade or pervert the purity of the rational mind in transition. The above features are 
observable in most of the major science fiction texts that feature avatars heavily. They 
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have in common the tendency to continually recapitulate a division, not an intimate, 
embodied, ongoing and co-constituting reconfiguration, between the human and the 
technological other, and the possibility of a kinesis of bounded consciousness between 
those two interchangeable bodies.  
 
Ultimately, the avatar as an understanding of embodiment in relation to machines evinces 
a figure that repeats and armours the unified subject that Haraway’s and Hayles’ models 
of understanding the human/machine interface attempt to disrupt, by simply refusing to 
let said subject be dissolved or unseated by the experiences of distribution across non-
human, technological bodies. The mind/body divided self that is cited in these 
cyberspaces needs to be reinforced by a distinct and repeated consolidation of the 
boundary between self and other, which in turn maps onto the exclusive logic of identity, 
excepting non-normative agents. There is never a sense that the ‘self’ in question is 
contingent upon the specificities of the corporeal form instantiating it; the materiality of 
the body—whether the ‘true’ organic body or the material form of the computer system 
hosting the avatar—is never seen in these narratives as significantly generative in the 
formation of the self. The body, whatever its form, is merely an often inadequate and 
vulnerable vessel for the mind, and the object of intervention and control as it ever has 
been in liberal humanist teleologies of enquiry. As Hayles remarks about the troubling 
discourses surrounding information and the history of cybernetics, the mind, here, has 
lost its body, and while a self may “own” a body, it is not seen as being part of one (3). 
What we see in the conventional depiction of the avatar is the very Moravecsian 
nightmare of mind-transfer (rather than mind-reassessment) that Hayles argues is a risk 
to liberatory or otherwise productive understandings of the human/machine interface 
(1). This version of the avatar evinces the possibility of spectacular dis-/re-embodied 
action, but that action is always in line with very conventional and normative models of 
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generational masculine “improvement” (i.e., the ability to be faster, stronger, more 
precise, more disciplined, more intelligent/rational, to live longer, et cetera), further 
stratifying rather than ever reconfiguring, reordering, or even daring to question the 
deterministic and exclusive logic that underpins those ambitions.  
 
The normative potency of the avatar emerges not least from its being the logical outcome 
of rational projects of technological enquiry, and its attendant ability to thus ratify 
deterministic discourses of scientific objectivity—and in a performative turn, the 
anticipation of this neutrality also conjures that neutrality, by rejecting those who 
apparently do not fit the pattern. As such, the avatar embodies a powerful defence against 
the disruptive potential of the interface between the organic and the technological, and is 
thus an inadequate and reductive descriptor of the experiences possible at that interface. 
The avatar is ‘the’ singular idealised body in cyberspace in these narratives.49 The mind 
occupies one point or another, it either fills the avatar or the offline body, never both; 
overspills from the putatively ‘virtual’ to the putatively ‘real’ are pejoratively coded, and 
those whose body-selves are inherently vulnerable to such crossovers are rejected as 
potentially viable users of avatars. The transferable mind must always be recuperated in 
these narratives; the disembodied essence must always be ratified, and that essence “is” 
the self of the subject in question. The issue here is not so much that it is not possible to 
simulate or recreate digitally a perfect analogue of embodied experience—that is a 
question beyond the remit of my thesis—but rather the problematic notion that the 
mind-self can be transported from one vessel to another, with continuity of selfhood. That 
is what the avatar dramatises: the transcendental kinesis of a bounded subject from one 
passive body to another. As such, this understanding fails to account for the co-
                                                 
49 The Fursona chapter outlines a different possible way to understand the body in 
cyberspace, where an avatar may be part of the field of implication from which the body is drawn 
out, but not totally constitutive of the body in and of itself. 
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constituting complexity of the human-technology relationship, even while it performs a 
desire to do so on the surface. 
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CHAPTER TWO:  
THE HACKER 
 
Like the avatar, the figure of the virtuoso computer/network hacker is one whose shape 
was consolidated in the 1980s. The hacker–the usually white male, often teenage expert 
user of the computer, able to penetrate any security system and crack any code—has 
been a prominent character in fiction and film since the 1980s: hackers constitute main 
or major characters in the films TRON, WarGames (dir. John Badham, 1983) and Weird 
Science (dir. John Hughes, 1985), Gibson’s Sprawl Trilogy, Stephenson’s Snow Crash, and 
the films Sneakers (dir. Phil Alden Robinson, 1992), Jurassic Park (dir. Steven Spielberg, 
1993), Johnny Mnemonic (dir. Robert Longo, 1995), Goldeneye (dir. Martin Campbell, 1995), 
Hackers (dir. Iain Softley, 1995), The Net (dir. Irwin Winkler, 1995) The Matrix, Swordfish 
(dir. Dominic Sena, 2001), The Core (dir. Jon Amiel, 2003), The Italian Job (dir. F. Gary 
Grey, 2003), National Treasure: Book of Secrets (dir. John Turtletaub, 2007) and Die Hard 4.0 
(dir. Len Wiseman, 2007).50 As well as appearing in these fictional texts, the hacker is a 
real-world figure whose representation in non-fiction texts is interconnected with that 
found in fiction; real world hacking practices have inspired the kind of hacking seen in 
fiction and vice versa. 51 Media reporting, critical writing and legislative action have given 
further definition to a stable and persistent depiction of the figure of the hacker. 
 
                                                 
50 The preponderance of film rather than written representations of the hacker, despite 
its appearance in the most influential cyberpunk novels of the 1980s and 1990s, is inescapable. 
This shift from literary to visual representations of hacking may feasibly have taken place partly 
as a result of the steady shift of computer use from text-based to graphical user interfaces, as I 
discuss on p92.  
51 Books on hackers, and particularly non-fiction accounts, have proven an enduring 
subgenre, and such accounts have been published regularly since the 1980s. The subgenre began 
with Stephen Levy’s Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution (1984), and notable examples since 
include Katie Hafner and John Markoff’s Cyberpunk: Outlaws and Hackers on the Computer Frontier 
(1991) and Bruce Sterling’s The Hacker Crackdown (1992). 
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The hacker is a figure which ties together a variety of discourses on technology and the 
body in a manner that has remained relatively conceptually consistent since its inception. 
Considerable changes that have taken place since the 1980s in the development and role 
of the Internet and of the computer (both the home computer and the business network) 
have done little to alter the conceptual image of the hacker. The figure connects 
corresponding discursive elements from fictional and non-fictional texts: the computer 
or network hacker began to emerge as a recognisable entity in fiction at around the same 
time that it was beginning to be stabilised in the burgeoning technoculture that flourished 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Case, the console cowboy hacker of Gibson’s 
Neuromancer, remains one of the most notorious and influential fictional hackers, but 
films such as WarGames dramatised early on the figure in a way that also helped 
substantiate the roles and aims of ‘real’ hackers.52 Though the term ‘hacker’ existed 
before this time – with something of a different meaning—the shape it took in the 1980s, 
in line with the increasing proliferation in the West of relatively affordable home 
computers based on digital microprocessors, is the shape it maintains today.53 Coupled 
with an already-present (sub-)culture of phone ‘phreaking’ in the USA—reverse 
engineering the antiquated public telephone system as a way to get free calls—the 
                                                 
52 Patrick S. Ryan identifies WarGames as the origin of the practice of “Wardialling”, a 
hacking technique whereby a user writes a program to make their computer dial every phone 
number in an area code to find vulnerable computer systems. This is given a present-day 
instantiation in the practice of “Wardriving”, driving around neighbourhoods with a laptop and 
an antenna, looking for unsecured wireless networks to exploit (2004: 3). According to Hafner 
and Markoff, the notorious KGB-recruited hacker Markus Hess was inspired to attempt to hack 
into the US military’s NORAD facility in Colorado after seeing the same thing depicted in 
WarGames (1991: 245). 
53 This more technically-specific understanding of “hacker” is best described in key texts 
examining the histories of hackers. Stephen Levy traces the origins of hacking from within an 
embryonic technoculture within a specific group of MIT engineers. “Hacking”, for Levy, is less 
reminiscent of the spectacular and often criminal image recognisable to us today, and more 
reminiscent of a spirit of technical, unconventional problem solving; he sees hacking as a rational 
teleology that valorises the process of programming and systems construction as an art in and of 
itself (1983: ch. 2). MacKenzie Wark also draws upon this account in his analysis of both the 
early era of hacking and the more recently-developed phenomenon of open-source software, 
which he believes embodies the hacker “ethic” in a way reminiscent of those early hackers’ aims 
(2006).  
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burgeoning use of home computers and the increasing permeation of digital technologies 
provided a fertile patch for the development of a mythology surrounding a subject able 
to use (and abuse) networked technologies in a way seemingly inaccessible to those 
outside such a natural, easy understanding. 
 
While ‘hacker’ does not function adequately in describing the full spectrum of real-world 
practices enacted by expert users of computers, it is nonetheless a popular and 
recognisable incarnation which conflates the different functions implied by specific 
technical definitions of various forms of expert computer user. Real-world terms in 
common use by such expert users such as ‘cracker’, ‘white hat’ or ‘black hat’, and the 
practices/processes of or interests in coding, programming, system/network incursion, 
computer security and so on, are not generally represented as discrete (or at all) by 
popular depictions of this figure.54 In this conflated format, the hacker figure’s normative 
function—again, like the avatar—is rooted in its position at the interface between the 
human(ist) subject and the technological/technologised other. The hacker resides 
between human and non-human agency, but polices the boundary between the two rather 
than blurring it, paying lip service to the potential politically liberatory effects of the 
interface while resisting subjective crossover from the non-human to the human. This 
reiteration of the bounded coherence of the human subject in control of its apparent 
invention comprises a kind of intentional policing of that boundary, and is performed in 
ways coded in terms of post-Enlightenment visions of the idealised rational agent.  
 
                                                 
54 These are contentious terms, but generally ‘hackers’ try to distinguish themselves from 
‘crackers’ by the former being simply interested in understanding and modifying information and 
other complex systems, and the latter being closer to the more criminal element as seen by the 
media and the establishment. ‘White hat’ and ‘black hat’ hackers are arranged along similar lines: 
white hat hackers are seen to only hack systems to test security and be of beneficial effect, 
whereas black hat hackers are those who do so for personal gain. For further elaboration on 
these terms, see Wark (2006). 
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According to both fictional and non-fictional representations, only certain people are 
capable of being successful hackers (or successful transcenders of the body), and, again, 
being invariably white and male, they are mythologically effective manipulators of the 
chaotic signs of the world around them. As Deborah Lupton points out, though, these 
ideal hackers are usually portrayed as physically undesirable by conventional standards, 
even “repugnant” (2000: 481). The standing cultural myth that these awkward young men 
entered into close relationships with computers as a means of escaping such 
uncomfortable embodied experiences masks an alternative (or at least supplementary) 
reading: that the organic, corporeal body is (re)discovered by hackers to be a site of 
vulnerability and a liability to the ideal mind-subject, and thus disavowed or abused as 
such. That body is demoted into the same realm as several lingering others, particularly 
putatively inadequate and overdetermined body subjects: anyone not white and male or 
otherwise seen as an inadequate thinking subject belongs to the less or un-differentiated 
object-world that is both target of and threat to the hacker’s rational actions.55 
‘Technology’ here is thus kept from invading the mind-self of the ideal masculine human 
subject by the installation of the hacker as a figure that iterates and reiterates divisions 
between human and technology. 
  
It is nothing new to point out that hacking is a predominantly male (fantasy) world: 
Squires’ Derridean reading of the dangerous tendency for narratives of technological 
transcendence to ignore (and thus reinscribe) gendered distinctions of subjects points out 
that young men “generate the codes and descriptors by which bodies in cyberspace are 
represented” (2000: 364). Not addressed widely though is the way in which these 
discourses work implicitly to reject women more actively rather than simply exclude them, 
                                                 
55 While there are non-male, non-white hackers, particularly in some film representations, 
either all markers of their difference are erased or assimilated/overwritten, or they are each 
compromised in some way by their bodies (causing them ultimately to fail as hackers), as I will 
demonstrate. 
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and indeed work to produce male hackers as subjects capable of resisting not just 
subjective invasion from/dissolution by increasingly lively technologies, but also the 
danger of a feminine incursion upon the uniquely male rational character of hacking.56 In 
other words, the logic that determines the human’s place in a relationship with an object-
machine is gendered, and places women in the same object category along with the 
system being incurred upon. The symbolic entanglement of ‘woman’ and ‘technology’ 
thus embodies a dual function: it identifies a putative feminine character to the 
technology being ‘hacked’, and marks that feminine character as something requiring 
either control or outright expulsion. The feminine character discovered in these 
transactions is one rooted in the putatively over-embodied nature of women’s 
subjectivity and its continuous interference in—and undermining of—the possibility of 
objectivity and rational thought. 
 
While there have been superficial attempts to reconfigure the image of the hacker in 
some texts and drag it away from its intellectual but physically unattractive, self-loathing 
image (particularly in films like The Net, Hackers, and The Matrix, which all foreground 
conventionally attractive hacker characters) the conceptual underpinnings of the figure of 
the hacker have changed little since its entering of mainstream cultural consciousness in 
the early 1980s. This chapter examines first the emergence of the figure of the hacker in 
the 1980s, goes on to establish the persistence of this image through major hacker texts 
of the 1990s, and then examines the figure as it has existed over the last ten years. These 
phases are not, of course, entirely discrete, and it would be false to imply clean breaks 
between each decade—if anything, I group the texts in this chronological manner in 
order to highlight conceptual continuity rather than significant difference between them. 
                                                 
56 Thomas Foster has identified “feminist and lesbian rewritings of cyberpunk fiction” 
that challenge the overriding mode of “disembodiment” that is invoked in relationships between 
human users and technologies (2000: 439). However, his essay does not address the hacker 
specifically. 
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In each period, the figure of the hacker can be seen to enact three central things. Firstly, 
the hacker claims status as a figure concerned with recrafting notions of human 
subjectivity in relationships with contemporary technologies, but this telos works instead 
to recuperate a dualistic notion of transcendental, essential human control of the 
technological other—thus further reiterating the distinction rather than collapsing it. 
Secondly, this act of subjective reiteration is a gendered one, mediated by the male hacker 
and coded in a way that excludes women from active roles as users of technology, 
forcing them into the object position alongside the technologies being ‘used’. Feminine 
‘versions’ of technological/intellectual inquiry are subjected, and this manifests in the 
rejection of women as hackers and a feminisation of the language of risk associated with 
computers. Both of these features of the hacker manifest, primarily, in a representation 
that performs a continuous and unbridled loathing for the organic body and its supposed 
inadequacies (as demonstrated, too, in the representation of the avatar as a means of 
‘escape’ from that body). Finally, the hacker projects an image of political rebellion, but 
always ultimately reasserts the authority against which it claims to rebel: a strong figure of 
hyper-individual masculine control at the technological interface becomes instead a node 
in the project of re-rationalisation and stabilisation of capital gone increasingly global and 
permeable in the “common language” of its digital mode (Haraway 1991: 164).57  
 
What this chapter does not do is try to ‘recoup’ the hacker in any way, or produce an 
account that assesses how realistic the cultural portrayal is of the hacker—there are some 
existing texts that seek to unravel or challenge the admittedly reductive image of the 
‘criminal’ computer hacker and the moral panics surrounding it.58 My intention here is to 
                                                 
57 See my examination of the permeating, literally liquefying effect of technologised 
global capital in Chapter Three.  
58 For this kind of account of the hacker in particular, see Douglas Thomas’s Hacker 
Culture (2002). Its main argument is that the hacker is portrayed by the media and pop culture 
either as a dangerous, criminally malignant “magician”, or a temperamental, childish vandal, 
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demonstrate the culturally normative function of the hacker figure as, rightly or wrongly, 
it is popularly depicted in texts (fictional or non-fictional) that deploy that figure. I show 
that the hacker, as one of the most recognisable figures of the meeting between the 
human and contemporary digital technologies, embodies a function that has remained a 
conventional, normative one, maintaining and reiterating narrow, dualistic and (thus) 
exclusive liberal humanist definitions of the human even while claiming to disrupt them, 
continuing to help this attitude towards technological embodiment permeate 
technocultures to the present day. The hacker rejects any version of the cyborg or the 
posthuman that does not reinscribe that dualism between mind and body—Haraway’s 
vision of the “permanently partial” entity is never ratified by the hacker (1991: 154). 
Instead, it uses the technological interface to dramatise, respectively, (feminised) 
technological threats to the boundedness of the masculine human subject, and the 
subsequent containment of those threats by a suitable rational agent.  
 
A Patina of Doughnut Glaze 
In examining the hacker’s first real popular incarnation—moving from being a figure 
known only to specialists within certain scientific disciplines to a far more mainstream 
instantiation (in a manner echoing the shift of cyberpunk aesthetics from cult readerships 
to the relative mainstream)—along with the majority of extant critical work on the 
hacker, I focus upon several (interrelated) features: the hacker figure’s ambivalent 
                                                                                                                                            
whereas more realistically the hacker is a less dramatic and less powerful figure, existing 
somewhere between the respective polar myths of criminal intent and liberatory, revolutionary 
bombast. Thomas negotiates hacker discourse to produce a reading of the hacker that isolates a 
more balanced view of its role in technoculture. It is very useful as both a factual resource and an 
analysis of the hacker figure in terms of its status as a concept, working primarily with hacker 
texts (e.g. 2600 and Phrack). However, the project’s remit – to “determine what hacking is and 
what hacker culture looks like” (9) – does not require it to address in any detail the basic question 
of the nature of the hacker body or the modes of thought that underwrite (and by which are 
underwritten) dualistic conceptions of subjectivity. Hafner and Markoff, whose work I examine 
in this chapter—produces more subtle and contextualised accounts of the lives and aims of 
individual hackers, seeking to recoup each as a person rather than a stereotype (though their 
account is still ultimately coded as a cautionary tale about hackers’ criminal potency). 
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tendency to perform a ‘revolutionary’ vision of (dis-)embodied subjectivity whilst 
simultaneously recuperating the mythological solidity of the humanist subject; its gender 
coding of this transaction (incorporating the abstraction of any failure of the transaction 
onto ‘unstable’ feminised bodies), and its own brand of fractured postmodern liberatory 
politics, which almost always ends up ratifying and reinforcing the very multinational 
corporate capitalist systems supposedly being resisted.  
 
The essential mind’s escape into cyberspace in Gibson’s novels—as well as its use of the 
avatar to seize control of the danger of alternative embodiment—is, in one sense, 
summative of the hacker’s attitude to the body, and the enduring influence of cyberpunk 
on subsequent representations of such figures.59 Indeed, much of the limited amount of 
critical and theoretical writing on the hacker focuses, perhaps unsurprisingly, upon its 
representation in the media and in cyberpunk fiction (and, in particular, in Gibson).60 
However, the origins of the hacker overflow the Sprawl Trilogy and cyberpunk in 
general. Insofar as fictional and non-fictional accounts of the hacker figure co-
substantiate (particularly in the 1980s), it is necessary to move between fictional and non-
fictional hacker depictions to trace its embryonic figurative shape in this period.61 To 
                                                 
59 Many of the features of the Sprawl Trilogy’s hacker bodies and their logic of identity 
are examined in my chapter on the avatar’. The hacker and the avatar are intimately connected in 
a relationship of co-substantiation: the hacker’s body is an important correspondent in the 
offline/online relationship that necessitates the avatar, with the avatar constituting the hacker’s 
idealised, impermeable virtual body in cyberspace. 
60 The hacker figure itself is not often interrogated in depth, in its normative function or 
otherwise. However, critical work that touches upon the role of the hacker includes Andrew Ross 
(2000), who interrogates moral panics around computer viruses and hackers as their vector of 
infection, and Sobchack (2000), who interrogates the apparently failed subversive politics of 
hackers. In terms of feminist work that examines hacker figures as part of its project, Heather J. 
Hicks (1996) interrogates the writing of female bodies in stories by Gibson and the work of 
James Tiptree Jr. (who is a female writer with a male pseudonym) and Squires’ already-mentioned 
article the promises of cyberfeminism critiques the adolescent male hacker figure to some degree. 
A. Susan Owen et al’s Bad Girls: Cultural Politics and Media Representations of Transgressive Women 
(2007) has a chapter on “hacking women” that touches on Hackers and The Net. 
61 My method of examination differs slightly in this subsection: I must draw together 
here several examples of the fictional and non-fictional in this crucial establishing stage of the 
hacker, as well as the bulk of the critical and theoretical material. However, with this established, 
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uncover the normative character of the hacker figure in this first popularly recognisable 
form during the 1980s, I draw together the common features of its literary representation 
by key cyberpunk voice Bruce Sterling, its depiction in the film Weird Science (and others), 
and its description in the non-fiction book Cyberpunk: Outlaws and Hackers on the Computer 
Frontier by Katie Hafner and John Markoff (1991).62  
 
Bruce Sterling’s celebratory preface for the classic cyberpunk short story collection 
Mirrorshades (1988) positions the hacker as a crucial cyberpunk representative, comparing 
it (of course, him) to the rock star (xii). This feverish essay is dualistic even as it claims to 
eschew categorical, bodily boundaries: 
Certain central themes spring up repeatedly in cyberpunk. The theme of body 
invasion: prosthetic limbs, implanted circuitry, cosmetic surgery, genetic 
alteration. The even more powerful theme of mind invasion: brain-computer 
interfaces, artificial intelligence, neurochemistry—techniques radically redefining 
the nature of humanity and the nature of the self. (xi) 
Sterling’s respective descriptions of “body” and “mind” invasions set out both the 
apparent vision of radical subjective reconfiguration and the inevitable retreat to 
Enlightenment logic driving cyberpunk’s hacker philosophies. Drawing a line of 
distinction between the two respective modes of invasion both reiterates a radical 
division in the first place and implicitly privileges the transformative power of 
                                                                                                                                            
I am able in the ensuing sections to use this as a basis to make deeper analyses of individual key 
fictional texts—which is where this vision of the hacker thrives most strongly in contemporary 
popular culture. 
62 Here is one moment where my rough division of these periods shows its ragged edges: 
while this subsection addresses hackers as perceived in the 1980s, this book was published in 
1991. Nonetheless, it accounts for hacking activity taking place mainly in the early-mid 1980s, 
depicts hackers active during that period, and certainly comes before the moment (discussed 
presently) where the hacker is repackaged aesthetically by the Hollywood film industry (while 
remaining conceptually intact). As such, despite the date of its publication, the text fits squarely 
into a mode of discussion about the hacker that is very much rooted in discovering and 
representing its earliest popular (i.e. 1980s) incarnation. 
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interventions in the “mind”, which is, for Sterling, the “nature of humanity and the 
nature of the self”. While the body and the mind may be invaded, changed, or 
reconfigured, to radical degrees, each is not a correspondent in the substantiation of the 
other: they are separate, and do not (or should not), in themselves, cross over. As seen 
with the avatar, and the separation of the mind from the body dramatised by 
ascendance/transcendence into cyberspace, this is an understanding of selfhood borne 
out by the major cyberpunk narratives and characters: Neuromancer’s Case is, again, an 
obvious touchstone. Being a figure of potential vulnerability to the crossover of the 
digital/technological other into the ‘real’ self, his strategies for ensuring the survival of 
his discrete subjectivity even in the face of radical technological change mark him as the 
idealised negotiator of the relationship between humans and technology.  
 
Cyberpunk fiction represents the more extreme end of the spectrum of representation of 
hackers, and dramatises mind/body dualism in the most radical ways, and while the 
hacker arose near-simultaneously in fiction and the real world, this particular and dualistic 
relationship between mind and body exists as the basis of all ensuing popular 
representations of the hacker. While Neuromancer’s dramatic science fiction future allows a 
radical ignoring of the body in favour of releasing the “abstract, disengaged soul-pilot” 
vision of the mind (Davis 2002: 12), we can see the same process at work in the 
comparatively mundane image of the hacker that was rooted in real technocultural 
activities contemporary to the 1980s. Unable to ascend literally into cyberspace via neural 
interface, the hacker figure nonetheless maintains the same logic—but it substitutes the 
mind’s literal escape from the body with an everyday disavowal of, and loathing for, the 
body—expressed through a steady programme of mistreatment and/or over-satiation of 
its needs and desires. And, as with the avatar, the logic of identity that establishes the 
boundaries of the successful hacker does so on the basis of judgements about an 
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individual’s ability to disavow the body in this way—and these judgements are gender-
coded. 
 
A somewhat standard description – even stereotype – of the body of the hacker based 
more squarely in reality can be found in almost all early fictional and non-fictional texts 
describing hackers. Deborah Lupton’s writing on the body of the computer user 
advances an effective summation of this image: “In sharp contrast to the idealized clean, 
hard, uncontaminated masculine body of the cyborg as it is embodied in the RoboCop and 
Terminator films, this type of computer body is physically repugnant according to 
commonly accepted notions of attractiveness.” She goes on to note that hackers might 
be lauded for their intellectual abilities (“their ‘brain’ or ‘software’”) but their bodies are 
derided:  
‘computer nerds’ or ‘hackers’ are invariably male, usually in their late adolescence 
or early adulthood, and are typically portrayed as social misfits and spectacularly 
physically unattractive: wearing thick, unflattering spectacles, overweight, pale, 
pimply skin, poor fashion sense. Their bodies are soft, not hard, from too much 
physical inactivity and junk food. (2000: 481) 
For Lupton, some texts depicting the human/machine interface produced figures like the 
hardened hypermasculine cyborg to resist the bodily subjective indistinctions of a shifting 
and potentially disruptive relationship with technology, but the hacker figure represents a 
kind of mundane real-world opposite, emblematic of, rather than reacting to, the 
problem of boundary ‘softness’ presented by intimate relationships with computers. 
Despite the hyper-rational possibilities of cyberspace itself, the bodily “softness” created 
by intimacy with computers is feminine-coded. In 1990s and 2000s hacker 
representations the ambivalence between the desire to inhabit technologically-mediated 
‘spaces’ and the need to ensure that this transaction remains a decision made by a free-
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willed mind-self, with the (feminine) spaces themselves remaining passive recipients of 
(masculine) action. 
 
The clearest examples of the hacker’s softened, awkward body can be found in Hafner 
and Markoff’s descriptions of notorious real-life hacker Kevin Mitnick and his friend 
Roscoe. Descriptions of their physical bodies are almost always framed within a disdain 
for their terrible fashion sense and diet: 
Roscoe’s appearance was surprisingly neat, but there was something amiss: his 
pale blue polyester pants with a slight flare at the bottom, and his dark polyester 
print shirt with an oversize collar, were already at least five years out of date [...] 
Roscoe lived on junk food, as did, it seemed, all his fellow phreaks. A patina of 
doughnut glaze frequently rested on Roscoe’s lips. In the afternoons, Roscoe 
moved onto Doritos and cheese-burgers. (1991: 35) 
It is also present in the first account of Mitnick’s appearance: “[The] plump and 
bespectacled Kevin Mitnick [...] was the kind of kid who would be picked last for a 
school team. His oversize plaid shirts were seldom tucked in, and his pear-shaped body 
was so irregular that any blue jeans would be an imperfect fit” (31). This sense that 
Mitnick was failing to engage socially as a result of his inadequate body is compounded 
further in this account of the young hacker’s encounters with law enforcement agencies: 
“Mitnick was on juvenile probation for breaking into other computers [...] in spite of 
Kevin’s cool reaction [...], his fear of getting caught was so profound that it gave him 
heart palpitations so severe that he would soon have to depend on heart medication 
usually taken by people three times his age” (91). These excerpts show the ways in which 
the bodies of hackers are always expected to ‘fail’ them. This engenders both the reason 
for and mode of escape into the self-constructed headspace of embryonic real-life 
computer networks: the disavowal (and often loathing) of those bodies.  
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As Lupton outlines, the stereotype of the overweight or inordinately skinny hacker, pasty 
and acne-ridden, with poor fashion sense, unable to relate to the opposite sex is clearly 
most often not a prompt to dismantle the cultural myths underscoring the reasons for 
such body-centric social marginalisation, but to seize upon a new territory in which their 
marginalised body does not matter (and can continue to be kept quieted by junk food, 
drugs and pornography), and all of the trappings of viable embodied subjectivity can be 
reproduced on the hacker’s own terms in the supposedly self-crafted mind-space of the 
electronic interface. I argue that this goes a step further: the near comical fantasies of 
power reproduced in Hafner and Markoff’s book suggest a direct correlation between this 
weakened, unfinished body and the defiant demonstrations of potency nevertheless 
possible as a result of the virtuosity of the mind inhabiting it. One hacker is reported to 
claim that “given the right information, one pimply adolescent scrunched into a phone 
booth with a terminal and a modem—and certainly Kevin Mitnick—could set off the 
necessary chain of commands to release hundreds of missiles from their silos and send 
them hurtling across the globe” (Hafner and Markoff 1991: 65, emphasis in original). 
This specific fantasy, of course, is reflected in the film WarGames, which depicts a lone 
hacker accidentally beginning the countdown to nuclear Armageddon with his home 
computer and crude acoustic coupler modem. 
 
There is also a depiction of a female hacker in Hafner and Markoff’s account that is 
emblematic of a relationship between women, hacking and digital technology in general 
that continues throughout almost all cultural representations of the hacker: female 
hackers, unlike their male counterparts, are not driven by rational curiosity, but by the 
incorrigible piques and desires of their unruly and overdetermined bodies. Similarly, the 
“real” source of their hacking ability resides in this embodied power, beyond their full 
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mental control. While Mitnick, Roscoe and others are seized by insatiable intellectual 
curiosity, their contemporary and (former) friend Susan Thunder is motivated to her own 
(nonetheless impressive) hacking exploits by an emotionally twisted need to get revenge 
on Roscoe for spurning her romantic advances: “by rejecting her so heartlessly, Roscoe 
was inviting trouble […] he had yet to experience Susan’s dark side” (34).63 
Foregrounded, too, is the putatively feminine character of her “hacks”. Even Roscoe’s 
brand of social engineering (the conventionally more “human” element of hacking 
whereby individuals are manipulated to gain passwords and so forth) is systematised and 
rational: he keeps careful lists and ledgers of various employees he has called at different 
companies, their roles, and what information he may be able to acquire from them. Susan 
Thunder’s mode of acquiring information, though, is more familiarly feminine-coded: 
What she couldn’t supply in technical knowledge she compensated for with other 
skills. One of her methods was to go out to a military base and hang around in 
the officers’ club, or, if she was asked to leave, in bars near the base. She would 
get friendly with a high-ranking officer, then go to bed with him. While he was 
sleeping, she would search through his personal effects for computer passwords 
and access codes. (30) 
Thunder’s mode of hacking is rooted in her ability to seduce men. Much is also made of 
her job in a “bordello” called the “Leather Castle” (52), and her attendant services as a 
sex worker. Elsewhere, too, Thunder is described as “obsessed by her desire”, (41) “ever 
the seducer” (55), “antagonistic and haughty” (57), and so on. The gender coding of 
hacker selves is clear here: Mitnick and Roscoe’s hacks are guided by curiosity and 
rational interest; attempts to overcome the limitations of their junk-saturated bodies. 
                                                 
63 These are, of course, reports of true events, and the authors cannot be blamed here for 
reporting the facts of Susan Thunder’s actions. However, her representation here as a hacker is 
very different to the representation of Mitnick or Roscoe, and is framed in such a way that 
separates ‘versions’ of hacking into domains expressed in terms of masculine and feminine 
coding. 
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Thunder’s hacking, however, is rooted in her body, reliant upon it, and subject to the 
overflows and overdeterminations of its (sexual) bodily desires. This encoding of the 
feminine body as only capable of an emotional, indistinct, irrational kind of hacking, in 
opposition to the masculine clarity of male hackers, maintains its cohesion through 
almost all ensuing representations of the hacker. 
 
We see less drastic but still pervasive and convincing examples of both this continual 
hacker frustration with embodiment and the feminine coding of that embodiment within 
a number of films, too. Appearing at a moment of renewed nervousness about nuclear 
war in the United States (hawkish heads of state took power on both sides of the Iron 
Curtain: Ronald Reagan in January 1981, and Yuri Andropov in November 1982), 
WarGames is critically celebrated for its enunciation of crises about artificial intelligence, 
the futility of nuclear conflict, and the slippage between the real and the simulated in 
computer-mediated transactions.64 In the film, the young hacker David Lightman 
inadvertently hacks into a United States defence computer at NORAD while trying to 
find new computer games to play. Initiating what he thinks is a simulation, he makes the 
computer believe that the Soviet Union has launched a massive nuclear attack on the 
United States. What the film’s central hacker figure shows most prominently is another 
male hacker whose bodily needs are more or less abandoned in pursuit of the ‘higher’ 
calling of projecting his consciousness into the task of hacking, an over-lively computer 
that needs re-subjecting into a passive position, and a firmly gendered understanding of 
who qualifies as a legitimate user of such technologies. Like many hacker figures, David 
eschews sleep, guzzles cans of Coke in front of the monitor, and laments his lack of 
physical fitness (he expresses his regret late in the film that he “can’t swim” because he 
“never got around to it”). The immediate needs of David’s body are temporarily sated 
                                                 
64  See my discussion of “artificial belligerence” in Chapter Five on the caring computer. 
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with the cheapest, most synthetic of nourishment as the hacker continues to push his 
consciousness into cyberspace. He is bored and unchallenged by his schoolwork, and 
only interested in the detective work of finding ways into computer systems, reordering 
the conditions of his offline life from the abstract online plane. WarGames helps stabilise 
the image of the hacker in some very tangible ways: as mentioned, real-life hackers were 
intoxicated by the film’s image of the potency an expert individual could have within a 
computer system, and drew inspiration for hacking practices from the occasionally quite 
realistic depictions of such within the film. It also, though, helps to congeal the figure of 
the male hacker and his particular mode of engaging with both systems and with women, 
which he treats almost equally. WarGames initiates an ongoing cinematic motif that 
positions women as well as computers as the targets of ‘hacking’: the plot trajectory that 
sees David end up with love interest Jennifer involves his hacking school computers to 
impress her by improving her poor grades, and playfully flirting with the idea of a 
romantic trip to Paris by making seat reservations for the two of them with a major 
airline.65  
 
These are, though, minor incursions compared to the hyper-gendered depiction of 
hacking seen in the film Weird Science.66 In this comedy, two unpopular teenagers, inspired 
by Frankenstein, use a computer to literally create a beautiful fantasy woman. Their original 
intention of a two-dimensional simulation of a woman—“we can use it, we can ask it 
questions, we can put it in real life sexual situations and see how it reacts”—soon 
                                                 
65 There is also both an absence and a failure of the familiar countercultural politics of 
the hacker in WarGames: firstly, David acts completely alone, in the absence of hacker 
communities. Secondly, the film’s apparent anti-nuclear message actually does much to 
recapitulate the standard doctrine on nuclear war: the WOPR war computer’s eventual discovery 
that “the only winning move is not to play” reinforces rather than unseats the logic of mutually 
assured destruction, and reassures that a rational subject would never initiate such a conflict.  
66 Jonathan Bernstein locates WarGames and Weird Science as part of a short “teen science 
cycle” of films that emerged in the 1980s: films about teenagers where science fiction plays a 
major part in propelling the narrative (1997: 128). For more on the collision between coming-of-
age narratives and technologies, see Andrew Shail and Robin Stoate (46ff). 
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succumbs to function creep, and they find themselves hacking into distant and 
mysterious computer databases, feeding cutouts of body parts from magazines into a 
scanner, and eventually strapping bras to their heads and hooking up a Barbie doll to the 
computer while chanting gibberish incantations. Appropriately, this mode of 
construction begins with their sitting in front of the computer screen and deciding, with 
the help of a wireframe diagram, how big her breasts should be: “anything more than a 
handful,” suggests project mastermind Gary to timid hacker Wyatt, “and you’re risking a 
sprained tongue”. The chaotic power of “Lisa”, though, once she is rendered flesh and 
blood (by a lightning strike to the house, again evoking cinematic depictions of 
Frankenstein’s monster), suggests the danger of the computer’s potential overextension 
into reality. While her behaviour is essentially benevolent, intended to guide the teenagers 
through their coming of age (and find them conventional girlfriends), she is a figure of 
threatening, magical power, able to bend reality according to her whims and piques. 
Overall, this ex nihilo production of a woman within cyberspace (there is a very Gibson-
esque moment of kinesis through a computer-generated space in Wyatt’s first hacks) 
sums up the hacker attitude to both technology and women: they are objects to be 
investigated, controlled, and, if necessary, built from the ground up if their threatening 
reality does not meet the required specifications.  
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Fig. 4. Gary and Wyatt select Lisa’s breast size in Weird Science. 
 
Like all the examples I examine in the remainder of this chapter, the first cluster of 
representations of the hacker here—in both fiction and non-fiction of the 1980s—
renders a character who seeks to use computers to access a space in which his 
subjectivity is viable and ‘hard’ rather than flabby and soft. This space itself is feminised, 
and the literal practice of hacking overlaps into the women in the lives of the hacker 
figures, in an effort to subject and control both. As apparently physically and subjectively 
subversive the behaviour of the hacker in relation to technology may seem, this, of 
course, does nothing to disrupt the categories that originally forced them to the margins 
in the first place. In fact, the possibility that unconventional subjective alliances may be 
forged—such as those between women and technology—is, as demonstrated in 
representations of the female hacker, actively contained by the plethora of discursive 
tools available for rendering feminine versions of rationality inadequate or aberrant.  
 
Sweet Machines 
This section examines the hacker figure in the 1990s, and the (failed) attempts to 
reconfigure or expand the category of subjects comprising viable hackers. There is a 
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relative absence of literary representations of the hacker after the end of the 1980s, and a 
notable turn to visual representations within major mainstream (mainly American, 
Hollywood) films: Sneakers, Jurassic Park, Goldeneye, Hackers, The Net  and The Matrix all 
foreground hackers as major characters, whereas notable literary representations are 
limited to Stephenson’s Snow Crash. One broad reason for this may be that film more 
easily reflects a change in the way computers were beginning to be used in the 1990s: the 
appearance and rapid adoption of Microsoft’s Windows 3.0 (1990) and Windows 3.1 (1992) 
substantiated a widespread shift away from command-line (text-based) input to 
computers and towards Graphical User Interfaces (GUIs).67 The relatively sudden shift 
to a visual/pictographic/iconic approach to computer use, along with the ability for 
computers to multi-task convincingly for the first time, registers in an equally visual way 
in cinematic depictions of the experience of using computers. Despite these cosmetic 
differences, though, the hacker figure continued to embody its normative function at the 
interface between the human and digital technologies—a function that maintains its 
dualistic, Cartesian character even as that dualism is rediscovered over and over again in 
the hacker’s forays into cyberspace, keeping digital technology in its putatively rightful 
place as an object of invention rather than an agent of substantiating influence, and 
limiting access to the privilege of being a hacker. The hacker as it develops through the 
1990s demonstrates a number of apparent attempts to overcome the ingrained 
stereotype, but also the eventual failure of each to do so, except in the most superficial of 
terms. Hacking remains a predominantly (even exclusively) male activity, and even within 
that category male hackers are an intellectually and materially privileged minority. This 
raising of an alternative character to hacking (i.e., the possibility that women could be 
                                                 
67 Windows was not the first GUI – it competed, as it does now, with Apple’s MacOS 
software, as well as other operating systems that have since disappeared (such as AmigaOS). 
However, Windows was the most successful GUI at the time: by 1993, the total number of 
registered Windows users had reached 25 million (computerhope.com n.d.). 
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hackers) followed by the undermining of those individuals mirrors the evocation and 
ensuing containment of the disruptive potential of the human-technological interface. 
 
Of the films mentioned above, it is Hackers that demonstrates most clearly the gendering 
of hacking. The film depicts the life of Dade “Zero Cool” Murphy (Jonny-Lee Miller), 
convicted of serious computer crimes at the age of eleven and disallowed from using 
computers or touchtone telephones until he is eighteen. Dade moves from Seattle to 
New York, and makes a new group of hacker friends, with whom he foils the conspiracy 
of an oil company’s corrupt system administrator—“The Plague”—to steal money from 
the company (as well as use a computer virus to capsize some oil tankers as a 
smokescreen). It also follows Dade’s attempts to ‘get a date’ with the film’s female hacker 
figure, Kate “Acid Burn” Libby (Angelina Jolie). Iain Softley’s 1995 film bids to escape 
the stereotypes of the unsexy, perpetually male hacker body, and rather embraces the 
hacker’s counterculture fantasy of a new order of social freedom and potency. As well as 
employing a fast-paced, colourful visual style and contemporary electronic rock 
soundtrack, and making its heroes more fashionably-dressed, fast-moving (rollerblading) 
members of a socially diverse community of hackers, Hackers also depicts a putatively 
skilled and powerful—and not to mention assertive—female hacker figure. Significantly, 
however, Hackers fails in its attempt to expand the remit of the ideal hacker figure to 
include previously excluded subjects—the film fails to make any fundamental breaks with 
the androcentric conceptual underpinnings of the particular understanding of the body 
on which this figure relies.68 Hackers, despite its superficially socially pluralistic approach 
                                                 
68 The first film to make any significant progress in representing the successful hacker as 
anything other than white and male is almost certainly The Matrix: Trinity is a female hacker of 
tremendous skill and ability. This representation, though, is still problematic: while embodying 
the culmination of 1990s attempts to package the hacker as a subversive, post-prejudicial 
manipulator of digital information, existing outside of normative networks of power and 
influence, The Matrix still fails ultimately to get beyond a very conventional and androcentric view 
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to cyberculture, participates in a mundane reiteration of a relationship between mind and 
body that privileges once more the former, and does so in a way that necessarily 
denigrates the body, and particularly the female body. The male hacker is still a 
mythically-unique and providentially-enabled manipulator of technology, the latter 
remaining (like conventional views of cyberspace itself) a feminised and passive agent, 
the object of rational creation and/or ordering. Similarly, the organic body is something 
to be managed or quieted with junk food, caffeine and nicotine, with kinesis/speed 
privileged as the only acceptable mode of being when one must inhabit the physical 
world. Women may be hackers too, in this world, and may even appear skilled, but they 
are emotionally or physically compromised, and always subject to become, at best, the 
sidekicks of the true (male) hacker virtuosos—as well as, at times, embodying (literally) a 
threat to the rationality of the male hacker. In harnessing, too, the vague, nihilistic 
‘anything but this’ countercultural politics of the disaffected middle-class Western 
teenager of the 1990s, its implied critiques of the runaway nature of corporate capital end 
up restating and armouring the legitimacy of those structures, with resistance by hackers 
demonstrated not as resistance to runaway capital itself, but only to those corrupt 
individuals who criminally misuse the system. 
  
Hackers effects a persistent symbolic entanglement of computers/digital space and 
women’s bodies, with both comprising the objects of discovery and the passive recipients 
of masculine intervention or interrogation. The film’s mise-en-scène is replete with the lurid 
eroticisation of the hacking experience. Posters declaring the value of a specifically 
masculine potency in the domination of technology assert that “information is 
penetration”, and implore readers to “trust [their] technolust”. The Plague, too, 
                                                                                                                                            
of the ideal hacker hero figure. See p. 66 for a discussion of Trinity’s steadily-compromised and 
increasingly conventionally-gendered role in The Matrix trilogy. 
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frequently invokes sexualised metaphors of the penetration of a passive body for 
hacking: “I disguised myself as an Alabama state trooper and penetrated the FBI NCIC”. 
“Hackers,” he remarks in another scene, “penetrate and ravage delicate private and 
publically owned computer systems, infecting them with viruses and stealing materials for 
their own ends”. There are further, even more explicit entanglements of women and 
technology: a scene where Dade and his hacker friends crowd around Kate’s expensive 
and powerful laptop computer is particularly redolent of masculine hormonal desire. 
Multiple (mostly technically nonsensical) “stats” about the laptop are shared in hushed 
tones of awe, before exclamations emerge such as “oof, I want it!” and “I want it to have 
my children, man!”. Coding technology as a feminine object to be penetrated, controlled 
or obtained, many of the film’s male hackers also invert the operation of that metaphor, 
as they participate in the project of “hacking” women. In one party scene, Dade’s hacker 
friends see a young woman dancing. One hacker (named “Lord Nikon”) immediately 
reels off her full name and address, obtained illegally by computer hacking. He uses this 
information to attract her attention. In a similar moment, happening immediately after 
the group of hackers has crowded around the laptop, they see Kate and her boyfriend 
starting to kiss intimately on the nearby bed, while they are still in the darkened corner of 
the room.69 The exchange, which circulates between the hackers, reduces sex to a 
computer game, with Kate’s male partner as the player in question, whose prowess they 
admire: “Was that her top?” “One-handed.” “Difficulty rating?” “Seven”. 70  
 
                                                 
69  This teenage voyeurism by a group of hackers recalls a similar moment in Sneakers, 
where that film’s group of hackers take turns watching, through a telescopic lens, a hacking target 
having sex. 
70 While beyond the parameters of this argument, one area of work on hackers might 
considers the comparisons between computer hackers and the activities of so-called “Pick-Up 
Artists”; communities of men who claim to be able to use psychological tricks and neurolinguistic 
programming to persuade women to have sex with them. The resonance between these practices 
and the practices of hackers, with women being the objects of a structured and almost 
mathematically-calculated programme of interrogation and decoding, is striking—as is their heavy 
proliferation on the Internet (Chivers 2010).  
Robin Stoate (Student No. 069063233) 
Reading Cyberspace: Fictions, Figures and (dis)Embodiment 
98 
 
 
 
Figs. 5 and 6. The hackers of Hackers awed by a laptop, and then by the prowess of Kate’s boyfriend. 
 
Dade is not above such remarks, either. As we first view Kate through Dade’s eyes, her 
intended androgynous look is undermined immediately by his tendency to subsume her 
into a highly gendered discourse of media consumption. When Dade meets Kate, the 
scene flickers suddenly through a sequence of near-subliminal cuts to highly sexualised 
images of women from comics and films. In a precursor to the hackers’ video gaming 
metaphors for sex, one of Dade’s first ‘victories’ over her is beating her at a virtual reality 
game, after which he observes, “looks like I’m on top”. Similarly, when Dade gets his 
revenge on Kate for her early prank (she fools him into locking himself on the school 
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roof in the rain), he does so by hacking the school’s computer systems and causing the 
fire sprinklers to activate: the hackers are delighted to see drenched women bouncing 
through hallways in increasingly-translucent white t-shirts. Kate’s tough image is replaced 
with a dishevelled, dripping one. 
 
In turn, the equation of women with technology maps onto the hacker figure’s need to 
be someone who cannot be controlled in that way: as seen with the deployment of the 
avatar as a kind of ‘one-way valve’ for the disembodied mind-self to enter, inhabit and 
act within a cyberspace, the male hacker does not wish to ever be the object of such 
penetration himself. The male hacker, in other words, must not end up tied into the 
object position in the logic of otherness that he uses to define both the computer and the 
woman. Women’s bodies are thus often written to constitute a considerable threat to the 
rationality and stability of the hacker subject—a threat requiring containment.71 We see 
two dream sequences in Hackers: Dade dreams of sex with Kate, and she dreams of sex 
with him. However, these scenes are coded very differently. In Dade’s dream, Kate 
enters Dade’s room and starts kissing him—but both are then arrested by secret service 
agents. Dade wakes up in horror. Kate’s dream, however, is just of sex, has no 
appreciable narrative trajectory outside of the intimate contact itself, and when she 
wakes, she gives a coy grin of enjoyment in the darkness. In another moment of female 
liability to the hacker’s rationality, The Plague uses Dade’s mother as a vector for 
manipulating him, using the spectre of her bodily vulnerability to force him into 
acquiescence: he tells the young hacker that his “mom will be arrested at work, she’ll be 
                                                 
71 There is some suggestion that Dade’s proximity to potentially over-permeable digital 
technologies risk effecting his exclusion from the heterosexual matrix in which he is expected to 
locate himself: early in the film, his mother asks him sarcastically whether he is up all night 
playing with his computer “or playing with himself”—following it up by asking him to reassure 
her that “he likes girls”. This scene is one of several evoking the pressure that Dade is under to 
fulfil his coming of age: inexplicably, Dade responds to his mother’s later question as to whether 
he is behaving on the Internet with “Yes, mom… and I’m still a virgin!”.  
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handcuffed, and later strip-searched” (notably, a very similar threat is levered against Y.T. 
in Snow Crash).72 In fact, despite the meshing of the risk/allure of women and technology, 
there are really no women in the film (except Kate) who understand technology to any 
great degree. Even Margot Wallace, a system administrator and The Plague’s partner (in 
both crime and socio-sexual congress), parrots The Plague’s technical terminology 
frequently and uncomprehendingly while he hacks, and seems to have little 
understanding of what he is doing in most cases.73 
  
Ultimately, female hackers are portrayed as ultimately just not as good as male ones, 
unable to conquer or read masculine figures, and are, in narratives such as Hackers, 
eventually subsumed into conventional feminine roles, which are coded as inevitable (to 
the extent of being dictated by fate or providence). Not only does Dade beat Kate 
frequently ‘at her own game’ (which ends, ultimately, with Dade ‘winning’ Kate—and 
insisting that she wear a dress on their eventual date) we are always arguably expected to 
know that Dade’s talent exists on a different level to hers.74 Narrative trajectories assure 
the quasi-mythical nature of Dade’s ability (a motif borne out far more explicitly in The 
                                                 
72 There is also a scene in Sneakers that pays lip service to the idea of an intelligent and 
rational woman, but only harnesses, in the end,4 the putative danger of women’s bodies to the 
rationality of the hacker. Protagonist Marty’s ex-partner Liz is set up early in the film to be 
intelligent—he goes to her for help understanding the work of a brilliant 
mathematician/cryptologist –but she is only ever ultimately used to gain access to a building by 
seducing an awkward (“computer dating”) programmer. She is valued narratively only for her 
ability to pollute the hyper-rational subjectivity of a computer scientist; any power she has within 
the text is rooted in her body and tied to her putative sexual allure. 
73 The character of Margot Wallace is another example of a failed powerful woman – an 
executive at the oil company, she is in collaboration with The Plague’s project of stealing money 
from the company. Uncomprehending and confused for most of the film, with little of an active 
role of any visible kind, her fall is implicitly linked to her attempt to embody a masculine 
controlling role: her supercomputer administrator password of “God”, for instance, recalls a 
hacker’s earlier assertion in the film that “system operators love to use “God”... it’s that whole 
male ego thing”. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that she is punished here for her claiming 
of that title without having the (inherently masculine) intellect/hacking talent to back it up. 
74 Owen et al highlight in this moment a self-undermining impersonation of progressive 
gender politics that reflects countless such illusions in hacker narratives: “though the script makes 
a gesture towards gender equity by Kate insisting that if she wins, Dade will wear a dress on their 
date, this would not actually have achieved equity if she had won: a dress on him is a joke; on her 
it symbolizes the recovery of her femininity” (2007: 78). 
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Matrix, where Neo is literally deigned by fate to save humanity). A prologue set in 1988 
shows the trial at which Dade was convicted as a child: the shot pans slowly across the 
faces of several serious-looking lawyers and legal officials (this while charges are read out 
referring to hacking crimes of considerable virtuosity, perpetuated by “a superior 
intelligence”) before ending in empty space, and then shifting downwards to the young 
Dade. Foregrounding Dade’s early talent in this way marks him as prodigious, the 
rightful owner and bearer of the hyper-rational practice of computer hacking. A later 
scene where Dade finally proves his unique ability comes when he is the only one capable 
of decoding a “garbage file”: his moment of realisation comes during a montage where 
the other hackers, Kate included, are restless and chaotic around his calm, brooding 
figure. While this continues, glowing mathematical formulae swirl around Dade’s head: 
his form of hacking is a transcendental experience, interfacing with the purity of digital 
data, ordering the chaos of signs into evidence for The Plague’s conspiracy (Fig. 7).75 
Where Kate has previously been seen to be the “elite” hacker of the group, this moment 
proves Dade’s supremacy in a kind of dramatisation of techno-enlightenment to which 
the other hackers do not have access.  
                                                 
75 Again, too, hacking depicts computer space here as a Euclidean plane, into which the 
rational mind-essence is projected, and for which only certain subjects are suitable for/capable of 
penetration. Hackers sets up immediately a familiarly cyberpunk relationship between cyberspace 
and the city: in a deliberate obfuscation between urban and electronic spaces reminiscent of 
images seen earlier in TRON and described frequently in Gibson’s novels, the film’s title 
sequence depicts Dade flying over New York in an aeroplane, with the cityscape fading 
seamlessly into the image of a printed circuit board. Indeed, the film is knowingly reminiscent of 
cyberpunk, and makes explicit references to Gibson’s work in particular: “keyboard cowboys” are 
mentioned at one point, and antagonist The Plague’s supercomputer is “a Gibson” – the most 
powerful and desirable brand of computer in the Hackers universe.  
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Fig. 7. Dade ‘ascends’ into the hyper-rational mind-space of the mythical hacker. 
 
Hackers is also a powerful example of the failed subversive politics of the hacker. As 
Sobchack points out in her reading of Mondo 2000, a glossy hacker magazine established 
in 1989 and published until 1998, the startling revolutionary claims of 1990s hackers are 
undermined frequently by a reductive tendency to repeat existing patterns of social 
power:  
This bumper-sticker libertarianism is neither progressive nor democratic [...] A 
list of features of the ‘cyberpunk worldview’ includes, at most, the notion of 
‘small groups’ as in: ‘Small groups of individual “console cowboys” can wield 
tremendous power over governments, corporations etc. [...] Its dreams of 
personal freedom and its utter faith in self-help are grounded in privilege and the 
status quo: male privilege, white privilege, economic privilege, First World 
privilege. Its dreams are grounded in the freedom to buy, and—especially—the 
freedom to sell. (145) 
Such collapse of large-scale revolutionary claims of freedom into Reaganite individualism 
is a recurring pattern in hacker fictions. Apparent moments of social activism give way 
quickly to more selfish, even childish priorities. Like WarGames’ David Lightman, 
Hackers’ Dade is a brilliant but conventionally underachieving hacker, who, before the 
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film’s conspiracy envelops him, focuses his talents upon playing pranks (e.g. he hacks a 
local TV station ostensibly to stop the ranted screeds of a racist politician, but this is 
replaced only with an episode of The Outer Limits). Dade’s hacking endeavours are 
rebellious, but, in general, harmless. The film takes pains to ensure that Dade’s future 
trajectory—working within the conventional system of corporate enterprise against 
which he bucks so superficially as a teenager—is evoked as frequently as possible: 
beyond the potential environmental disaster of the virus-infected automated oil tankers, 
one of the film’s main sources of peril is the possibility that Dade will not “get into 
college”. The film’s only two relatively chaotic and socially subversive characters–Razor 
and Blade, media hackers and video artists—are, too, set upon a vector that sees their 
teenage rebelliousness commodified and resold: a major television network is said to be 
negotiating with them to purchase their erstwhile ‘underground’ show. Frenetic and 
disruptive hacker “Cereal Killer” invokes a “higher purpose” when trying to get Kate and 
Dade to work together to get their friend “The Phreak” out of prison, citing “a wakeup 
call for the Nintendo generation... we demand free access to data, well, it comes with 
some responsibility”. The Plague himself has not grown up – despite being an adult in 
his late twenties, he is a perpetual teenage manchild (skateboarding, eating junk food, 
playing VR games et cetera). The film thus evokes the threat of not fulfilling the 
conventional corporate trajectory: ‘go straight’ and become a responsible adult, working 
for the mainstream, or end up in prison like The Plague eventually does.76 
 
                                                 
76 Skateboarding is used as a signifier for teenage ways of engaging with the world; the 
eventual progression for the teenage character is control of the car. The Plague is implicitly coded 
as developmentally stunted by his reliance on this form of transport. See Shail and Stoate for a 
discussion of teenage ways of moving through the world (48). Wider discussion of the teen 
movie or “teenpic”, including an exhaustive account of the consolidation of the figure of the 
teenager and how cinema contributed to its establishment can be found in Thomas Doherty’s 
Teenagers and Teenpics: The Juvenilization of American Movies in the 1950s (1988) and Timothy Shary’s 
Teen Movies: American Youth on Screen (2005). 
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Being a kind of cinematic manifesto for the popularly-imagined shape of the 
computer/network hacker in the middle of the 1990s, as well as trying to distil both the 
excitement and concerns surrounding the increasing mainstreaming of computers (and 
the Internet in particular) in the 1990s, Hackers is emblematic of the nevertheless 
contiguous flow of the hacker figure’s conventional, normative logic of identity vis-à-vis 
digital technologies and the body, with that figure surfacing apparently as a boldly 
rebranded version of itself, but displaying very little conceptual change from its earlier 
incarnations in the 1980s. Ultimately, throughout the 1990s, performances of the hacker 
figure’s putatively subversive influence at the interface—primarily the apparent recrafting 
of the gendered human-computer relationship, but also the challenging of corporate 
greed—are failures. Hackers demonstrates the need for its teenaged characters to “grow 
up” and accept both the narrow and normative function of the hacker role and the 
legitimacy of the military-industrial structures that provided the technologies that brought 
it into being. As Dade asks of Kate, himself blurring the line between her computer and 
her body, “are you sure this sweet machine’s not going to waste?”. Female hackers, here, 
remain “sweet machines”, and those in control remain the masculine mind-subjects 
capable of decoding, penetrating and owning them. 
 
Playtime’s Over, Sweetheart 
While the 1990s saw the Internet being established firmly in the public consciousness in 
the West—and registering prominently in the abovementioned texts—the more 
romantic, outlandish and exaggerated vision of the online experience (and indeed hacker 
communities) became less tenable after the turn of the millennium, partly because more 
people were familiar with the rather more mundane realities of using the Internet (and 
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arguably jaded by such technocultural anti-climaxes as the nonexistent Y2K bug).77 For 
the most part, too, attempts such as those seen in Hackers and The Matrix to reconfigure 
the image of the unsexy male hacker dwindle after 1999. The Core (dir. Jon Amiel, 2003) 
and Die Hard 4.0 (dir. John McTiernan, 2007), the two mainstream Hollywood films 
depicting hacker characters, display if anything a backsliding towards the 1980s 
understanding of who can and should be allowed to occupy the figure of the hacker.78 If 
the 1990s representation of the hacker sometimes comprises a superficial attempt to 
expand the figure of the hacker to include more previously excluded subjects, after this 
point we witness a reassertion of the exclusively male hacker, reproduced through the 
subjection of technology as a discrete but threatening object requiring decoding and 
control, and, again, the gender-coding of these encounters. The hacker continues to 
possess a singular, quasi-mystical and essential ability to use technology, and technology 
itself continues to embody a passive—if occasionally dangerous—entity whose 
permeation by digital information can only be regulated legitimately by this kind of 
hacker. Female hackers exist, but fail in their roles, because their bodies are as unruly as 
the digital information that they are ultimately unable to control. 
 
Conversely, the male hacker’s near-loathing of his own organic body, the desires and 
influences of which are, too, coded as feminine (or aroused by dangerous feminine 
influences), manifests once more in a programme of bodily hardening, body disavowal 
and body subjection—along with a deliberate rewriting of the meaning-value of any 
                                                 
77 Estimates suggest that the number of people using the Internet worldwide rose from 
13 million in 1995 to 458 million in 2001; current figures are close to 2 billion 
(internetworldstats.com 2010). 
78 Swordfish attempts to overcome this image, but does so by hypermasculinising the 
hacker body rather than expanding the remit of the hacker figure to include women: the film’s 
lead character, played by Hugh Jackman, is a conventionally handsome and hard-bodied action 
hero as well as being a hacker. In one scene, Jackman’s character is challenged to hack a 
computer while being fellated by a woman: this representation is perhaps the absolute distillation 
of the threat of embodied feminine sexuality to the putatively masculine rational activity of 
computer hacking. 
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unavoidable embodied signifiers (such as scars) to better suit the discourses of masculine 
activity.79 As seen in earlier texts, hackers’ (non-)politics espouses a liberatory, anti-
corporate, subversive character while working simultaneously to reassert (and later join) 
the conventional social and economic order it claims to disrupt. The hacker’s putative 
‘rebellious but righteous’ role in taking on ‘the system’, manifesting once more in a 
confrontation between the hacker and the corrupt system administrator, usually just 
actually reinforces that system rather than critiquing it. The hacker never smashes the 
established order; he just has unique insight into people who are using it in a corrupt or 
power-hungry fashion, and uses his privileged perspective to help restore order. Focusing 
mainly here upon Die Hard 4.0, and drawing comparisons with some other nearby hacker 
depictions, I examine the continued role of the hacker in policing the symbolic boundary 
between the human and the technological other, and the ways that this policing is 
mapped onto other subjectively ‘risky’ interface encounters. As is the case with all the 
hacker narratives examined so far, the ongoing reiteration of the dualistic view of mind 
and body manifests in unidirectional interactions with technology, along with the socially 
exclusionary practices of its reinscription. 
 
The fourth film in an ongoing franchise that began with Die Hard (dir. John McTiernan, 
1988), Die Hard 4.0 (entitled Live Free or Die Hard in the USA) concerns an attempt by a 
brilliant but disgruntled ex-government computer security expert, Thomas Gabriel, to get 
revenge on the United States of America for his earlier dismissal. With the paid help of 
armed mercenaries (and the unwitting aid of several hackers’ coding skills), he sets up a 
“cyber attack” on the United States’ information technology infrastructure that 
culminates in an attempt to download financial records to give him untraceable access to 
every digital cent of the country’s money. The film’s hero, New York cop John McClane 
                                                 
79 “Chicks dig scars,” McClane explains to Matt at the end of Die Hard 4.0. 
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(played by longtime action hero Bruce Willis), works with teenage hacker Matt Farrell 
(played by the comparatively nerdy Justin Long) to foil the plot. It is primarily an action 
film, the high-technology theme of which serves ostensibly as the scaffolding upon 
which to hang lots of violence, gunfire and explosions.80 However, the relationship 
between McClane and Matt—as well as those relationships between all the film’s hackers 
and their respective technologies—animates the hacker figure’s role, as well as reasserting 
who can become an effective hacker, and what the risks are to the hacker subject. 
 
Firstly, Die Hard 4.0 projects a highly gendered depiction of the relationships between 
individual subjects and technology. As seen in Hackers, women are both inadequate and 
potentially dangerous masters of technology, with their inadequacies and their risks to 
more legitimate (male) users rooted in their sexuality and the ‘more embodied’ character 
to their gender. Die Hard 4.0 has a prominent female hacker figure: antagonist Thomas 
Gabriel’s partner, Mai Linh. She tricks several of the world’s most notorious hackers into 
writing code for Gabriel’s cyber attack, by playing the part of a systems administrator for 
a fictional company, ‘employing’ the hackers to ‘test’ their security systems by writing 
advanced computer viruses. Each of these hackers is murdered by remote control when 
their part of the job has been delivered: a bomb built into their computer is triggered, 
killing them and destroying the evidence. Implicit in these opening scenes is the quasi-
seducing nature of Mai’s task: her appeal to the vulnerable embodied desires of these 
uniformly teenage, single male hackers is highlighted during a telephone exchange 
between Mai and Matt (one of the hackers in question): “you have a sexy voice,” he 
remarks, “is there anything else I can do for you? To you?”. It is only McClane’s 
                                                 
80 The film’s underlying concern—that digital information is radically permeable and 
vulnerable when not being corralled into order by a conventionally legitimate user/subject—also 
reflects concerns regarding the infectious/contagious nature of globalised common capital, and 
these concerns are expressed in a gendered manner. See Chapter Three on the nanotechnological 
swarm for a discussion of the pejorative marking of digital capital as feminine and “leaky”. 
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intervention—he arrives to arrest Matt on suspicion of his involvement in an earlier 
cyberattack—that averts Matt’s death. This is a scene, though, that plants the seeds for a 
more acute failure of Mai’s role as a hacker. Having hacked into the radio despatches 
system of Washington DC’s police department, Mai attempts to mislead the driver of the 
police car transporting McClane and Matt to the headquarters of the government’s 
computer security agency. As Mai tries, over the radio, to direct the driver into an 
ambush, a police officer in the car remarks: “man, that’s a sexy voice”. Matt recognises 
the voice, having had his attention drawn to its “sexiness”, and this is followed up by 
McClane testing Mai with a kind of police officer shibboleth (he remarks, using radio 
“10-codes”, upon a fictional mass outbreak of nudism). Not knowing this code, she fails 
to parse and respond properly to his reference. Her deception is thus uncovered by her 
inability to rein in her too-lively sexuality: “cut the bullshit, honey,” McClane demands, 
“and put your boss on.” Mai’s body, here, beyond her rational control, has let her down. 
 
Despite her proximity to and apparent understanding of the relevant technology, and her 
ability to move through digital spaces and access systems in a fluent and informed way, 
Mai’s role is less that of the rational hacker and more that of the temptress, whose body 
is both the source of her power and the cause of her inevitable downfall as it is decoded 
and mastered by the masculine subjects whose rational legitimacy comes under no such 
scrutiny. “Playtime’s over, sweetheart”, McClane tells Mai as she attempts to hack the 
control system of a major power station: her masquerade as a hacker has been brought to 
an end, and the rightful male hacker—Matt, protected by McClane’s powerful body, and 
learning to armour his own body in similar ways—has been installed in her place, to 
repair the damage she has done. The role of women here is to not to be hackers, but to 
be used to disrupt the rationality of an active male subject—an emotional or erotic 
connection to a female character is a vulnerability for the male protagonists and 
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antagonists. Gabriel tries to force McClane to take unnecessary risks by kidnapping his 
teenage daughter, Lucy.81 McClane taunts Gabriel over Mai’s death, using extremely 
sexualised and misogynistic language: “Mai... little Asian chick, likes to kick people? Last 
time I saw her she was at the bottom of an elevator shaft, with an SUV rammed up her 
ass”.82 Mai is not, though, the only simultaneous embodiment of failed rationality and 
technological permeability. Again, like in Hackers, women-with-technology in Die Hard 
4.0 are more frequently the objects of hacking than effective hackers themselves. For 
instance, in a moment where McClane and Matt are trying to start a stolen car whose 
immobiliser has been triggered, Matt persuades the woman remotely administering the 
car for the manufacturer (“Delores”) to start it for them, appealing to her emotions by 
pretending that he is with his critically ill father, and needs to drive to a hospital. Easily 
manipulated via her emotions, Delores is emblematic of the vulnerability to the system 
that is posed by women installed at the interface, women’s attendant inability to ever 
truly embody roles of effective users of technology, and, indeed, the symbolic 
equivocation of women with technology, as passive commodities subject to ‘hacking’. 
 
The film’s central relationship between McClane and Matt evinces the subjective risk at 
which the hacker subject places himself, by existing at the intersection between uniquely 
“human” selfhood and the potentially disruptive domain of information technologies. 
The need to resist the crossover of influence of the technological into the masculine 
                                                 
81 While Lucy is given a “fiery” personality in the film—she is defiant and violent—this 
is explained as her being “her father’s daughter”. She remains the imprinted outcome of 
McClane’s overbearing masculinity, and this imprint pales to a poor replica when he himself is 
present: she is subsumed immediately into the traditional damsel role when she is rescued by 
McClane, and tearfully says that she “knew [he] would come for [her]”. Gabriel’s attempts to 
disrupt McClane’s life by hacking focus first upon emptying his pension account. Lucy belongs, 
apparently, to the same pliable domain as the dangerously indistinct digital entity of McClane’s 
financial security. 
82  His remarks are also more than slightly racist—at one point he refers to her as an 
“Asian hooker bitch”, deploying an Orientalist discourse of obtainable and commodified Asian 
female sexuality. 
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mind-self, and to ensure complete control of dangerously permeable (feminised) digital 
information, is evoked by the pairing of a stereotypically pale, teenaged, socially/sexually 
immature, physically unfit boy-hacker with a strong, heavily-built, literally battle-scarred, 
gun-toting action hero. While Matt is viewed at the outset as a typical hacker, obsessed 
with the mind and ignoring the body (foregoing sleep, swilling energy drinks and 
eschewing physical exercise) there is a dangerous ambivalence in this particular tactic of 
body-subjection that only McClane can correct: Matt’s brand of bodily disavowal is tied 
to his vulnerability to a kind of digital seduction, and manifests in an ignorance and 
weakness of his own body rather than a commanding recrafting of it. McClane frequently 
browbeats Matt for being unfit—“it’s a little thing they invented in the sixties, called 
‘jogging’”— or mocking him for being on the cusp of being an immature man-child: 
picking up a collectible model in Matt’s apartment, McClane asks, “not spending a whole 
lotta time with the girls, huh?”.83 Matt whines frequently and childishly about his body—
“I skinned my knee and my asthma is acting up”; “I just need to catch my breath”, “I 
have low blood sugar”, and so on—but by the end of the film, has taken a bullet in the 
leg and shoots a man dead. One of McClane’s roles in the film is to help Matt to learn 
how to “grow up”: he teaches the young hacker about his body. When Matt says he 
“can’t stop shaking”, McClane tells him that it’s “the adrenaline, you’re just scared, it’ll 
pass.” Matt is so divorced from the prescribed parameters of the masculine bodily 
experience that he has lost track of even what fear and adrenaline are. The young hacker 
requires McClane’s help in learning how to interpret properly (and, significantly, disavow 
where necessary) his own body’s signals and desires, armouring himself against invasions 
made more likely by his sustained proximity to digital technology. We witness a young 
                                                 
83 At some moments, McClane and Matt’s homosocial relationship borders on the 
homoerotic—there are several shots of a panting, sweating Matt watching with awe as McClane 
violently kills another henchman. In one particularly charged moment, Matt asks to see 
McClane’s identification, and McClane coyly lifts his jacket to reveal a large gun at his hip. Matt 
stammers, “that… that actually looks pretty good.” 
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and physically unassertive hacker supplied with a counterpart hypermasculine body to 
help him learn how to re-conquer the interconnected dangers of the feminine and the 
technologised other: the risk to the hacker subject here is that his proximity to feminine-
coded digital technologies could, in some way, invade his rationality, disempower—and 
ultimately emasculate—him, if the latter is not ordered properly (by violence) into 
conventional patterns of influence and separation. McClane sets about rediscovering a 
potent embodied masculinity where the over-feminine permeable weightlessness of data 
has emerged as powerful force (and in the process, reasserts the fading influence of the 
nation-state: “it’s not a system,” he insists; “it’s a country”). 84 
 
Fig. 8. McClane telling Matt to ignore his fear. 
 
The hacker figure’s occurrence in Die Hard 4.0 re-establishes once more the conceptual 
shape it has held since the 1980s. Systemic resistance dissolves into a collaboration with 
authority, and this, too, is partly absorbed into the discourse of ‘growing up’: teenage 
hackers need to be helped onto the correct masculine path or end up browbeaten and 
                                                 
84 Other characters give us insight into the potential consequences of failing to master 
the computer’s feminising influence: the character of “The Warlock”, an overweight hacker who 
lives in a basement (and feebly refers to it as his “command centre”) shows the danger of not 
having this kind of masculine guidance—he is browbeaten by his hysterical caricature of aging 
single mother. 
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controlled by women or technology. Thus here technology is raised as a threatening 
‘object’ in order to dramatise its taming and controlling. Women and technology are still 
symbolically entangled, too: putative female inadequacy in handling technology is rooted 
in the sexualised body, but this bodily ‘unruliness’ overspills into technology itself, 
necessitating the imposition of a unified and rational (male) self to ensure its subjection. 
The ongoing reiteration of the dualistic view of the relationship between mind and body, 
then, manifests in these interactions with technology, along with the exclusionary 
practices of its reinscription. 
 
Hack the Planet 
The hacker appears to be a progressive figure, poised to use technology to radically 
reconfigure the boundaries of subjectivity according to egalitarian principles of merit and 
intellectual ability. Instead, however, this figure resides at that interface and defines the 
terms by which subjects can interact with technology. It does so in a way that projects an 
image of possible social transgression through relationships with technology, while in 
reality effecting a policing of the boundaries between the human and the technological 
other. Suspicion of individuals/users who are judged to be inadequate at keeping those 
two things separate run deeply in hacker narratives, and the ejection of those inadequate 
mind-selves—either through denigrating their ability to hack based on their unruly 
bodies, forcing them into the object position (i.e. producing them as objects of hacking 
endeavours), or killing them outright—is emblematic of this suspicion. Women are 
frequently the losers in these transactions: the ongoing effort to keep the category of the 
rational hacker subject ‘pure’ operates through deployment of the discursive tools of 
misogyny and an androcentric status quo. Even the stated political dreams of hackers—
the overturning of corporate power, the appeal to plural voices rather than monolithic 
government ones, technologically-enabled social and literal mobility for all—are reduced 
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to a libertarian fantasy of radical individualism, where the individuals concerned are all 
those who are inherently privileged by their being included in that extant narrow category 
of white, male, technologically-educated computer users, and that privilege is invisible to 
them. 
  
Despite considerable social change in the way digital technologies are distributed and 
used since the 1980s, the hacker figure maintains a conceptual role which is virtually 
unchanged over time. From the beginnings of cyberpunk, through the hacker’s ‘sexy’ 
period in the 1990s and to its further consolidation as something of a cinematic 
stereotype in the last decade, this figure of the hacker has not changed, except to take on 
superficial elements of rebranding, and, perhaps to become even more stable. Even 
apparent conscious attempts to expand the hacker role outside of the narrow and 
prescriptive definition founded in cyberpunk are hamstrung by the fundamental logic of 
bodily disavowal and categorical exclusion on which the hacker figure is based. The 
hacker is therefore a figure that is so fundamentally built to reject alternative notions of 
embodiment and reinscribe the rules of engagement along exclusive and dualistic lines, 
that it is very difficult to imagine it being reclaimed or deployed for more progressive 
political purposes. Attempts to extend the category of the hacker from its narrow white, 
male heterosexual stereotype only raise the possibility of those alternative hacker subjects 
in order to contain them. While the encounters between putatively human and technological 
subjects in these narratives may evoke fantasies of social liberation and escape from 
prejudice, they are far from the cyborgic hybrids of Haraway’s metaphor: if anything, 
hackers want to maintain at all times a solid and incontrovertible sense of rational, 
masculine control, and anyone not included in that category is subject to being the object 
of that control. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  
THE NANOTECHNOLOGICAL SWARM 
 
In Engines of Creation (1986), MIT nanotechnology pioneer Eric Drexler coined a name 
for a catastrophic phenomenon that was beginning to appear in science fiction.85 The 
“grey goo” scenario describes a situation in which a swarm of microscopic, molecular, 
self-replicating technologies—an idea based largely on concepts propounded by the 
physicist Richard Feynman (1959), and eventually intended for any number of beneficial 
purposes from medical aid to experimental science—spontaneously start to evolve and 
multiply beyond control, literally consuming their environment and turning it into a 
homogenous organic slop that eventually spreads to assimilate the entire universe. This 
process, described as “ecophagy” (literally “eating the environment”) by Robert Freitas 
of the Insitute for Molecular Manufacturing in California, and rooted in dramatic 
projections regarding contemporary developments in nanotechnology, appears in a 
number of science fiction texts. Greg Bear’s novel Blood Music (1985) is the most widely-
cited example of this phenomenon; the novel describes a near-future world in which 
simple molecular “bio-computers” (later “noocytes”) consume and transform the specific 
human body into which they are injected, before spreading to absorb and transform the 
whole of North America into vast, formless strata of matter. Another, more recent 
fictional representation can be seen in the remake of the 1951 science fiction film The 
Day the Earth Stood Still (2008), the climax of which depicts an alien robot transforming 
itself into a swarm of “nanites” that dissolves everything in its path.  
 
 
                                                 
85 For a version of this argument which is framed by work by other authors on similar 
apocalyptic scenarios, see Stoate (2010). 
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Fig. 9. Nanites absorb a stadium in The Day the Earth Stood Still (2008). 
 
It is also a concern that has attracted wider attention in the ‘real’ world—self-described 
transhumanists such as Raymond Kurzweil and mainstream media organs such as The 
New York Times have published pieces on the need to contain the potentially global threat 
of nanotechnology through a “responsible” development and deployment of the idea. In 
2004 Prince Charles responded to the notion in a way that did not name grey goo 
directly, but which urged particularly careful handling of nanotechnology, and expressed 
concern over a perceived lack of ethical consideration: “[If] we look at the EU’s research 
programme for nanotechnology, only an estimated 5 per cent of total funding is being 
spent on examining the environmental, social and ethical dimensions of these 
technologies. That certainly doesn’t inspire confidence” (Wales 2004). The imaginative 
weight of this idea, then, evokes a particularly fearful response from some quarters. 
 
The third and final figure that, I argue, has a policing effect at the boundary between the 
humanist subject and the technological other is this nanotechnological swarm. Like the 
avatar and the hacker, the nanotechnological swarm both animates technological threats 
to the cohesion of the (dis-)embodied liberal humanist version of the human subject and 
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dramatises those threats being brought under control by a conventional, rational 
(masculine) subject. However, the nanotechnological swarm goes further than the 
previous two figures: rather than acting as just a representative of digital technology’s 
metaphorical or conceptual threat to the exclusivity of masculine human agency (in ways 
that the avatar and the hacker are, I have argued, figures deployed to resist), the 
nanotechnological swarm literalises that threat to the cohesion of the subject: the swarm 
threatens the complete and literal dissolution of the mind and the body of the hitherto 
differentiated human subject. In that sense, the nanotechnological swarm stands as 
arguably the most dramatic figure of technological threats to, and recapitulation of, 
conventional and dualistic visions of the human. Furthermore, the trajectory of 
nanotechnological development and its unique position as the product of a collision 
between transnational private/state capital, the digital and the material (e.g. the 
transmission of capital, into code, into material) allows us to discover an ongoing 
concern over the possibly radically permeating effects of globalised commodification 
upon difference itself. 
 
It is not, of course, unreasonable to warn or build safeguards against such a scenario—
nobody really wants to be dissolved into a fluid grey mess—and indeed, my purpose here 
is not to determine how likely a grey goo scenario is.86 My focus is, again, on the figure’s 
representations in fiction: what can be uncovered in fictional depictions of the grey goo 
scenario are wider concerns about the homogenising effect of global capital and an 
ensuing total obliteration of difference itself—but  with the latter ‘blamed’ upon the 
bodies of marginalized subjects. In other words, anxieties about literal corporeal 
dissolution into a continuum of matter are symptomatic of fears of a capital-driven global 
                                                 
86 For a scientific critique of fictional representations of nanotechnology (and Crichton’s 
Prey in particular) see Chris Phoenix (2003). 
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assimilation of all subject positions into transmissible, digitally encoded, abstracted, 
commodified ciphers—and yet, within these narratives, the perceived source of this 
disastrous global sameness is, ironically, displaced away from capital and onto exoticized 
representatives of difference itself.87 While the levelling of difference, by the transcription 
into what Haraway terms the “common language” of (digitized) capital in those 
considered ‘other’ is desirable for the agents of capital itself (particularly in the drive to 
create new market demographics), there is a lingering risk that that obliteration of 
difference will overspill into the agent coded as active; the subject in charge could lose 
control and human(ist) exceptionalism could be eroded or erased (164).88 The scapegoats 
for this rampant dissolution become the putatively inadequate bodies of those 
traditionally coded as other to the lingering normative subjects of Western discourse: 
those who are non-male, non-white, non-heterosexual, et cetera. 
 
This chapter examines grey goo texts as points of convergence for those varying, tangled, 
and often contradictory concerns. Important to note here is that while my previous two 
chapters have focused upon the resilience of their respective figures over time, theorising 
the significance of the figures’ (non-)changes as ongoing normative responses to the 
subjective threat of the interface, this chapter focuses on two texts produced in a much 
shorter historical moment. Rather than moving through several decades of texts and 
tracing the figure’s shape through those texts, the nanotechnological swarm’s normative, 
boundary-policing functions are best uncovered by comparing thoroughly a strikingly 
                                                 
87 Digital, globalised capital lurks in the contexts of this thesis, too, of course: as 
highlighted by Haraway’s “common language”, the flow of subjectivity between humans and 
machines engendered by technological change is lubricated in no small part by the increasing 
promiscuity of (digitised) money between private and public institutions, countries, individuals 
and so on. But the nanotechnological swarm represents an absolutely acute entanglement of 
technology, culture and capital in a way that literalises the flow of digitised money into material (as 
I explain presently), and this necessitates my foregrounding the role and influence of such capital 
much more strongly than I have in previous chapters. 
88  That is, considered other within the frameworks of normative logics of identity, which 
includes as other ‘the world’ itself. 
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similar set of discourses in two books published within just four years of each other.89 
Unravelling the discourse of grey goo in two novels—Prey by Michael Crichton (2002) 
and Bloom by Wil McCarthy (1998)—we can see the ways in which grey goo serves as 
both a model for the capital-driven dissolution of difference, and a cluster of metaphors 
which scapegoats normatively marginalized subjects (primarily women) by linking the 
putative inadequacies of their bodies to the burgeoning threat of the constantly-
expanding, gooey menace. My approach here has much in common with Stephen 
Dougherty’s work on the biopolitics of the killer virus novel (2001), upon which I draw 
at several points throughout my argument, but, as in the rest of this section of my thesis, 
I also draw upon feminist scholarship on embodiment that considers explicitly the effect 
that the perceived permeability of the female body has on normative notions of 
subjectivity and difference.  
 
The latter appeal to such theories signals a further necessary slight difference in approach 
in this chapter. Compared to the previous two figures I examined, the nanotechological 
swarm embodies a collision of discourses that is remarkably specific in the character of 
its feminine coding, and, as such, demands a reading that is aligned more explicitly with 
pre-existing theoretical frameworks dealing with that feminine coding. Informed here in 
particular by Grosz and Shildrick, I move through readings of each of the two novels 
that focus specifically upon the part that women have to play in these narratives of 
dissolution. My overall contention is that, despite its explicit links to ‘post-industrial’ 
economies, and its obvious metaphorical connection to the flow of capital inherent in 
these structures, a trajectory of nanotechnological research resulting in the outcome of 
                                                 
89 The nanotechnological swarm, despite its dramatic instantiation in the texts I have 
mentioned, is not a figure that has permeated as widely as the avatar or the hacker. However, its 
cohesiveness in the texts in which it does appear, and its attendant and seemingly stable cultural 
function as the very literalisation of the dangers of the interface, makes it a figure that cannot be 
ignored. The two novels I examine are replete with evidence of the figure’s discursive function. 
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ecophagy by grey goo is perceived to be less a problem with capital itself, and more a 
problem of adequate control of the ‘invented’, technological other. Pollutant effects on 
that sense of control, which (supposedly) hitherto rested in the hands of rational, 
humanist agents, may be derived from interference by damaged or incomplete subjective 
participants at the crucial stage of the interface, most of whom are feminine-coded.90 
And, as with the avatar and the hacker, what is dramatised here ultimately is a restoration 
of the border between the human subject and the technological object: the 
nanotechnological swarm, as a figure, is concerned with policing, rather than collapsing 
that boundary. 
 
Nano-capital 
Fluidity is built into the very vocabulary of global capital exchange: liquidity, cash flow, 
income streams, floatation, solvency, bailouts, slush funds, dark pools, bubbles et cetera. 
Money – or rather, the digitally-abstracted simulation of the same – is increasingly (and 
perhaps inherently) liquid, promiscuous and intangible, even as its flows become more 
carefully mapped technologically (and indeed constituted by that mapping). Perhaps 
more interestingly, though, this liquidity in itself can be bound up, like nanotechnology, 
with the issues, possibilities and problems of the imperceptibly small. For instance, there 
are concerns over the receding palpability/comprehensibility of financial transactions in 
the wake of practices such as high-frequency trading: firms and hedge funds with enough 
money and foresight to do so use datacenters of powerful computers to read the financial 
markets algorithmically, and thus profit from automatically buying and selling shares 
instantaneously, taking advantage of combined gains from thousands of miniscule 
                                                 
90 The continual reiteration and rehearsal of this battle for control in the face of such 
permeable subjects is performative in its construction of that controlling humanist agent assumed 
as an a priori entity. 
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millisecond-to-millisecond discrepancies in prices.91 The nanoscale character that this 
practice takes on in the imagination resonates with the notion of grey goo almost as 
much as does its firm rooting in the technological: these computer-originated 
transactions are too small for us to comprehend; they are too quick for us to perceive. 
The liveliness of this mode of capital exchange has inspired deep anxiety in financial 
institutions: the practice of high frequency trading, which currently accounts for forty-
two per cent of the US market, is under scrutiny from a number of regulatory bodies in 
Europe and the United States. The practice itself has little or nothing to do with the 
nature of what is being bought or sold, but is based simply on the algorithmic 
relationship between figures, stabilized into sameness by abstraction and encoding. Many 
lament the tendency for money to slip through our fingers, but the concerns evidenced 
by such widespread investigations show that this nano-capital goes further than that—it 
threatens to soak through our skin and pass through our bodies, beneath perception and 
beyond control.92 
 
There are still more tangible examples of this seeping dissolution of difference by 
globalized capitalism. Rosi Braidotti demonstrates how the homogenising effect of 
capital in post-Cold War Europe is distilled in the commercial campaign for the United 
Colors of Benetton clothing brand:  
The colossal success—at least here in Europe—of Benetton’s advertising 
campaign seems to sum up the semiotic code of the European unification 
project: all united in our respective differences, provided that our currency is the 
same, our living standards comparable, and our designer clothes, of course, made 
in [...] Italy, with capital held transcontinentally. (1994: 246)  
                                                 
91 See Caroline Binham (2010). 
92 The venture capitalist group NanoCapital supports financially the development of 
nanotechnology. 
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This advertising campaign cheerfully imagines a post-prejudicial world “united” by a 
specific product, and the unique selling point of that product is the very levelling effect 
of its “universal” appeal, this state being accessible only by the act of purchasing. 
Difference itself is annexed, reproduced as a version of itself that can become a saleable 
commodity in a common order of exchange (Braidotti refers to this in a later work as 
“the global market of Sameness” [2006: 58]), and thus, effectively, dissolved.93  
 
The potential overspill of this flow of capital into the controlling subject (the consumer, the 
corporation, et cetera) rather than the commodifiable object poses the threat. The 
cognitive dissonance in the constant expansion of homogenising capital crystallizes in the 
tension between the desire to control difference (the other, the markets, the world) 
through liquidity and the comfort of marketable sameness on one hand, and the fear that 
capital itself could run out of control (as seen in the imperceptibility of high frequency 
trades) on the other, meaning that such interventions would reach back out and drag the 
(mythically) unique individual subject into the abstracted, commodified mire, too. This 
“Benetton effect” and high frequency trading are both, then, visible intensifications of a 
process of financial and digital abstraction (and thus, through the global commonality of 
this encoding, homogenisation) of the subject that is well accounted-for in work by a 
number of scholars. Citing Donna Haraway, Stephen Dougherty shows how fictional 
discourses of infection and contagion found in killer virus novels express anxieties about 
a steady transcription of the body into an abstract and staccato digital code, a tendency 
occurring within a sociopolitical and economic landscape that advances “a search for a 
common language in which all resistance to instrumental control disappears and all 
heterogeneity can be submitted to disassembly, reassembly, investment and exchange” 
                                                 
93 For further discussion of the Benetton effect and difference, see Sarah Franklin et al 
(2000: 146ff). 
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(qtd. in Dougherty 2001: 1). For Dougherty, a crisis of subjectivity engendered by the 
flow of global capital and the associated “ontological shift whereby the corporeal body is 
turned into an information system, a purely discursive network of signs” (2) is signalled 
by a series of metaphorical breakdowns between the language of infection and the 
language of digital communications within novels describing the dramatic spread of 
contagious, deadly viruses which dissolve or haemorrhage the body (4). Crucially, 
Dougherty points out an alignment between embodied/subjective instability and 
marginalized subjects – in this case, the “nonwhites” who “most viscerally embody the 
threat of viral contagion”: these diseases are almost invariably seen to arise on the 
African continent or other areas of former explicit Western colonial control, and to 
spread through the vector of normatively inadequate and indistinct body-subjects (5). 
The killer virus novel is only, for Dougherty, able to reconcile or rescue the embodied 
self by appealing back to colonial narratives in which a normalising (white Western) force 
restores order and containment to this rising threat (20).  
 
This raises the issue of the representation of uncontained subjects in grey goo narratives. 
Grouped together here are a cluster of studies examining the shapes and representations 
of embodiment in post-Enlightenment Western culture. Firstly, let us return to the 
(relatively) recent turn to the body as subject of study in feminist theory, as outlined in 
the Introduction. This turn engenders a wealth of critical positions on the ways that 
corporeal instantiation of any kind, and especially of the kind marked as “other” to the 
liberal humanist subject, disrupts the “objective” primacy - and threatens the very 
bounded existence - of that subject. Grosz’s Volatile Bodies advances ways to understand 
gendered subjectivities “through” the body (vii). Grosz suggests that this approach  
helps to problematize the universalist and universalizing assumptions of 
humanism, through which women’s--and all other groups’--specificities, 
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positions, and histories are rendered irrelevant or redundant; it resists the 
tendency to attribute a human nature to the subject’s interior; and it resists 
tendencies to dualism, which splits subjectivity into two mutually exclusive 
domains. (ix-x) 
Grosz’s work generates the beginning of a framework for examining the dangers of 
permeability for the Cartesian cogito-self: the body’s ostensible purpose is purely to 
provide a binary other to the mind, and its tendency to invade and disrupt the reason of 
that mind resides in its (perceived) unensouled, physical, desiring influence (5).  
 
Offering an understanding of embodied otherness that resonates strongly with Grosz’s 
study, Shildrick’s Leaky Bodies and Boundaries (1997) and Embodying the Monster (2002) both 
examine the question of the body’s pejorative position and its attendant inadequacy as a 
vessel for the Cartesian subject. In the former, Shildrick writes that women are denied 
full objective agency by the way that certain things place them ‘closer to nature’, 
specifically bodily processes such as menstruation and the much larger female role in 
reproduction. Both of these things are seen as somehow polluting to the rationality of 
the humanist self: 
In being somehow more fully embodied than men, women have been 
characterized simply as less able to rise above uncontrollable natural processes 
and passions [...] It is as though bodies could somehow interfere with moral 
thought, instructing the mind[...] Losing control of oneself is to a large degree 
synonymous with losing control of, or having no control over, one’s body. (Leaky 
Bodies 26-7) 
This fear of “losing control” of the body is located most strongly for Shildrick in 
discourses that place the female body as simply an “underdeveloped” version of that of 
the male with blurred, permeable boundaries (28). This dangerous indistinction between 
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the mind and the body, coded as female in phallocentric discourses, unsettles the very 
bases of objectivity and so the operational stage for any kind of supposedly rational 
intervention or interrogation, and threatens absorption of the subject into the 
undifferentiated object-realm of nature.  
 
Permeability is, again, the key here. Phallocentric narratives are extremely wary of 
assigning agency to anything that cannot be mapped onto dualisms with neat, clean 
divisions: an attempt to distance the subject from pollutant others is coded into the bases 
of the binary oppositions that determine the logic of identity, and the putative literal 
“leakiness” of othered bodies—whether through menstruation, childbearing, perceived 
vulnerability to infection or otherwise—maps inevitably onto the ontology of the self, 
and construes a constant threat to these divisions. Shildrick’s later monograph expands 
further upon this by examining the bodies of entities considered ‘monstrous’ in Western 
culture:  
The security of categories—whether of self or non-self—is undone by a radical 
undecidability. The issue is not one of revaluing differently embodied others, but 
of rethinking the nature of embodiment itself […] Where normative embodiment 
has hitherto seemed to guarantee individual autonomous selfhood, what is 
monstrous in all its forms—hybrid creatures, conjoined twins, human clones, 
cyborg embodiment and others—disrupts the notions of separation and 
distinction that underlie such claims […] In short, what is at stake is not simply 
the status of those bodies which may be termed monstrous, but the being in the 
body of us all. To valorize the monster, then, is to challenge the parameters of 
the subject as defined within logocentric discourse (2002: 2-3) 
In other words, not only do monstrous bodies—defined primarily by said leakiness, 
permeability and hybridity of selfhood (10)—threaten to compromise the normative 
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subject, they do so by the very ontological indistinguishability between the two. Readings 
of monstrous bodies, for Shildrick, uncover anxieties not just about the threatened 
invasion of the monstrous to the normative, but about the possibility that, actually, the 
dualistic subject is always already monstrous (4). 
 
My own position combines elements of these perspectives. The grey goo narrative 
expresses anxieties about a steady dissolution of difference in the face of increasingly 
fluid capital, but those anxieties manifest through older discourses of the threat posed by 
leaky natural (female) bodies to the white, masculine, Western mind. The grey goo 
narrative associates the dissolving, haemorrhaging leakiness and contagion of 
catastrophically powerful nanotechnological agents with the perceived permeability of 
specific kinds of othered bodies, which, in turn, function as scapegoats for the 
homogenising effects of codified capital. These bodies are unable to maintain properly 
their ontological boundaries and thus contain their tendency to infect or dissolve 
bounded subjects hitherto instantiated in ostensibly solid, finished body-vessels. In other 
words, the late capitalist “point of crisis” (Dougherty 2001: 2) for the body-self reaches 
perhaps its most explicit instantiation when that crisis is literalised by the threat of 
nanotechnological entities created in a laboratory by profit-making corporations, but, as 
the project of transcription into code remains desirable as part of the late capitalist 
project, blame for the ‘goo’ of money shifts to marginalised subjects, loathed for their 
inability to properly master the process.  
 
Like it was Her Invention 
Of the two novels under examination in this chapter, the most normative in its portrayal 
of the nanotechnologically-besieged body is also the most recent. Jack Forman, the 
protagonist of Michael Crichton’s Prey, is an unemployed computer programmer from 
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California, made redundant after whistle-blowing on his employers’ corporate fraud and 
then clandestinely blacklisted from jobs at other similar firms. He is, by this turn of 
events, made into a stay-at-home dad, while his brilliantly intelligent wife Julia leads work 
on nanotechnologies at the secretive Xymos laboratory.94 Jack once designed a series of 
computer programs with so-called ‘emergent behaviour’, which a team of Xymos 
researchers – led by Julia - licensed for use in its experiments with medical 
nanotechnologies. In broad terms, the novel defines “emergent behaviour” in 
programming as when the computer program in question, rather than being pre-
programmed with rules and responses for every eventuality, is given a set of basic rules, 
and left to run and learn from its own mistakes. Xymos uses emergent code, designed by 
Jack, to control a swarm of billions of the microscopic particles it has created, ostensibly 
for the purpose of looking inside the human body (but as it later becomes apparent, 
having been at first a military surveillance technology).95 However, owing to a number of 
misjudgements made by Xymos researchers, the swarm escapes into the surrounding 
Nevada desert – and begins both to reproduce and to ‘learn’.96 Its learning is guided by 
the particular set of rules that Jack programmed into the system that was originally 
intended for “pure” software applications. The emergent behaviour that the swarm 
control programme emulates is modelled on emergent behaviour seen in “nature”, 
specifically the rules underpinning the “instinctual” actions of predators.  
 
                                                 
94 The name is rather unsubtly descendent of real-life nano-research laboratory Zyvex 
(Phoenix, 2003). 
95 The ocularcentric tendency to use new technologies first as a means of extending the 
visibility of a “target” resonates with Paul Virilio’s consideration of the joint development of the 
film camera and the machine gun as co-dependent technologies of warfare, in War and Cinema 
(1984). This is not to mention the ramifications of this kind of imaging for the male gaze and its 
scopophilic attempts to “know” the female body. 
96 Placing the action of Prey in the Nevada desert also quietly marks it as resonant with a 
tradition of military-industrial complex “skunkworks” ventures (organisations of scientists given 
considerable autonomy by their employers to carry out experiments that may or may not lead to 
specific marketable breakthroughs). 
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Thus, when the swarm escapes the confines of its hermitic laboratory birthplace, it 
begins to “hunt” creatures on the outside – first small animals, and then, inevitably, 
human beings. The codified body-subject – the swarm, borne of capital investment and 
intended to be a generator of more capital, constructed molecule-by-molecule of “pure” 
data - is seen as dangerously unstable and potentially absorbing of the human subject. 
However, the deadly cross-contamination made possible by the money-lubricated flow of 
software into nanoscale hardware (the licensing of Jack’s code) is only paid lip service - 
notably by Crichton’s doom-laden foreword, which notes the increasing investment in 
nanotechnology, but is less concerned with that than with “our self-deluded recklessness 
[and] the long and difficult journey to control our technology” (xii). While the foreword 
is ostensibly a comically grave one-size-fits-all condemnation of human naivety to the 
liveliness of technology, digital capital itself – while used to indicate the increase of 
research over time - is never implicated as a basis for the threat. The dangers here are 
posed by the “recklessness” of certain subjects, manifested through a lack of “control” of 
technology. The foreword, to some extent, exculpates global capital - from whose 
impulse the push for nanotechnological breakthroughs originates - before the novel even 
begins. Crichton mentions Fujitsu, Intel and IBM, along with the US Government, as 
major investors in nanotechnological research (xiii), but does not consider this 
penetration of cross-pollinated state and private investment into the erstwhile 
pure/bounded rationality of the natural sciences (another outcome of the increasingly 
promiscuous language of encoded capital) to be, in itself, a problem. Rather, he outlines 
the possibility of managing the ensuing technology through “international controls”, 
making comparisons between the threat of nanotechnology and that of computer crime: 
“we’ve learned to put hackers in jail [...] errant biotechnologists will soon join them” 
(xv).97 Individual rogue subjects are a risk within the global system of capital exchange, 
                                                 
97 This is reminiscent of Prince Charles’ manner of surveying of the nanotechnological 
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but the liquidity of the system itself does not have to constitute a risk. The novel, as a 
whole, glosses over the role of capital, even as it depicts the capital-driven circumstances 
within which the story takes place. In order to do this, it locates a scapegoat for the 
threat: the novel’s most deeply-ingrained anxiety, on which the blame for the outbreak of 
the nanotechnological swarm is more squarely laid, is over female bodily permeability, 
and the risk that this poses to male boundedness and subjective stability. 
 
Prey’s particular deployment of the permeability motif for the purposes of horror is 
shared by both the grey goo narratives in this chapter: the swarm of nanobots kills 
subjects by literally soaking into their bodies and transforming them. It gets into the 
mouth, nose, eyes and lungs and breaks the body down as “food”, at the molecular level 
– eventually turning it into homogenous goo. We see this first on a small scale, when the 
swarm attacks a wild rabbit and partially dissolves its insides, and we see it with 
increasing frequency and intensity as the swarm begins to kill human characters: 
I looked down and saw David Brooks’s shirt. Then I realized I was standing on 
what was left of his torso, which had turned into a kind of whitish jelly. My foot 
was right in his abdomen. His rib cage scraped against my shin, leaving a white 
streak on my pants. I looked back and saw David’s face, ghostly white and 
eroded, his features eaten away until he looked [featureless]. I felt instant nausea, 
and tasted bile. (419) 
Jack’s accidental stepping into the dissolved shell of a fellow scientist’s disintegrating 
carcass shows the disgust generated by the literal dissolution of the body to pale 
                                                                                                                                            
research landscape; he also produces figures about investment in nanotechnology. Like Crichton, 
though, Prince Charles does not implicate this capital flow itself in potential problems with 
nanotechnology, so much as opine that the money is just not being spent correctly (i.e. on 
controlling the technology). 
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featurelessness.98 The primary explicit source of horror in the novel, then, is in the 
swarm’s ability to literally dissolve the bodies of those it attacks, rendering them into an 
averaged-out sameness. The bounded human subject, as instantiated within an organic 
body, is seen as vulnerable to this invading influence; the monstrosity of the swarm 
emerges from the fluid nature of its radical leakiness – it does not just contain and/or 
emit a dangerously fluid influence, it absolutely embodies it in and of itself.  
 
Crichton’s anxieties about the permeability of a data-encoded body are made the most 
explicit when looking beyond the obvious horror of physical dissolution and death. 
Eventually, the swarm learns to literally invade the brain and take “conscious” control of 
subjects: by the end of the novel, Julia has fallen completely under the influence of the 
swarm, and takes on an explicitly antagonistic role. She embodies as a hybrid the 
murderous leakiness of the nano-entities with what appears to be the unstable 
pseudohuman form par excellence: the female body. In many ways she starts to become 
something of a caricature of the femme fatale – she becomes sultry, and her earlier infidelity 
(Jack’s early suspicions over her having an affair with a co-worker all are confirmed) 
erupts into a kind of pansexual promiscuity; her figure and features become hardened 
and statuesque, she is suddenly given to hysterical outbursts of jealousy (466), and begins 
to dispatch her enemies by way of transferring swarm particles to them with a deadly, 
poisonous kiss: 
Vince grabbed a fistful of Charley’s hair and tried to hold his head steady. Julia 
continued to kiss him. Then she stepped away, and as she did I saw a river of 
                                                 
98 As Dougherty (2001 n8) also points out, this kind of bilious response to the corpse 
may also be viewed through Julia Kristeva’s work on abjection (1982). It is worth noting too that, 
as a character, David Brooks is a scientist of great rationality until he is struck down by a moment 
of hysterics leading directly to his death (310ff). His failure to embody a properly masculine 
paradigm of behaviour under crisis leads to his overtaking first by intellectual instability and then 
literal dissolution by the feminine-coded swarm. 
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black between her mouth and Charley’s. It was only there for a moment, and 
then it faded [...] Julia wiped her lips, and smiled. 
Charley sagged, dropped to the ground. He appeared dazed. A black cloud came 
out of his mouth, and swirled around his head. (457) 
Julia is, in fact, the axial point around which the novel’s gender-coding of 
nanotechnological horror rotates. There are a number of ways in which the alignment of 
this horror as female is manifested through her, but clearest is the line drawn between a 
perceived incompatibility of woman and scientific endeavour because (and through the 
motif) of women’s presumed biological destiny: childbearing. It is apparent from early in 
the story that Julia’s inability to balance properly her domestic and working lives (along 
with the replacement of Jack as breadwinner) leads to the slow decline of her family.  
 
The most explicit expression of this poisonous collision between rationality and the 
feminine sphere of childcare, though, is in what initially causes the swarm to become 
dangerous in the first place. When it first escapes the lab, the male members of staff at 
Xymos are intent on destroying it while it would be easy to do so. But Julia refuses, as 
shown in this conversation between Jack and one of the Xymos scientists: 
‘[It] was Julia’s idea to treat [the swarm] like a child. She went outside with bright 
blocks, toys. Things a kid would like. And the swarm seemed to be responding to 
her. She was very excited about it.’ 
[...] 
‘But David,’ I said, ‘You all knew this was a runaway, evolving outside the 
laboratory. Didn’t anybody think to just go out and destroy it?’ 
‘Sure. We all wanted to. Julia wouldn’t allow it [...] She was, I don’t know, she was 
really taken with it. I mean, she was proud of it. Like it was her invention.’ (256-
7) 
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Julia cannot bring herself to wipe out the swarm because her feminine and ontologically 
unstable “instinct” to rear children has interfered with the rationality of her subjectivity 
and polluted the hitherto objective scientific project she was leading; as Shildrick, 
remarks pregnancy is “the paradigm case of breached boundaries” (1997: 35). The 
supposed inevitability of the feminine right/desire/need/requirement to bear children is 
always at risk of manifesting the kinds of subjective indistinctions that make women’s 
bodies inadequate vessels for a bounded, objective self. And, combined with the 
Enlightenment gender myth that while men create with their minds, women can only 
create with their bodies, in this case, the collision between those two approaches is 
disastrous, and eventually engenders total dissolution of tangible embodied difference. 
Julia’s decision to treat the swarm like a child is instrumental in the entity’s shift from 
contained experiment to near-invulnerable, hyper-permeable menace. We see the effects 
of this poisoned subjectivity everywhere in the novel; the swarm infects and absorbs 
more and more subjects – mainly scientists – turning them to Julia’s side.  
 
Significantly, the swarm even begins to take on human form; it imitates the physical 
characteristics of the human beings around which it has spent time, but often de-
coalesces into faceless, uncanny mannequins. This failed attempt by the swarm to attain 
the embodied manifestation of a “true” human subject allows us to view the normative 
perception of the female subject: a failed (but dangerous) caricature of male selfhood, 
thwarted by its own body’s ambiguous boundaries. Perhaps the most bizarre example of 
this is the point at which Julia’s swarm body literally engulfs Jack’s: 
And the moment I spoke, a river of pale particles streamed off Julia, curved in 
the air, and came down like a shower all over my body and into my mouth. I 
clamped my mouth shut, but it didn’t seem to matter, because in the mirror my 
body seemed to dissolve away, to be replaced by Julia’s body. It was as if her skin 
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had left her, flowed into the air, and slid down over me. Now there were two 
Julias standing side by side in front of the mirror. (506) 
In this strange scene (somewhat resonant with a kind of inversion of the mirror stage), 
Jack’s self-image disappears as his own body is literally (re-)integrated into a female body. 
The novel’s motif of the polluting and disintegration of scientists by the swarm functions 
as a particularly acute example of the threat of a hyper-feminine permeable body to 
putatively hyper-rational subjects. Apart from Jack (who nonetheless reasserts his father 
role by the end of the novel), those operating outside very conventional normative 
gender roles may fail in their work (Jack’s psychiatrist sister cannot control Jack’s kids 
while he is away) or even end up dead if their subjectivity has not been adequately shored 
up against the seeping, permeating invader.  
 
David Brooks, for instance, is killed because he becomes hysterical while trying to hide 
from the swarm: 
‘Coming,’ [David] said. ‘They’re coming.’ His voice shook with tension. ‘Oh 
Jesus, they’re coming.’ He pulled back on the doorknob with both hands, using 
his whole body weight. He muttered over and over, ‘Coming... they’re coming...’ 
‘Oh great,’ Charley said. ‘The fucking guy’s cracked.’ 
I went over to David, and put my hand on his shoulder. He was pulling on the 
doorknob, breathing in ragged gasps. ‘David,’ I said quietly, ‘Let’s take it easy 
now. Let’s take a deep breath.’ 
He was sweating, his whole body tense, his shoulder shaking under my hand. It 
was pure panic. I said softly, ‘Let go of the doorknob. It’s not doing any good’. 
[...] 
Rosie went to the refrigerator and came back with a bottle of water. She gave it 
to David, who drank it as he cried.[...] 
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David Brooks bolted [...] the swarms instantly spun and chased him. (292-311) 
Brooks fails to maintain his rationality in the face of danger, and dissolves first into 
rather feminised hysterics, before eventually then being dissolved in a more literal sense 
by the swarm: his vulnerability emerges from his failure to act in a putatively masculine 
way. In a following scene, too, an assertive young female programmer, Rosie, is killed 
when she disobeys Jack’s orders not to try and help Brooks escape after he has been 
attacked. Characters who maintain their prescribed positions in the gender matrix fare 
better: Jack’s most trusted companion in the novel is Mae-Chan, a stereotypically demure 
Asian biologist-cum-programmer who rarely speaks in the novel but manages to survive 
its duration through her quiet assent to the protagonist’s wishes.99 
  
Less subtly, this focus on portraying the failure/death of those outside of those gender 
roles exemplifies (and is underpinned by) a more conventionally misogynistic 
subnarrative. The most explicit manifestation of this is Crichton’s digression into a 
screed about parental custody rights after divorce proceedings. Jack’s initial fears in the 
novel are that Julia is planning to leave him, and in particular that she is carefully 
constructing an argument that she will use in court to gain custody of the children when 
she does so:  
I felt uneasy for a lot of reasons. A lot of her comments sounded like she was 
building a case against me. Laying it out methodically, step by step [...] I could 
easily imagine the lawyer saying those things in court. And I knew why. 
According to a recent article I had read in Redbook magazine, ‘alienation of 
affection’ was currently the trendy argument in court. The father is turning the 
                                                 
99 Between those two extremes, characters such as the overweight, flatulent Charley are 
tolerated for their hyperrational minds which compensate for the failings of the body (the vile, 
farting Charley is an “expert in genetic algorithms” and his company is endured “because he is so 
talented” [172]).This image of the grotesque hacker seems near-universal, and resonates both 
with the figure of Dennis Nedry in Crichton’s novel Jurassic Park (1990) and any number of other 
hacker figures in fiction.  
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children against the mother. Poisoning their little minds by word and deed. While 
the Mom is blameless as always. (92) 
Jack goes on to describe an anecdote where a friend was unable to gain custody of his 
children after divorcing his heroin-addicted wife, because “every father knew the legal 
system was hopelessly biased in favour of mothers... the judge said that the wife was 
genuinely trying to overcome her addiction, and that children need their mother” (92-3). 
Crichton’s concern (through Jack—it is difficult not to conflate the author’s voice with 
the character’s in given the venom of this screed) that women can somehow corrupt the 
legal process with (feminine) appeals to such “alienation of affection” or “poisoning of 
little minds” is, of course, borne out by the apparent truth of the novel: that the “real” 
risk of corrupting influence upon children comes from Julia (as seen with her “improper” 
treatment of the swarm). 
 
Throughout Prey, we are harrowed by depictions of the dissolution of difference into 
gooey homogeneity, ostensibly driven by the literal conversion of capital into code into 
matter (the cyberpunk dream of “data made flesh” [Gibson 1984: 26]).100 However, 
culpability for the liquefying side-effects of that process is frequently dislodged onto 
vulnerable body-subjects. As Dougherty notes in his examination of the killer virus 
novel, “bodily crisis and expressions of authentic anxiety about humankind’s fate in an 
increasingly digitised, late capitalist society” are depicted in “the loathsome disintegration 
of the organic body beset by infection (4). This “loathsome disintegration” becomes all 
the more of a risk when we start to encounter bodies that cannot adequately shore 
themselves up against subjective invasion, and Julia is the clearest example in Crichton’s 
novel of the ways in which the “blame” for the instability of the coded subject is 
                                                 
100 Dougherty, though, rightly warns against seeing cyberpunk as a genre adequate for 
interrogating anxieties over the encoded body – partly because cyberpunk revels so much in these 
shifts, ignoring their wider implications (2-5). 
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dislocated onto the similarly unstable condition of femininity. In a concerted and steady 
assault upon the novel’s female characters, it produces an image of womanhood which is 
designed to highlight a putative instability, and an attendant influence that is literally 
poisonous to rationality and dissolving of the cohesion of the thinking masculine subject.  
 
The Fecund Zone 
Bloom presents a picture of nanotechnology gone awry that is simultaneously more radical 
than Prey in the swarm’s transforming reach and equally marginalising of those figures 
that the novel’s discourse marks as responsible for that dissolution. While Prey limits the 
infestation/infection of its nanoscale antagonist(s) to a small laboratory in the Nevada 
desert and its unfortunate occupants, Bloom concerns a truly vast expansion of grey goo – 
in this case, “technogenic life” known as “mycora,” a man-made fungus-like entity which 
rapidly assimilates not just human beings, but most of Earth’s solar system. Set in the late 
twenty-first century, Bloom’s protagonist, John Strasheim, is a bootmaker and part-time 
journalist, carving out a meagre living on/in Jupiter’s moon Ganymede. 101 Like most 
survivors of the accidental escape of this manmade life form on Earth, he is part of “the 
Immunity”; a rather uptight culture of workaholics living mostly among Jupiter’s moons. 
The Immunity lives in an artificially-engineered and environmentally ubiquitous “immune 
system”, which protects them, largely, from the invasion of the mycora which have 
colonised most of the rest of the solar system—though there are still occasional 
outbreaks or “blooms”. Noted for his volunteer “news” coverage of an outbreak of 
mycora on Ganymede, Strasheim is asked to join an Immunity mission to travel into the 
heart of what is now known as the “mycosystem”. Because most spacecraft would 
quickly be dissolved and assimilated by the mycora, the ship in which the “myconauts” 
                                                 
101 McCarthy’s work falls into the so-called “hard” science fiction category, where the 
exploration and extrapolation of scientific ideas are privileged. Strasheim is a bootmaker before 
he is a journalist, because on Ganymede gravity is so different from on Earth that providing 
special boots for the colony’s occupants is of the highest priority.  
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must travel – appropriately named the Louis Pasteur—is treated with an experimental “T-
Balance” coating; a substance painted onto the hull that is capable of resisting 
absorption.  
 
Bloom makes similar judgements to Prey about the respective values of a strictly humanist 
version of bounded subjectivity, and the dangers of a feminine-coded 
invasion/infection/perversion of that subjectivity. Its portrayal of nanotechnology-gone-
mad apparently absolves capital of its own solvent threat: the novel sets up a money-free 
“ladderdown” economy based on the relative energy potentials of various elements 
within nuclear transmutation. Perhaps, though, this is also the novel’s only real explicit 
symptom of anxiety over the diminished tactility of digital capital. Replacing the 
abstraction of encoded money with a system that has constant recourse to a scientifically-
measurable use-value (in the form of energy released and metals produced) speaks of a 
desire to be able to comprehend the value of a thing in and of itself, rather than its 
increasingly homogenous exchange-value. Indeed, Strasheim’s home is a city inside a 
moon, where the streets are literally paved with gold (19). In a segment where the Louis 
Pasteur’s value in the ladderdown economy is explained in scientific terms, one of 
Strasheim’s colleagues outlines why this is the case: 
Many people are surprised to learn that lead’s energy potential is only twenty-five 
percent less than uranium’s, but the thing to remember is that lead has ten fewer 
transmutation targets -- eighty-one versus ninety-one –which translates into a 
factor of a thousand reduction in its value. Gold, three rungs lower still, is worth 
about a five-thousandth as much as uranium. It has beautiful mechanical and 
electrical properties, but really, the major cost of paving the streets with it is the 
labor. (75) 
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The flow of capital in Bloom is made invisible by ladderdown exchange – or at least, 
presented in a form that eschews the infinite interchangeability of digital code. The 
economy underwriting the mission to the heart of the Mycosystem (and indeed 
everything else) is built upon nuclear transmutations that have specific, solid, 
unshakeable foundations, rooted in the comfortingly immutable laws of physics. Infinitely 
reciprocal, undifferentiated abstraction of value has been denied here in favour of linear 
relationships between materials and their ability to animate specific physical outcomes. 
The absence of money here is telling both of the subjective anxieties surrounding its 
permeable diminishment into digital code, and the need to defend projects (i.e. scientific 
teleologies) whose explication is heavily reliant upon the driving forces of corporate 
capital. These anxieties are displaced, as with Prey, onto the marginalised bodies of 
women. 
 
The way that the mycora infects and absorbs (and thus kills) in Bloom is very similar to 
the way that the swarm does so in Prey: It effects a total dissolution of the vulnerable 
corporeal body. When an outbreak of the lifeform happens, the environment and human 
beings alike are quickly broken down and assimilated into the mass – as shown in a 
section describing a deliberate release of mycora by a man attempting to sabotage the 
Louis Pasteur’s mission: 
The air vent and the wall it was part of began to boil, their substance turning 
fluid, turning into rainbow-threaded vapors as the tiny, tiny mycora disassembled 
them molecule by molecule [...]Tug’s body did not come apart at once into 
threads and dust, but his skin had gone rainbow-crystalline with mycoric frost 
before he’d even hit the floor, and of course he never did rise [...] That Jinacio 
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suffered in the twelve seconds of his death goes without saying, but the images 
are not on file. God, I owe him that much, at least. (58-9) 102 
Bloom illustrates once more the fear of a leaking, fecund, aggressively indeterminate body 
to the bounded subject, and like Prey, it enriches its sense of horror by drawing upon the 
mycora’s ‘feminine’ characteristics. Descriptions of the mycora in Bloom often focus on 
the entity’s radical fertility as a source of fear. The outbreak of bloom described in the 
novel’s opening segment laments the fates of those “unfortunate enough to be within the 
fecund radius when the fruiting bodies swelled and popped” (4). This idea of a “fecund 
radius” or “fecund zone” crops up regularly in the novel, and the threat of being 
permeated by and integrated into this radically embodied entity’s “meaningless program” 
(5) is ever present: the caricature of pregnancy that we see here is, of course, lacking in 
the ‘meaning’—the unified, teleologically-stable mind-self—of the male characters who 
fight it.103 One of the primary means of on-the-spot defense against mycoric outbreak is, 
too, feminine-coded: those at ground zero of an emerging bloom will hope that, before 
they die, they will be able to drop a couple of “witch’s tits”—devices that drop the 
temperature in that small area and literally freeze the bloom in its tracks (3). The 
unexamined deployment of this somewhat medieval metaphor, with the attendant 
maintenance of its connotations of coldness and abjection, essentially fights one feminine 
stereotype with another: the relentless, all-consuming reproducer is neutralised by the 
equal-but-opposite spectre of the frigid, unnatural vision of a female body with no 
apparent use for men.  
 
                                                 
102 The “zee-spec” described here is a mobile computing device, worn like goggles. For 
Strasheim it serves as a means of recording and enhancing his “real-world” perception and 
experience. This is another example of the desire to use technology primarily in order to intensify 
the gaze of the (male) subject into the object-world.  
103 Being “in bloom” is also a term for being visibly pregnant, and has any number of 
descendents; to have “flowers in the window” et cetera. 
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Apart from this one rather striking trend of devices underpinning the depictions of the 
mycora, there are characters and entities who even more clearly embody the text’s 
tendency to displace the grey goo enemy’s undesirable, ontologically indistinct qualities 
onto othered subjects—and, again, women in particular. As with Prey, Bloom’s primary 
antagonist figure is a female scientist whose objectivity has been ‘polluted’ by her 
succumbing to the will of this radically embodied entity. And, as with Prey, it is a version 
of pregnancy and the nurturing ‘instinct’ of the mother that is the foil to the scientific 
project, and, by extension, the integrity of the bounded subject itself. As shown earlier, 
Prey’s Julia distorts the teleologically pure aim of the nanomachines by literally treating 
the swarm like a child. In the case of Bloom’s bioanalyst character Renata Baucum, 
clandestine sabotage of the Louis Pasteur at several points during the mission culminates 
in an attempt to release an outbreak of mycora onboard the ship – by rupturing a pouch 
of TGL spores that she carries inside her body: 
She gasped, then screamed. Alarm klaxons sounded. Warning lights began to 
flash. Baucum’s skin began to change color, and then to shimmer in an oil-on-
water sort of way. She screamed again, and this time it sounded all wrong, like 
she was coughing up a lungful of dandelion fluff, or trying to [...] Baucum’s skin 
had lost its smoothness, had developed an unmistakable powdery-vapory aura of 
rainbow-blossoming mycostructure, and I was more afraid of that than I can tell 
you, more afraid than if she were burning, or aiming a weapon, or anything. (234-
5) 
This literal, physical dissolution of Baucum—effected by her desire to let the mycora 
assimilate her—plays out before the rest of the crew like a grotesque caricature of birth. 
There is a resonance here with the ‘chest-bursting’ xenomorphs of Alien (dir. Ridley 
Scott, 1979), and both representations of this process represent, on one level, an 
expression of male fears of female fecundity. It is notable that Strasheim considers the 
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threat of absorption into sameness represented by Baucum’s changing, 
permeable/permeating body to be a more grave threat than that of the potential death 
that would ensue from being attacked in a more conventional manner. The nightmarish 
permeability of grey goo remains the source of horror because of its enduring threat to 
the boundary logic of humanistic subjectivity that makes normative difference possible, 
rather than the (apparently) comparatively mundane risk of organic death. Before this 
moment, though, Baucum exhibits a number of other behaviours which suggest a much 
closer alignment between women and the mycora (and so, women and this dangerously 
unbounded body). Baucum, like Prey’s Julia, evokes the figure of the femme fatale by 
seducing Strasheim, (assumedly) to stop him from “reading” her in the way that he had 
been attempting, and thus prevent him from uncovering her plot.104 ‘Using her body’ in 
an attempt to disrupt the clarity of Strasheim’s inquiry in this way is a microcosmic 
resonation of the threat from the mycora: “those soft tissues I had so recently admired” 
(234) are what transfix the journalist-protagonist’s gaze, even as Baucum is assimilated by 
her own gut-borne colony of spores.  
 
In fact, Baucum’s representation in the novel is, in general, best measured against that of 
Strasheim. Strasheim is on the Louis Pasteur as a journalist; he is engaged in the highly 
rational (and conventionally male/masculine) practice of ordering chaotic information 
from the mission into linear, cohesive narratives and sending it back to the Immunity.105 
                                                 
104 Indeed, in one moment, Strasheim is horrified when Baucum wishes to “trade zee-
specs” - despite having just had sex with her. He sees this as “a shocking intimacy”: it is fine for 
him to share the base flesh of his body with this woman, but allowing her into this ocularcentric 
extension and representation of his mind-self is almost too much for him to bear (193). 
105 As the Louis Pasteur moves further away from its Immunity home, Strasheim’s 
despatches gradually dwindle from vast audio-visual presentations to short “plaintext” messages 
which, nonetheless, still contain the “essence” of the message. It is a prescient model for a 
particular trend in real-world Internet-style broadcasting, given the novel’s 1998 publication date: 
these messages might be compared to the stripped down “tweets” of the online social network 
Twitter. Digression aside, Strasheim’s ability to locate and re-present this “essence” is, again, 
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He does so mainly using his zee-spec which he also occasionally uses, like many other 
members of the Immunity, to escape the drudgery of his miserable, claustrophobic life, 
and model alternative, escapist virtual reality spaces (in a manner not a million miles away 
from what we also see in Snow Crash). While aboard the Louis Pasteur, Strasheim uses his 
zee-spec to play around with Conway’s Game of Life, a piece of software (or “cellular 
automaton”) designed to model the progression of artificial life in the form of dots, 
which “evolve” generationally according to the program’s internal rules and the initial 
state constructed by the player.106 While trying to better understand the progression of 
mycoric life—and under Baucum’s suggeston—Strasheim begins to alter the rules of 
Conway’s game in order to accommodate a more ready simulation of mycoric 
progression and bloom (171). However, he consistently fails to produce the kind of all-
consuming, hungry “life” of the mycora in his simulation (172-6). Baucum, too, wishes to 
model the mycora – and while she has a microbiologist’s understanding and insight into 
this form of life, she, too fails to create a workable celluar automaton within the Game of 
Life. However, while Strasheim falls back on crafting a conventional virtual vision (i.e., a 
static 3-D ‘construction’ rather than a life simulation) of his ideal city based on that of a 
pre-bloom Earth—full of the cool straight lines of rational urban planning (177)—
Baucum’s virtual proclivities push her towards constructing a vision of the Earth that is 
overrun by the mycora. 
 
Strasheim’s interest, in other words, is in the logical penetration of the mycora’s inner 
workings (by which to understand the enemy more fully)—whereas Baucum’s priority is 
to attempt to immerse herself aesthetically and proprioceptively in the bloom. She 
relishes losing herself in this world; it is a guilty pleasure - and she shows it to Strasheim: 
                                                                                                                                            
linked to a very traditional understanding of the male decoding of signs – and indeed, of there 
being an “essence” to a message in the first place.  
106 Conway’s Game of Life is in fact a real piece of software, created in 1970 by John 
Horton Conway. 
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I gasped […] not fields, not forests, not jungles or deserts, but…something else. 
Something clearly alive, breathing, pulsing, moving in organic fits and spasms. Not 
one thing, not even a million things, but an infinity of them—mounds upon 
mounds, branches upon branches, flowers upon flowers upon flowers… And 
things more disturbing than that, things like eyes and mouths and tentacles, like 
slimy pools filled with wriggling forms, like bristly brain-coral reefs sprouting 
fish, snakes, monsters, from penile stalks of quivering meat. Suggestions of form, 
only, like animal shapes glimpsed in cloud […] I would have nightmares for a 
week, a month, the rest of my life, now that I knew what Hell looked like. (193-5; 
emphasis in original) 
Strasheim can only recoil at this vision of Earth, and we are left with an image of 
Baucum as having a polluted understanding of what it is ‘correct’ to create in cyberspace. 
Strasheim may model the mycora in the Game of Life in order to better understand it, but 
when he fails, he does not try to create a top-down, fractal facsimile of the entity’s body 
in the manner that Baucum does. Baucum’s motives for modelling mycoric development 
are irrational; they are emergent from a desire to ‘touch’ or to join the entity in some way, 
rather than a more conventionally rational need to understand or analyse it.107 This is not 
the only time when Baucum’s ability to maintain her commitment to the established 
teleology of objective scientific inquiry is questioned. A moment where Strasheim 
interviews Baucum about her views on the potential for mycora to exhibit any kind of 
collective consciousness or “self”, and the rumours of some form of humanity still living 
within the Mycosystem, is another opportunity to show the slippage of the woman 
scientist’s ability to maintain an objectivity or distance from the object of inquiry: 
“Humans in the Mycosystem, more than just a silly rumor? Maybe. Maybe. The thought 
                                                 
107 That the entry to this ‘world’ happens in a post-coital moment only exacerbates the 
link between sex with a woman and the danger of subjective dissolution. 
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was unsettling. But Baucum’s tone was beginning to bother me as well; too much like the 
Temples’ propaganda, more anger than true scientific indifference. How open was her 
mind?” (100, emphasis in original). Of course, even with that striking emphasis on the 
openness of “her” mind, and the rest of the above evidence, taking Baucum to be a 
cipher for the novel’s rejection of a putatively feminine appropriation of subjectivity and 
conscious intellect (reflected in the mycora) is limiting. However, while Baucum is the 
only fully fleshed-out (as it were) female character in the novel, McCarthy’s 
representation of the conspiracy that aids and abets her desire to join the bloom is 
steeped in a similar kind of feminine coding.108 The “Temples of Transcendent 
Evolution” are a quasi-religious organisation dedicated to researching the mycoric bloom, 
attempting to locate the “mycoric soul” (29). The only definite representatives of this 
organisation that we encounter in the novel are women, and Strasheim, like most 
members of the Immunity (their churches are regularly burned to the ground), has little 
time for them.  
 
We see this clearly in a segment relating an interview by Strasheim of a Temples 
“spokeswoman”, Jeanine Proust: 
“Some people [...] accuse the Temples of going too far. The psychotropics, the fecundity rituals, 
the Confessions of Awe... Some suggest that the Mycosystem has become an object of actual 
worship among your followers.” 
She shakes her head. “No, I’m sorry, that would be stating it far too strongly. The spiritual 
implications of complexity on such a scale are simply not known. If a mycoric soul exists down 
                                                 
108 Minor female characters in Bloom are represented by an engineer named Davenport, 
who does not get enough words in the novel to be fully appraised, and, a little more significantly, 
Strasheim’s mother. In an early chapter (called “Wombs”), Strasheim meets with his ageing, 
senile mother, to tell her of the mission upon which he will be embarking. His view of her 
condition seems a mixture of mourning and contempt; he loathes the fact that “she used to be 
smart” (emphasis in original) and feels that she is “dead already, an empty shell of flesh and 
nerve” (21). Robbed of her earlier impersonation of masculine thought, Strasheim’s mother is 
loathed for her disintegration into the flesh. 
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there in that fractal wilderness, our apprehension of it must be fragmentary at best [...] It’s a 
frontier that can only be explored when we’re brave enough to let a bloom run its course [...] this 
is all very easy for outsiders to misunderstand.” 
 “I agree,” I say to her, fighting to hold my temper, my impartiality suddenly strained just a bit 
too far. “I doubt I’ve understood you at all. I don’t see you people vacationing on Mars. I don’t 
see you volunteering to die in a bloom. Isn’t apprehending spiritual truths a little empty if it isn’t 
backed up by actual deeds?” 
At this, she flashes a kind of disappointed smile—I’ve got her and she knows it. (29, 
emphasis in original). 
McCarthy does not seem to be entirely aware that Strasheim’s browbeating of the 
Temples’ representative could come across as fallacious as it does (and this is not the 
only moment where Strasheim is written to have had the dubiously triumphant final 
word in an argument with a woman—it happens in his first meeting with Baucum as well 
[48]). We are no doubt expected to agree with Strasheim here, that those in search of 
“spiritual truths” should put up—by committing suicide, piecemeal—or shut up; we are 
led to concur that this kind of thought has no place in the Immunity’s economy of 
knowledge. It is, though, just one of several of the novel’s expressions of frustration at a 
somehow-feminised version of inquiry represented by the Temples. Despite the 
Immunity’s dwindling birth rate, Strasheim singles out “fecundity rituals” as one of the 
inexplicable Temples practices worthy of concern, and it is difficult not to consider this 
to emerge from the same anxieties about the perceived pollutant effect of the female 
body.  
 
Grey Goo and You 
Overall, the deployment of the figure of the nanotechnological swarm demonstrates a 
tendency for the instability of categories of difference evoked by the digitized, 
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commodified subject to be blamed upon marginalised bodies. This in turn effects an 
exculpation of the coalescing of effects produced by the codification of the human body 
emerging out of late capitalist attempts to transcribe the self into abstract digital (and 
thus universally saleable) essence. There is a deepening concern about the homogenising 
effect of the breakdown of subjective boundaries by the codification of the subject, and, 
in response, fictions that register these anxieties rehearse marginalising discourses, which 
have the perceived ability to restore objectivity, and thus the possibility of normative 
difference. Indeed, at times, both of the texts above uncover threats in female 
subjectivity as a means of exonerating the capital-driven codification of the subject, 
performing an explicit removal of money from the bases of the novels’ dissolving 
jeopardy altogether. What haunts both novels is the spectre not of the inherent 
mutability of digitalised capital, but that of lost control: control of the scientific project, 
control of nature; control by—and of—women. While promiscuous, steadily-atomised 
money itself either lurks somewhere in the texts or is represented by a money-shaped 
hole in the texts’ logic, the notion that it is in any way responsible for the gooey collapses 
of human subjects into the undifferentiated object-world is rejected with alacrity. Instead, 
persistent and pervasive discourses regarding a putative female inadequacy to attain 
rational subjectivity are deployed as the real reason why our systems of abstraction and 
digitization are inherently risky, prone to leaks and cross-contaminations.  
 
The rehearsal of these discursive patterns flows, constantly, through the narrative of the 
nanotechnological swarm. Of particular importance is the recurring issue of how 
conventional, bounded subjectivity is both threatened and then policed: like the avatar 
and the hacker, the swarm is a figure that exists at a point where a putatively artificial 
subject arises out of its predetermined role as a passive invention, and reaches for 
viability to the detriment of the literal and figurative cohesion of the human(ist) subject 
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that “created” it. It is true that both the avatar and the hacker are figures that animate the 
containment of such threats, while the swarm is the radical embodiment of one of those 
threats—but the figure’s cultural function is near-identical: we only see grey goo appear in 
order that it be resisted, ordered, contained or, at the very least, explained and 
compartmentalised. Prey’s Jack and Bloom’s Strasheim are active individuals imbued with 
the same mythical rationality as any hacker, and their roles in their respective stories are 
to ensure that only that narrow category of subjectivity is defended as viable. The 
nanotechnological swarm is, in short, a means of ensuring that increasingly lively 
technologies remain at the “object” end of the subject-object dyad, in spite of (and in 
explicit resistance to) the pestering of conventional agency that such technologies 
continue to represent. We see demonstrated here exactly the kind of monstrous, 
promiscuous hybridity made possible by fundamentally unstable relationships with 
technology, but as with those kept subjected by narratives of the avatar or the hacker, 
they are only animated in order to be rejected or destroyed. Once again, both Haraway’s 
and Hayles’ subtle readings of the interface go unheard here: while there is no evidence 
that either Crichton or McCarthy had read Haraway or Hayles, the same kinds of 
subjective dissolutions described by both thinkers—ones that could unseat the 
exceptional human from its privileged position atop its fictional taxonomy—are repelled 
with alacrity, and the attendant political possibilities of that unseating are repelled 
alongside them. This representation of subjectivity at the interface reinscribes 
hegemonically once more the triumph of humanist exceptionalism, and the tiny sliver of 
humanity that is even capable of being assigned full agency within that exceptional 
category. 
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Cultural conceptions of the human-technological interface are frequently channelled into 
robust and normative figures that recapitulate exactly the kinds of dualistic concerns that 
Haraway, Hayles and others have argued could be unravelled by them. The figures in 
Section One have demonstrated the ways in which the human/technological interface is 
reproduced frequently as a means of reiterating the boundaries of the liberal humanist 
subject in the face of the threats of its reconfiguration by that interface, and how those 
threats are gender-coded.109  In Section Two, I examine—and determine by examining—
three  figures which may offer an alternative means of understanding the interface, which 
do not reiterate those dualistic concerns, and do not ratify a singular, reduced, essential 
vision of the human subject in operation or control of a technological other. An 
important thing to acknowledge in connecting the two sections is a slight shift (and 
expansion) in the nature of the texts under examination. The figures examined in Section 
One of this thesis are pursued, on the whole, through analysis of literary and cinematic 
texts, but this is not—and indeed cannot be— exclusively the case for the figures that I 
examine here in Section Two. The avatar, the hacker and the nanotechnological swarm 
all evoke real-world questions and issues, and co-exist in technocultural discourses 
alongside their appearances in fiction—but all register by far the most clearly as 
consolidated figures in fiction. Literature and film provide, for those figures, the richest 
and most stable ground from which to effect an analysis. The figures I outline in the 
ensuing chapters, though—the fursona, the caring computer, and the decaying digital—
overflow easy location within fiction, because they have not yet been clearly consolidated 
or stabilised. While the avatar, the hacker or the nanotechnological swarm can be 
                                                 
109 I focused here, of course, on fictional examples. However, for more on the ‘policing’ 
of this subject online in the ‘real’ world, see Stoate (2007). In this article, I point out the tendency 
for users of the Internet to police explicitly performances of authentic identity online. These 
“Internet Detectives” pursue a project of ensuring that those making claims to certain life 
experiences (such as, for instance, life-threatening accidents) have actually had those 
experiences—and take pains to point out falsehoods where they occur. This process is, I argue, 
performative—it reproduces the boundary logic of the self by the very practice of stating the 
exclusion of those whose performances of authenticity are putatively inadequate. 
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identified as stable and recurring entities within individual texts, the figures I outline here 
are emerging, and can thus only be described as tying together elements and features seen 
across texts—texts that overflow books and films, and run into practices and processes 
enacted on the Internet, in the news media, computer/video games, scientific texts, and 
many other sources.110 Identifying these emerging figures, in other words, is less about 
the relatively simple task of locating them fully-formed in individual texts (fictional or 
otherwise) and subsequently discovering their features and normative functions, and 
more about mapping the connections between alike phenomena in various disparate but 
resonant discourses permeating fiction and non-fiction texts alike.  
 
Stabilising the image of each figure in Section Two is, then, partly performed by the analysis 
itself. I make connections between texts that can identify tangible evidence of the far 
more complex nature of present-day human/technological embodiment, and, eventually, 
to promote a partial recouping of cyberspace as something that does not necessarily have 
to be as knowable, solid, three-dimensional and Euclidean, subject to domination and 
control (or indeed, as I will argue, even a space at all). Their commonality emerges 
further in their recapitulations of corporeality and finitude; this is not a posthuman fever 
dream of the kind described by Hans Moravecs or Raymond Kurzweil, and there is no 
opportunity for dualistic transcendence here. Attempting to rediscover the role of the 
corporeal body, though, in the face of so many deterministic and transcendentalist 
discourses, is a complex task. The ensuing figures are messy, mobile, temporary, 
contingent and materially located; they are as embodied as it is possible to be, and both 
rely upon and correspond in generating the material conditions of their own occurrence. 
They may never even be identifiable again outside of the specific discursive 
                                                 
110 The figures in Section One do, of course, tie together discourses across these varied 
kinds of texts, too—but their shapes and functions are so comparatively well-established in 
fiction that examining them in this context is by far the best way to illustrate their features and 
functions. 
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entanglements that I engender in the following chapters. Naming and locating them does 
not produce a taxonomy of figurative species to be identified as specific bounded entities 
in future texts, or a toolkit to provide emblematic examples of ‘correct’ collisions 
between the human and the technological—but rather to show the possibility of 
operating outside the dualistic policing seen in the figures of Section One.  
 
The power of the extant and most highly-proliferated, prescriptive models for 
understanding embodied subjectivity at the interface is great, and they may, to an extent, 
have succeeded in containing the subversive potential of that interface. But the 
relationship between humans and technologies still need not be exclusive of alternative 
understandings, and the purpose of Section Two is to map three such possible alternative 
understandings. Apart from the difference between the stability or level of 
congealment/consolidation of the two respective groups of figures I examine, my 
methodological shift reflects several other crucial points. Firstly, and notwithstanding the 
broad-strokes examples given above, the figures I map in Section Two are not direct and 
finished replies, answers, replacements, or progressions from those seen in Section One. 
They are not individually opposite (nor even always directly comparable) as discrete 
entities. I do not, in other words, purport to just invert the same troubling dualisms and 
valorise the body to the exception of the mind, or uncover (or indeed prescribe) a 
distinct chronological shift from the previous to the now. Nor do I even claim a 
necessary shift here from the normative to the non-normative: the figures in Section Two 
do not escape possible colonisation or (re)appropriation by existing discourses of power 
and domination, though they may be more resistant to them in their mobility and 
contingency than those uncovered in Section One.  
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
THE FURSONA 
 
A fursona is a constructed alternative depiction of the self, negotiated primarily through 
the Internet. The word is a portmanteau of “furry persona”: this alternative depiction 
usually takes the form of some kind of anthropomorphic or cartoon animal. In this 
chapter, I read the fursona as an emerging node of collision between human subjects and 
technologies that reflects the first of three potential alternative ways to read the 
embodied relationship between human subjects and digital technologies. The fursona 
animates a relationship between embodied human users and technology that is 
considerably more complex and less reductive than the boundary-policing figures 
discussed in Section One of this thesis. “Fursona” is a word in common use within the 
‘furry fandom’: a collection of interest groups, united mainly through the Internet, with a 
shared obsession with (and often sexual fetish for) fictional, graphical, role-played and 
otherwise performed representations of anthropomorphic animals as seen in cartoons, 
comics, et cetera. Emerging out of science fiction fan communities in the 1980s (the first 
exclusively furry convention, ConFurence Zero, took place in Southern California in 1989), 
the furry fandom has grown considerably.111 There are now several online communities 
dedicated entirely to furries: the largest single example is Fur Affinity (2005-present), 
which, according to its annual statistics for 2009, caters to over 215, 000 active users.112 
There are also dozens of furry conventions worldwide each year.113 These conventions, in 
a manner similar to science fiction and fantasy conventions, bring together furry fans, 
                                                 
111 A detailed chronology of the growth of the furry fandom by science fiction historian 
Fred Patten can be found at http://yarf.furry.com/chronology.html. 
112 See Dragoneer (2010). 
113 The largest, AnthroCon, is an annual three-day meeting of over 3,000 furries held in 
Pittsburgh; one of nearly equal size is held each year in San Jose, named Further Confusion 
(Brandolph 2008). 
. 
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artists, writers, animal/mascot costume enthusiasts (“fursuiters”) and so on.114 Furries 
have also registered—largely, and perhaps somewhat understandably, as curiosities—in 
several mainstream texts: a focus upon the furry fandom’s sexual elements is typified by 
depictions such as that in an episode of the forensic police drama CSI: Crime Scene 
Investigation (“Fur and Loathing” [2003]) or in the showbusiness comedy-drama Entourage 
(“The Day Fuckers” [2007]). Mainstream news media coverage also accounts for 
furries.115  
 
Unlike the avatar, hacker or nanotechnological swarm, the fursona is not a term that 
represents a clearly-consolidated figure that can be identified within fiction, but rather a 
contentious and variable one, upon which I seize here to demonstrate a concatenation of 
discourses and theoretical moves. A concrete definition of “fursona” is the topic of lively 
contestation even within the furry subculture, but it is possible to give an outline of its 
basic and most widely-accepted functions.116 Furries’ interest in anthropomorphic 
animals often extends beyond merely drawing/collecting relevant artwork or attending 
conventions. Many furries develop a virtual, alternative fantasy representative of 
themselves, normally an anthropomorphic version of their preferred animal although, as 
I will show, the idea of the fursona being a ‘representative’ of an offline subject is not 
                                                 
114 Given the comic book/cartoon underpinnings of the interest, many, if not most 
furries have an interest in drawing. 
115 Media coverage generally either plays up to the sexual fetish aspect, such as in the 
Vanity Fair article by George Gurley (2001) or, less frequently, attempts to produce a more 
complete picture of the fandom, such as in a report by Denise Winterman (2009). Recent 
attempts to do otherwise notwithstanding, the media’s frequent reduction of the furry fandom to 
its (nonetheless considerable) sexual fetish element has led to a growing resistance of furries to 
being represented or surveyed by the media and social researchers alike. This makes finding 
reliable data on furry demographics difficult, though furries’ strong online presence means that 
what is available is frequently and collaboratively updated by members of the community. A 
particularly valuable resource is the continually-updated Furry Survey, which records data on users’ 
perceptions of their own furry interests, political views, sexuality, and so forth, and accounts for 
over 3,000 respondents to date:  http://www.klisoura.com/ot_furrysurvey.php 
116 There is a dearth of peer-reviewed publications on this subject, but a reasonable 
broad description of the major different understandings of “fursona” within the furry community 
can be found on WikiFur, a knowledgebase for information related to furries and their 
community: http://en.wikifur.com/wiki/Fursona. 
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quite an adequate reflection of its functions. This fursona may be as simple as an avatar 
picture to use on a forum, or may extend to being a complex fictional character with a 
personality, history and residence in a “setting” distinct from the user’s own life. Furries 
very frequently produce (or commission) drawings of their fursonas, roleplay (“RP”) as 
them, or (somewhat less frequently) dress up as them in expensive, custom-designed 
costumes (fursuits). The crucial aspect of the fursona though, and its importance for 
understanding an alternative representation of the body in cyberspace, is that many 
furries do not draw any meaningful distinction between their offline (or ‘mundane’) 
human selves and their fursonas. The fursona, as it is understood in the furry fandom, is 
a furry user’s creation, but it is almost always both heavily invested with a user’s own 
personality and generative of experience and identity in that offline user’s subjectivity. 
Furries’ performances and depictions of their fantasy selves, built over time from clusters 
of various media and experiences, reach out from the facilitating/enabling technologies 
of the Internet, and impact upon their identities in affective, embodied ways.  
 
This is not, in other words, a unidirectional relationship of human control of 
technological agency/space, with a clear and continually-performed separation between 
the offline and the online. If the avatar (as well as the hacker and the nanotechnological 
swarm) are each respective kinds of cyberbodies, dramatising the recapitulation of a 
dualistic division at the electronic interface, and resisting the crossover of influence from 
the technological into the (masculine) mind-self, the fursona is a kind of cyberbody that 
rediscovers the indistinctions and crossovers that emerged while possibilities as 
relationships with technology shifted (as highlighted by Haraway), but which those more 
normative figures reject. As a particularly acute example of an emerging cyberbody, and 
thus existing in motion beyond the discourses within which the figures of Section One 
are gridlocked, the fursona represents a mode of using technologies that does not (and 
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cannot) ratify unidirectional instrumental control of/intervention into an ‘other’ 
(cyber)space or agent, keeping the mind and body separate, but a willed (and, perhaps 
more importantly, unwilled) collapsing of that dualism: it allows, by its very 
substantiation, the uncontrolled seep and leak of influence into the formerly putatively 
controlling subject—in a manner that prompts or forces the ongoing reconfiguration and 
resubstantiation of that subject. Where the figures in Section One all animate threats to 
the boundedness of the conventional liberal humanist subject and then dramatise the 
containment of those threats by a rational (male) actor, the fursona is the first figure I 
analyse that emerges from similar human/technological interfaces 
(user/computer/network et cetera) and yet overflows the possibility of such containment. 
Furthermore, it initiates a recouping of the organic body’s role in its affective character, 
which is so often discarded or subjected in conventional encounters with or depictions of 
the electronic interface. Finally, it confounds the possibility of imagining cyberspace as a 
penetrable plane or space: the fursona demonstrates an understanding of cyberspace that 
distributes it across various strands of material contingency, and the subject purportedly 
inhabiting cyberspace is not really inhabiting it at all, but is materially linked to and drawn 
out of that cyberspace itself, in opposition to the cyberpunk-influenced image of the 
mind-self as a separate, discrete essence that travels through a grid at great speed and 
with near infinite potency.117  
 
Finally, it is important to note that this chapter is not about furries themselves so much 
as it is about their particularly complex manner of constructing and living the alternative 
identities they seek, with a specific focus on their encounters with the Internet. This 
account of the fursona is not intended to offer or prescribe a mental, social or 
                                                 
117 This idea of cyberspace and the interface body as, respectively, a material milieu and 
the explication of potential into contingent and transient transductions of affect is taken up 
further in the Decaying Digital chapter. 
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psychological diagnosis of any kind, or to compartmentalise their behaviour as ‘outsider 
art’ or any other such categorisation.118 Nor do I assert any kind of particularly 
revolutionary ethical relationship between humans and animals in or related to the furry 
community: the fandom’s basis in comics, fiction and cartoons marks it as a 
phenomenon arising out of media representations of animals rather than encounters or 
relationships with so-called real animals themselves.119  Rather, I seize upon the unusual 
and complicated processes in action to investigate how furries’ proximity to and 
relationships to digital technologies, such as the Internet, can affect or aid in the 
construction of their desired alternative embodied identities—which nonetheless are 
never produced as the discrete and unified outcome of a rational and intellectual crafting 
or arrangement. The question of ‘what happens’ to the body and the human subject when 
it encounters the permeating reach of digital technologies can be illustrated in far more 
detail by examining a figure like the fursona, which is open, shifting, indistinct, and 
operates at least partly beyond the conscious control of any individual agent involved—
rendering it inherently resistant to totalising gestures of domination. The nature of a 
putative user’s subject can be significantly transformed by online interactions congealed 
in the figure of the fursona. Discovering—or rediscovering—the fursona in this complex 
transaction is a task rooted in showing this cyberbody’s material (and affective) character: 
the fursona is both the nexus of and the active generator/distributor of the subject-
constituting body-effects of the Internet as a concentration of media technologies.  
                                                 
118 For an account of “the furry typology” that examines furries’ perceptions of their 
respective human and zoomorphic identities from a more empirical perspective, see Gerbasi, 
Paolone et alia (2008). Gerbasi et alia assert that a quarter of self-described furries produced a 
“distorted” view of identification with their own species (197). They conclude with a tentative 
identification of “species identity disorder”, making comparisons to “gender identity disorder”, 
though stress that much more research is needed (ibid). 
119 The ‘question of the animal’ is widely theorised. Perhaps the best example for me to 
list here is the one that most closely resonates with the work I am undertaking. Haraway writes 
on the question of the animal in When Species Meet, accounting for and responding to version of 
‘the animal’ as perceived by Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari respectively. 
(2008: 20-35) 
Robin Stoate (Student No. 069063233) 
Reading Cyberspace: Fictions, Figures and (dis)Embodiment 
157 
 
 
Prosthetic Memory 
The performative character of certain online activities helps to police claims of 
authenticity in a way that serves primarily to reject inadequate authenticity claims in order 
to better constitute the subjectivities of those doing the policing. While a mode of inquiry 
focusing upon the performative is certainly robust, and explicative of the normative 
effects of some online encounters, it is not entirely appropriate for examining the more 
dispersed and affective/affected nature of the loose collective that is the fursona. There 
is undoubtedly a performative character to many of the online interactions I describe 
here, but my focus upon the body (rather than just the discursive) makes it necessary to 
engage a register that accounts, perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, for the material 
quality of the putatively immaterial experience of the Internet. My primary strategy here 
for unravelling the fursona’s material function is positioning it as the simultaneous 
generator and recipient of bodily impacts on the register of the affective. My trajectory 
for mapping the affective quality of online encounters is inspired by Landsberg’s notion 
of “prosthetic memory”.120 In Prosthetic Memory: the Transformation of American Remembrance 
in the Age of Mass Culture (2004), she argues that memory can manifest as something 
directly transplantable (and saleable) among people in a radically new way, facilitated by 
mass media technologies. These kinds of technologically-mediated experiences can reach 
out into the physical, sensate world of the viewer/consumer/subject in collision with 
those mediations, and make a tangible impact on their subject formation.  
 
                                                 
120 The study, practices and representations of memory in and out of literature and 
culture constitutes a vast field of critical, theoretical and philosophical study. I do not claim here 
to represent all of that field, but to focus on one specific intersection between memory, the body 
and commodified media technologies, as analysed by Landbserg. For a thorough survey of key 
theorists of memory, as well as studies of some major intersections between memory and 
literature, see Anne Whitehead (2009). 
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Her project comprises a theoretical account of “the production and dissemination of 
memories that have no direct connection to a person’s lived past and yet are essential to 
the production and articulation of subjectivity” (20). Within this model, watching a film, 
reading a book and so on are embodied experiences in themselves rather than 
representations of experiences, and we take away from those experiences real and 
tangible memories that can have permanent implications for the constitution of our 
individual identities. Landsberg builds this notion upon theories of the “bodily, 
experiential component of film spectatorship” (32).121 A collapse between representation 
and experience which is not coded pejoratively is emblematic of the possibilities of 
alternative subject formation that can be enacted in concert with the Internet. While the 
capacity to move an audience synaesthetically through media meets its explication par 
excellence in the cinema, I argue here throughout that the Internet produces effects/affects 
in the body in very similar ways, as evidenced by the writing of the participants/users I 
examine. Indeed, though she does not focus upon it in any great depth, Landsberg does 
gesture towards the Internet as another technology that can enable the circulation of 
prosthetic memories: “in the twenty-first century, this challenge [to ownership of 
“authentic” memories] is lodged even more strongly by the Internet, with its capacity to 
freely disseminate texts, information, music, and so forth” (147).  
 
These “prosthetic” memories are “sensuous”, “worn on the body” and “produced by an 
experience of mass-mediated representations” (ibid., emphasis in original). The experiences 
one has at the cinema, or at a holocaust museum, or reading a graphic novel, can 
generate memories of events and identification with the represented individuals that 
extends beyond suspension of disbelief, and into the archiving of memories that could be 
                                                 
121 Landsberg references here the work of Steven Shaviro: Shaviro writes that “cinematic 
images are not representations, but events” (qtd. in Landsberg, 32; emphasis in original).  
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(and sometimes are) mistaken for ‘real’ ones. Recipients of these prosthetic memories use 
them in tangible ways; their life and actions are guided by these experiences in ways that 
do not mark them as inadequate or inferior to ‘real’ experiences. To illustrate this 
phenomenon, Landsberg makes reference to two science fiction texts that dramatise a 
more radical prosthesis of memory. Reading the films Blade Runner (dir. Ridley Scott, 
1982) and Total Recall (dir. Paul Verhoeven, 1990), both of which deal with the idea of 
technologically-mediated memory implants, she outlines the ways in which this ‘false’ 
memory could be appropriated and assimilated in the process of individual subject 
formation, and the ultimate unimportance of their dislocated (or absent) experiential 
origins.122 “Both Blade Runner and Total Recall”, she writes, “are about characters who 
understand themselves through a variety of alienated experiences and memories that they 
accept as their own and subsequently make their own through use” (47). What is 
important here is that these characters use these memories, no matter their origin, and 
construct identities around them. I would add to Landsberg’s analysis that the very 
viability of these conventionally baseless identities—with which we as an audience are, in 
both cases, clearly expected to sympathise—is not compromised by the decision taken by 
both films’ directors not to ever reveal their respective protagonists’ putatively true or 
authentic identities. This deliberate ambivalence resists totalising readings of the films’ 
narratives, but it also functions to illustrate the relative unimportance of the origins of 
the memories in question. Where these memories arose originally, if anywhere, is less 
important than the ways in which they constitute or affect the subjectivities of those who 
come to possess or wear them.  
 
                                                 
122 This radical form of prosthetic memory implantation is also an idea taken up in the 
film Moon (dir. Duncan Jones, 2009). I examine this film in detail in the Caring Computer 
chapter. 
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That these memories, particularly in Total Recall, can come from nowhere at all—or at 
least, no specific conventional source of memory—illustrates the potentially 
transformative nature of representations of even things that have no clear basis in one 
recognisable ‘real’ event or phenomenon. As Landsberg writes: 
Because these mass cultural commodities, these images and narratives [...] are 
mediated through the cultural, political and social worlds of people, they have the 
capacity to affect a person’s subjectivity. The radical potential of prosthetic 
memory derives from the fact that the subjectivities they produce are not 
“natural”, not based on some count of authenticity [...] What matters is not the 
source of the memories but how they are invoked and used. (146)  
Significantly, while Landsberg’s examples demonstrate the circulation of prosthetic 
memories through mass media texts, and their apparently radical alienation from the 
supposed phenomenal experiences of the individuals or collectives who originated them, 
the examples she gives tend to be about distributing the reconstructed/re-represented 
memories of events that have putatively real-world, historical referents: she highlights the 
possibility that spectators can and do appropriate prosthetic memory in order to “suture 
themselves into history” (14). However, the focus upon the representation of major 
historical events is not necessarily indicative of the notion that only conventionally ‘real’ 
things (i.e. known events with such a documented historical register) can be represented 
or reproduced as prosthetic memories. 
 
I perceive two reasons for this. Firstly, while the un- or hyper-real experiences invoked in 
the prosthetic memories I show in this section may not have obvious conventionally real 
historical referents, their status as cultural texts, embedded within historical and social 
contexts, renders them, like all texts, at least partly the expressions of those material 
bases, inextricably linked to and contingent upon the materialities of their local 
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histories.123 Secondly, even though a link to history is foregrounded in Landsberg’s 
study–the memory-generating mediated reproductions of the Holocaust, the Second 
World War or the experiences of African-American slaves are rightly prevalent because 
of their overwhelming historical significance, a need to understand and manage the 
ongoing cultural effects, and the ensuing wide social and economic support for mediated 
strategies to do so—the focus upon these widely-represented and rupturing 
moments/durations of known history does not necessarily preclude the possibility that 
representations without mimetically-indicated and concrete historical counterparts—such 
as fictional or fantastic representations—could obey the same rules, and thus produce 
similar effects (affects) in the bodies of those exposed to/participating in them. 
Landsberg’s framework can, I argue, bear this theoretical weight. In a direct challenge to 
two widely-repeated protestations about a perceived postmodern collapse of authenticity, 
she explicitly disavows the urge to appeal to a pre-existing, essential (and impossible to 
access) real: 
Jameson’s argument does not consider that the technologies of the 
“postmodern” moment might themselves change what counts as experience. 
Both assumptions unwittingly betray a longing for some earlier moment when, 
for Baudrillard, there was a “real”, or, for Jameson, people experienced history in 
an authentic way. But the “real” and the “authentic” are and  have always been a 
limit case, an ideal state. People’s relations to both the world and the past have 
always been mediated through representation and narrative. Even in the historical 
moment that these theorists label “the postmodern,” one experiences one’s life as 
real [...] In other words, Baudrillard and Jameson may be conflating “the 
                                                 
123 Landsberg in fact makes the same point to further justify her examination of the 
representation of prosthetic memory in fictional texts (22). 
Robin Stoate (Student No. 069063233) 
Reading Cyberspace: Fictions, Figures and (dis)Embodiment 
162 
 
authentic” and “the experiential”, erroneously rendering them both obsolete in 
what they call postmodernity. (33) 
For Landsberg, the desire to privilege prosthetic memories which are traceable back to 
tangible real-world events—over those which, by Platonic logic, are not—only ratifies a 
vision of authentic remembrance and authentic experience that is just not tenable.  
 
This relationship between (in)authenticity, memory, technology and subjectivity is one 
whose character can be extended to describe the Internet-organised concatenation of 
effects and affects that is embodied by the fursona. While the identity-building practices 
of the specific subculture I examine here do not register as being sourced from discrete 
events on the same level of cultural significance as those Landsberg describes, the process 
of combining various mass-media technologies to invoke absent experience is analogous. 
The fursona manifests a colliding cluster of memories reflecting completely 
fictional/fantastic events/creatures124/lives—which have never existed—and the arguable 
postmodern shift in what counts as experience renders those putatively inauthentic 
origins broadly immaterial. Whether users produce their subjectivities based on 
prosthetic memories circulated as a response to real historical moments or as a 
fabrication stabilised only by community consensus, the effects/affects induced in the 
bodies/subjectivities of spectators/participants are, feasibly, identical. I want to 
emphasise the importance of a multimedia aspect of online interaction here: what has 
become more apparent now in the wake of wider deployment of broadband technology 
is the delivery of a much wider variety of media than merely text. Many considerations of 
online interaction have delineated their remit in their consideration of mainly text-based 
                                                 
124 Landsberg, while examining the prosthetic circulation of memories relating to the 
Holocaust, analyses Art Spiegelman’s celebrated anthropomorphic graphic novel Maus  (1972-
1991). Referring specifically to the fantastic nature of the graphic novel’s characters—they are 
bipedal anthropomorphic cats and mice—she writes that “artificial parameters do not make the 
affective experiences any less real” (117). 
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forms of interaction, or attempts to encompass online experience into the bounds of 
conventional theories of narrative (mainly through examinations of hypertext) or 
psychology.125 While a huge majority of person-to-person communication online does 
happen in terms of text (and indeed the first example I outline in this chapter is rooted 
first in text-based roleplaying), the intensification of other media online, especially images 
and video, means that the consideration of online experience must be allowed to account 
for the ways in which a user may be impacted aesthetically by those things. 
  
Each example I discuss here shows the variety of ways in which the various media 
technologies of the Internet are used to produce, circulate and affix memories and 
experiences to the bodies of users (and thus problematise the unidirectional implication 
of the conventional relationship between a ‘user’ and a ‘technology’). The fursona 
emerges as an entanglement of these processes; it is an indistinct but material agent, 
contingent upon the performances, media texts (and thus memories) in circulation, and 
with substantive influence upon its ‘creator’ even as it is produced itself, in an ongoing 
co-constitutive exchange.126 Importantly, while I discuss things here like avatars, profiles, 
characters, totems and so forth, these are not to be conflated with the fursona: all of these 
things form part of the fursona. The fursona is the indistinct body-subject that 
simultaneously includes, influences and reflects all of the above and more—including 
players themselves. This complex entanglement lies at the root of the fursona’s power to 
                                                 
125 Marie Laure-Ryan’s Narrative as Virtual Reality: Immersion and Interactivity in Literature and 
Electronic Media (2001) is exemplary of the kind of theoretical interventions that situate Internet 
texts (and hypertext in particular) within a wider literary tradition. A major work on Internet 
interaction taking the perspective of a clinical psychologist can be found in Sherry Turkle’s Life on 
the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet (1995). Both of these are emblematic of the theoretical 
tendency to consider primarily the role of text in online identity construction. 
126 The examples I outline here—especially that of Otherkin and of “Simon”—are 
particularly extreme examples of furry or furry-related identity-construction. There are varying 
levels of engagement with the furry community and furry interests, and these examples should 
not stand as representative of every person who identifies as “furry”.  
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move beyond the enduring boundary logic of conventional visions of the 
human/technological interfaces outlined in Section One. 
 
City of Unity 
One of the ways by which furries bring their fursonas into being is through Internet Role 
Playing (commonly referred to by participants as RP). RP is very much like a kind of 
collaborative writing, and can take several forms, but there are two very common ones: 
chatting/writing in ‘real time’ using an Internet Relay Chat (IRC) client (mIRC or similar) 
or instant messenger service (MSN Messenger, AOL Instant Messenger etc), or posting 
messages on blogs or web forums. In the former format (which is closer to ‘real time’), 
users/players connect to an IRC server or to their messenger service, join a themed RP 
channel or set up a one-to-one chat with another user/player. In the latter, themed 
forums or blog communities (such as are found on LiveJournal or similar services) are 
used as a place where players can take turns posting messages. In both cases the users 
involved co-operate in ‘acting out’ scenes with original characters, each taking turns to 
write a section of the ongoing narrative.127 There is no object to the game other than 
enjoying the immersion in the interaction and the story produced, and there is no way to 
‘win’ as such.128 Roleplaying is about the generation of prosthetic memories as a means to 
build a story, but those memories also have a constitutive effect on the identity of the 
user(s) involved in the building of that story. 
 
                                                 
127 In some online RP games, both things are done: users play out the ‘scenes’ on IRC in 
real time, and then dump the logs of those scenes on forums for others to read at a later date. 
The logs can be drawn upon at a later date by other players, in order to help deepen and further 
substantiate their own scenes. The highly-organised dystopian furry role playing game City of 
Unity is one such example of this practice (2007- ). 
128 Turkle’s work on Multi-User Dungeons (MUDs) is widely-cited and gives a good 
sense of this dimension of the debate (1995). 
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An excerpt from an RP log, published on the game’s web forum, gives an idea of the 
kind of play enacted on one furry roleplaying site—the dystopic future cyberpunk setting 
City of Unity (the asterisk denotes a player character’s action in the third person; a word 
enclosed in angle brackets indicates the name of the player making that contribution to 
the story): 
* Krendius jumped at the sound of a voice behind him, turning to face the 
source. Tiger, female, seemed relaxed if tired... Hm. The fox’s face remained 
mostly impassive, looking her over with a slightly curious air about him. He 
seemed to be sizing her up, but maybe that was just paranoia. “Aye, can be. 
Depends on who tells ya. What brings ya back here?” Glancing around, one 
could see warehouses set into the walls of the massive trainyard, facing each-
other across a drainage channel as deep as the average man was tall. Only a few 
improvised bridges cobbled together from sheet metal spanned the gap. “No’ 
much for someone like y’self here.” 
<Tatyana> “Someone like myself?” Tatyana echoed with a short laugh before 
taking another drag on her cigarette. “And tell me, exactly, what sort of person 
am I?” She adjusted the fedora on her head, looking around at the desolate 
trainyard, the old warehouses watching over the place like stoic guardians. “For 
anyone, I would say, this place offers... tranquility, potentially. Calmness and 
solitude are two of the rarest commodities on this city,” she explained, looking 
around as if expecting something to jump out at her for testing fate, “and I know 
a thing or two about rare commodities.” The tigress chuckled, tossing her burnt-
out cigarette to the side. “Unless, of course, you’re suggesting this your... ‘turf’ or 
something of that nature. I would hate to be on the bad side of one of your... 
motorcycle gangs or what have you.” Her tone suggested that she wasn’t actually 
very afraid of that at all. (Overwatch 2009) 
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An excerpt from a larger scene depicting an encounter between the player characters 
Krendius and Tatyana, this scene in turn forms part of a colossal and ongoing story. A 
quick search discovers that the poster playing the character of Krendius—
“Overwatch”—has nearly thirty such posts in the RP logs forum, each one accounting 
for thousands of words of interaction, and these stretch back to May 2008. There are, 
according to the game’s character list, over 150 player characters in operation, each one 
with their own dedicated profile page.129   
 
These RP posts exemplify the format that much freeform roleplaying comprises. But just 
as important as the posts themselves are the texts generated around them by the players 
involved: the experiences enacted within these RP posts have significant and widely-
reported implications for the putatively ‘offline’ memories of those who have taken part. 
Apart from the supplementary texts to support the in-character (IC) story/setting, one 
does not have to search hard for examples of the overflow of these textual/visual 
experiences into the vernacular, out-of-character (OOC) conversations of players.130 
Crucially, these conversations frequently foreground the emotional development of their 
characters as central to their appeal. As one RPer (as they are known) reports on the 
OOC forum of his memories of writing within the RP setting(s) offered by the furry 
game World of Feila: 
RP Name: The Public Enemy  
Setting: Age of Drive-by Shootings (1930s)  
Character(s): Charles ‘Mooney’ Ashby  
Basic plot/genre: 30s gangsters racketeering and fighting each other. 
                                                 
129 http://city-of-unity.com/characters.html 
130 City of Unity has forums for character artwork, setting-specific fiction to support later 
RP sessions, as well as at least one ongoing forum thread dedicated to producing the perfect 
“soundtrack” of songs for RP. 
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Reasons Why: This one just went so well, on my end at least. There was always 
an overtone of violence, but it was never the same old dithering around player-
vs-player combat where nobody gets hurt. I always had lots to write, and most of 
all I really enjoyed writing and developing the character of Mooney, whom 
received a few odd details and character elements as he went through different 
situations from one end of the scale to the other. His actions towards different 
people, both players and NPCs were the most interesting to me. I think my 
favourite developed aspect of him is his subconscious which torments him with 
dreams of being Number One, and in another RP, nightmares about going to 
hell, an idea that stemmed from this RP. The only downside is that the story was 
cut short by absences, and eventual petering out of interest.  
 
Fig. 10. A post by a regular player on the RP game World of Feila. The fursona here is evidenced 
partly by the entanglement of the nonhuman avatar image, the “species” (“Ferret”) listed beneath 
it, as well as the appeal for framing discussions of RP sessions. 
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Players often talk about their characters as if they are acquaintances, and have a deep 
attachment to them; there is much social capital in conversations about characters 
(threads on the Feila forums centre around questions such as “Can your characters 
read?”, “[do you play] Serious or Silly characters?” or “What do your characters sound 
like”?). RP here represents a very similar process to Landsberg’s model: players 
‘experience’ events that they have never, actually, experienced ‘for real”—through and 
with the proxy of their character. The reported experiences are ones of emotional, 
affective connection: stabilised by consensus and the preponderance of writing about RP 
both reports the affective impact of the roleplaying experiences and reiterates it, in its 
drawing of other readers into the collusion with and ratification of those experiences. 
These experiences are seized or used (knowingly or otherwise) in the production of their 
own subjectivities. 
 
In a forum thread on the topic of relationships between players and their characters, 
player “Themnax” describes his typical character type, and figures it in terms of his own 
life: 
wandering hermit, usually more interested in scenery and technology then in 
individual people, but never wants to make anyone unhappy, and always tries 
very hard to avoid doing so. likes to show up where least expected. sometimes 
comes and goes entirely unnoticed. sometimes leaves comments, often as 
anonymously as he can [...] not really arrogant at all, just a-social, as in not usually 
seeking company. 
not inclined to display emotions or trust having them, though without entirely 
denying them either. (Themnax 2010) 
Themnax’s RP experience is one of repeating and reiterating elements of his own life 
even as those RP experiences overlap back into it. His focus upon the personality and 
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emotional type of the character is telling of the register in which the character’s exploits 
appeal. This kind of roleplaying, despite it being about the putative control of a character, 
is clearly not the same as the notion of an avatar as described in Section One. It is not 
about transcendence of the body or hyperrational control of an othered, neutral 
cyberspace. RP characters are infinitely more unstable than the bounded, discrete digital 
shells of avatars. Quite distinct from this simple calculus, the comparatively esoteric 
nature of these RP characters reflects a version of identity that is partial; it consolidates 
only in the presence and unstable context of other characters and components. And, 
even then, is not tied down or discrete: trying to ‘locate’ a character on the Internet is 
quite impossible because it is not a discrete entity, but rather one that is held together 
only under specific conditions. In this way, the player becomes inextricable from the 
character, because each influences the identity and self of the other through what 
amounts to ‘shared’ experience.  
 
The manifold strands of experience, shared between the deeply complex informing 
contexts of player, character, other players, mood, memory, situation, and so on, congeal 
into what is effectively a deeply unstable version of body, neither within some other-
plane version of cyberspace nor outside of it. It is not a ‘digital’ nor an ‘organic’ body, 
but both: affecting and making unstable the notion of the player as an entity that can ever 
make a clean break from its cyberspace experiences, this unstable body, combined of 
those media and affects, is the fursona. If, as with Landsberg’s model of prosthetic 
memory, events that happen in roleplaying are, like films and other media, real bodily 
events themselves, with a distinct affective character, and not just representations or 
reports of events, they can affect the construction of identity in the same way as 
conventionally real, lived, ‘genuine’ events. Indeed, here the user is experiencing a real 
event: its bounds are merely drawn in unstable ways, and the impact of emotional affect 
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emerges from the stage of a fantasy enabled by technologically-mediated interaction with 
others. The ‘event’ here is that the user is (say) in a room, using a computer, typing 
words, experiencing the emotions they feel from being involved in a story that is 
overwhelmingly personal, and which is figured and built over days, weeks, months or 
years in a manner that grows alongside their own ‘offline’ life.131 The origins or triggers of 
the emotions are less important than the fact that the user feels, assimilates, and uses 
them to help formulate their identity, even if they do not know they are doing so. The 
fursona, then, is the material, discursive, metaphorical node of connection between those 
informing contexts; it confounds any kind of subject/object relationship between a user 
and a technology and spawns multiple and co-substantiating entities that are as hard to 
stabilise as they are to map.  
 
Hardly OOC 
RP and the frequent appeal to its affective character so defined, we can use it as the way 
into still more acute examples of fursonas. The first I examine in this section is that of a 
user who takes RP and uses it as part of a complex assemblage of varied media to 
perform and shape the bounds of his own version of the fursona. “FirefoxMcCloud” is 
(or claims to be) an eighteen-year-old user, who presents online as either an 
anthropomorphic fox or a hybrid fox-dragon. His performance is rooted in RP, pictures, 
and detailed descriptions of his characters. However, in an intensification of the kinds of 
performances seen in City of Unity or World of Feila, FireFoxMcCloud does not tend to 
distinguish between himself as a player and his character. His website, World of this Kitsune, 
                                                 
131 The difference between roleplaying and just reading more conventional published 
fiction is clear here:  the ongoing contribution from the user makes the experience extremely 
personal. The user’s connection to the character is, as frequently reported by such users, very 
intimate. Unlike video games/hyperfiction, roleplaying of this kind is almost unlimited in scope. 
One can play for years and a character can experience anything that can be imagined, and if the 
other players are good enough and make it convincing enough, the potential impact upon 
subjective construction is endless. 
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serves as the organisational nexus of this performance, and its landing page gives an 
overview of his approach and attitude (Fig. 11): 
 
Fig. 11. Firefox McCloud’s Website. 
 
This site is about FireFox (Me.) 
Gotta problem? Deal with it. 
Oh yeah, the site contains mature content, so be aware.  
No longer on Furcadia, contant [sic] via YIM or YIM through Live Messenger, 
yoallwyn@yahoo.com (McCloud 2010). 
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Here he lays out several items: links to the various media elements constituting his 
character(s), a somewhat confrontational approach to challenges to his chosen 
performance, and a warning that his site contains “mature content” (meaning 
pornography involving his character).132 He disavows participation in a graphical furry RP 
game called Furcadia, and says he is to be contacted through an instant messenging 
programme (Yahoo Instant Messenger). On the linked “description” page, which gives 
detailed descriptions of his two respective character instantiations, FirefoxMcCloud 
claims that he is “Rarely OOC”—that is, he is rarely ‘out of character’, and is to be 
treated as in-character at all times (ibid). FirefoxMcCloud’s experience represents a quite 
common vision of the fursona. His construction of an alternative identity online is 
elaborate, carefully-defined and produced in painstaking detail—but he also does not have 
full control of the affective impact of this fursona upon ‘him’. The fursona affects him 
even as he constructs it; the emotional register of his relationship to the fursona (evinced 
not least by his apparent need or craving to continue the RP and his wilful refusal to give 
an account of his “authentic” offline body) demonstrates the pleasurable confusion of 
fantasy taken to the point of prosthetic memory, and the overflow of any unidirectional, 
                                                 
132 Given the dubious legal status of so-called “furry porn” or “yiff” (which apparently 
only really comprises drawings of fantastic creatures—albeit sexually explicit ones—but whose 
animal physical characteristics intermeshed with human ones could, theoretically, fall foul of 
obscenity laws, not least owing to their monstrous hybridity) I choose not to examine it here. 
However, further examinations of the fursona could account for the considerable affective power 
of furry pornography on the subjective experiences of those who consume it (and perhaps 
should, given its large role in the furry community). A study of this kind has precedent: I point 
here, as a possible example, to work by Susanna Passonen, whose analysis of her own affective 
encounters with unsolicited porn emails “involves taking seriously the power of pornographic 
texts to move their readers” and asserts that “affective encounters with porn are ambivalent and 
often contradictory” (2007: 43). A collision between Paasonen’s nuanced reading of the affective 
impact of pornography (i.e. moving beyond frequent feminist standpoints of either pleasure or 
disgust in encounters with porn) and the constitutive effect of that affective experience upon 
individual subjectivity could be potentially fruitful in furthering the examination of the fursona, 
and other unconventional online-mediated body-subjects for whose communities such erotica 
forms a part. 
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instrumental subject/object control relationship of the user to the technological other (or 
indeed cyberspace).133  
 
This further-augmented kind of RP, represented by FirefoxMcCloud, is a particularly 
intensive use of the Internet to generate memory (and so experience) that has not 
‘actually happened’ to the user in question. However, while the experiences of RP may 
serve to alter the archive of experience of this user, and change his putatively separate 
offline identity to the point where he collapses the distinction between his offline self 
and his character, there are even more explicit attempts to use the Internet to generate 
fantasy worlds, bodies or characters that could not be enacted or ratified in another way. 
Examining performances enacted upon LiveJournal, as well as a website maintained by the 
group itself, it is possible to locate a collective of users organised around their claim to 
some kind of a non-human essence (or “soul”, as it is often enunciated). These 
“Otherkin” stake a claim on identity that is not limited to human experience, but that 
incorporates elements of fantastic (but, interestingly, often highly uniform and specific) 
experience – that of being inhabited by the soul of an animal, such as a wolf, or even a 
dragon: 
Otherkin (aka Fairth, Metahuman, and sometimes overlapping with Vampires 
and Furries) are those people who believe themselves to be spiritually and/or 
physically other than human. While mythological species (elves, satyrs, fairies, 
dragons, and so on) are widely accepted as being included under the term 
“Otherkin”, many people in the community prefer to include aliens, vampires, 
therianthropes, furries, extraterrestrial humans, and other nonhuman races. A 
mythological or literary equivalent is not necessary to be included under the 
                                                 
133 This is a performance that not only eschews appeals to the offline body for proof of 
subjective authenticity, it does the absolute opposite, hiding the putatively offline body in favour 
of representing and celebrating that body constructed in cyberspace. 
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“Otherkin” umbrella-term; there are types of otherkin that have not shown up in 
known legends or fiction (star-dragons, Elenari, etc.) (Windtree n.d. [a]). 
The experience that they claim is generated by a variety of media. Like the extreme RP 
performance of FirefoxMcCloud, as I show above, Otherkin create a ‘character’ that they 
play. But, unlike FirefoxMcCloud, they do distinguish between their ‘authentic’ self and 
the character: it is just that in case, the character played is their ‘true’ self. This imagined, 
longed-for subject is one with which Otherkin are engaged in an ongoing struggle to 
articulate, through the vast catalogue of aspects and flows of media that they generate: 
drawings, fiction (and combinations of those two such as webcomics), forum and journal 
participation which may include discussions of paganism, visualisation and meditation 
techniques, down to the self-consciously placed minutiae such as everyday language used 
in online discussion or the tags used to describe comment or linking systems on their 
journals (Otherkin LiveJournal blog user “Lupabitch” encourages visitors not to leave 
comments, but to “nose the earth” [Lupabitch 2006]).  
 
I focus here on a few members of the Otherkin community, who believe (and enunciate) 
that their life experience is influenced by the spirit or soul of non-human creatures in one 
capacity or another. Some are less explicit in their claims of this than others, ascribing 
belief to be rather more totemistic than a direct belief of being, for example, an animal 
trapped in a human body134, but the varied media generated makes Otherkin a useful 
example of the way that attempts are made by some users to stabilise a radical identity via 
the Internet, showing the lines of influence that can and do emerge. One user 
(Kuwaizair) of the LiveJournal community posts the question: 
                                                 
134 For a more detailed definition of these types, see Windtree (n.d. [b]): “Transgendered 
people feel they were born into a body of the wrong gender. Trans-spirited otherkin usually feel 
they were born into (or are residing within) a body of the wrong species. Like someone played a 
collosal joke upon them at conception and they were put into a body of the wrong species” 
(ibid).  
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does anyone here think the dragon, if existing in the flesh in another paraell [sic] universe 
could be related to those mammal-like reptiles? only more evolved and somehow with 
six limbs? (given we are talking about winged dragons) or would wing less and winnged 
be differnt familys [sic]? (Kuwaizair 2006) 
The reply by “Flarecarrot” is swift and decisive: “by definition no they cannot be related” 
(ibid.). This type of discussion typifies the exchanges of conversation used (employing 
presumed knowledge, amongst other devices) to help to stabilise, consensually, the reality 
of the non-human identity that is claimed. Reinforced by confident, assertive co-
operation by other participants in the role, supposed facts about the physical attributes of 
the fictional creatures are imbued as truths. Further to this kind of interaction, and 
importantly when considering the material, affective mode of access to this notion, is, 
again, the entanglement of the above performances with a wide array of artistic 
representations of the non-human creatures that Otherkin are supposed to represent. 
Drawings, in particular, are everywhere in Otherkin communities. One particular 
webcomic, called Theri There after the notion of “therianthropy” or shape-shifting, depicts 
the problems that Otherkin have with dealing with everyday, ‘mundane’ life. One 
example shows an anthropomorphic tiger shedding a smart suit, with the caption 
“Halloween is when our costumes are taken off”.  
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Fig. 12. A frame excerpt from the Otherkin webcomic Theri There (Sandstorm 2005)  
The way they enact their fantasy does, in a way, make it real on the level that it materially 
alters their archive of experience, if only owing to the amount of time spent online and 
involved in projects producing the aesthetic effects of being this kind of media-
negotiated ‘other’ (evidenced by the elaborate, fully-fleshed out nature of the fantasies). 
By producing vast amounts of media artefacts using the Internet as both an organisation 
tool and a stage of display, Otherkin gather a contingent assemblage of cumulative 
aesthetic experiences from which new ‘memories’, in Landsberg’s terms, can be 
explicated.135 The fursona, held temporarily in flux out of all of those contributing media, 
with their varying levels of sensate impact, again comes into being somewhere between 
those experiences (not, importantly, as the discrete object of the Otherkin’s invention). 
 
Despite, though, the intense attention paid by Otherkin to the reality-effect of their 
online performances, there are still more radical examples to be found. My final reading 
of the fursona deals with, again, a similar premise, but taken even further in its attempts 
                                                 
135 The idea of ‘explicating’ embodied experience from a milieu of implication is explored fully, in terms of 
radical materialist conceptions of the body, in Chapter Six on digital decay. 
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to embody a radical reality enabled only by networks of material instantiation enacted on 
and via the Internet. “Simon” of “Furryneko.com” uses his website as a means of 
offering a manifesto for his lifestyle choice. A British male in his twenties with a number 
of failed relationships, he has come to the conclusion that his best hope for 
companionship resides within the furred arms of an imaginary character of his own 
creation; a cartoon anthropomorphic tiger he has named “Kara”. In the “Life as a Furry” 
section of the site, Simon identifies himself as belonging to a vast “furry” Internet 
subculture. Simon defines being a furry as follows: “To me, being a furry means I have a 
love for anthromorphs [sic]. Anthromorphs are commonly animals with human features, 
or vica-versa [sic], some examples are; Bugs Bunny, Lola Bunny, Daffy Duck, etc. There 
are many people around the internet who choose to draw adult art of anthromorphs, 
some slightly risqué, and others explicit.” (Furryneko 2006). What is most pertinent is 
how Kara is created as an assemblage by Simon’s attempts to make her more ‘real’. His 
site contains drawings of Kara that he has had commissioned, many of which are erotic 
in nature.  
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Fig. 13. “Simon” and “Kara” (BBMBBF, 2006) 
 
He gives her a birthday, interests (the same interests as him) and says that “she works out 
daily to maintain her shape” (ibid.). He describes how she is “always there”, and hints at 
their sexual exploits. He even wears, in “real life”, a ring engraved with her name. Using 
his website as a way of describing all of these things, Simon forces Kara into online 
discourse and makes her as ‘real’ to the website viewer as he is himself. She is, he writes, 
“as real as any other person” (ibid.). If it were not for Simon’s explicit stating otherwise—
and the fact that, of course, Kara is a kind of creature that does not exist outside of this 
kind of assemblage of circumstances–she would not seem any less real than Simon 
himself from the description that he gives. Kara is a cluster of effects that is temporarily 
created out of the many circumstantial, peripheral things that Simon asserts on the site, 
the site itself, the drawings, the ring that he wears, and the viewer(s) of the website. And, 
in turn the Kara assemblage creates between herself and Simon another assemblage 
which constitutes the fursona. The Internet serves as one of many tools of media 
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production, making Kara real in a disembodied (in the unified sense) way, but one that 
nevertheless has a profound effect on Simon’s identity and the way that he lives his life. 
 
Fur Affinity 
These examples represent individuals who deliberately take advantage of the bodily 
sensations that can be generated by participation in certain online experiences. The 
affective aspect of the interactions, arises in both the emotionally-implicating character of 
the texts produced, and the production of media outside of text (such as the prevalence 
of character images). The prosthesis of imagined and transplantable memory enacted 
through these texts, performances and images intensifies the available material, sensate 
archive of experience to the extent that a new understanding of the online body/subject 
can be drawn out from it. Furries are not the cute bunnies or the mighty wolves that they 
portray themselves as, of course: but they are not discrete/separate humans operating 
puppets/avatars either. The indistinctions caused by the generative effects of furries’ 
‘false’, ‘inauthentic’ memories—produced through the ‘lived’ experiences of roleplaying, 
performance and fantasy social networking—mean that there is no way to separate the 
ensuing identity/subjectivity of the furry in question entirely from the fantasy they have 
constructed. What emerges here is a hybrid existing between the offline subject and the 
memory effects of the media texts involved. The fursona is not, then, representative or 
mimetic: it is not the furry character/animal/cartoon reflecting the unidirectionally-
applied intentions or thoughts of a person occupying or experiencing it, but something in 
between. The entity emerging from these interactions exists in a way that is contingent 
upon them, and it substantiates as an irreducibly local effect of the online/offline 
experience.  
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Important, again, is the synaesthetic aspect of these kinds of interactions. There is no 
instrumental transfer of ‘meaning’, discursive or otherwise, from which a new self is 
consciously assembled or condensed. This is not a Foucauldian model of docile-bodied 
inscription. As Landsberg has pointed out with her observation that “the physical 
sensation of one’s body being moved was a fundamental aspect of cinema” (13), 
transference of visual meaning into a genuinely felt, physical sensation is exactly the kind 
of transformation that exemplifies how certain modes of interaction can have an 
affective character beyond obvious expectation. While considered to be weightless, 
disembodied, and so forth, the Internet actually allows a conflation of media that allows 
those kinds of overflows of visual, textual, emotional and other stimulus into felt 
experience to be evoked alongside other kinds of texts. With prosthetic memory, one 
does not need to have ‘been there’ to access, share in, and be affected by the feeling of 
the experience represented, and in this case, ‘there’ does not even have to exist in any 
conventional, knowable, mappable sense. Thus, on the Internet, transformations of 
sensate experience may be brought about by writing, by drawings, by music, by voice-to-
voice real time communication, by journal-keeping, by roleplaying, by cybersex, or by any 
combination of those things.136 The participation in those Internet-mediated practices 
represents the intensification of a milieu from which this cyberbody may emerge, 
between and dependent on the participants, whose subjective experience and positioning 
remains qualitatively altered by the process. 
  
The fursona is less just another reinstantiation of the dualistic, dominating avatar, and 
more a complex, hybrid pastiche of effects and affects generated out of an extremely 
diverse set of technologically-mediated practices and interests. Rather than policing the 
                                                 
136 For accounts of cybersex and its constitutive effects in online embodiment, see 
Roseanne Allucquére Stone (1995) and Stacy Gillis (2004). 
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boundary between the human and the technological other, and embodying a normative 
function that follows and remaps familiarly exclusive dualisms, the fursona, in its 
dispersed, mobile (and disputed) character, collapses the interface between the human 
user and the technological agent, and infolds online experiences into offline ones—
privileging no one particular aspect as authentic—with implications for that user’s 
memory and subjectivity. It is true that, in its position at the interface between the human 
and the technological, it is undoubtedly a figure that presents temptations to draw a line 
of direct comparison with the avatar, or to consider the former to be the latter’s 
superseding version. However, rather than being an answer to the avatar, the fursona 
partly absorbs the avatar: in a modified form, avatars may (and indeed often do) form part 
of the complex but contingent structure of the fursona. 
  
Robin Stoate (Student No. 069063233) 
Reading Cyberspace: Fictions, Figures and (dis)Embodiment 
182 
 
CHAPTER FIVE:  
THE CARING COMPUTER 
 
I have offered an account of one figure that constitutes a consolidation of an alternative 
set of discourses and practices for understanding the murkier, messier interactions 
implicated in the usually highly dualistic relationship between human and technological 
subjects. The second figure that I offer here as an alternative mode of envisioning the 
human-technological encounter is the caring computer. Representing an overturning of 
well-established science-fictional conventions of evil or genocidal artificial intelligences, 
as well as intervening in debates over prescribed cultural notions of care, the caring 
computer assigns an affective, materially-contingent character to agents previously 
considered radically incapable of having such impacts—specifically, artificial intelligences. 
The possible discovery of a conversely complex, multidirectional, affective quality in 
interfaces with these agents both opens up new possibilities for understanding the roles 
of those involved in relationships of care, and, like the fursona, allows us to imagine 
encounters at the human-technological interface that are not about reinscribing once 
more the flawed dualistic Cartesian human subject into a putatively neutral (cyber)space. 
The persistent, ongoing ratification of the subject-object relationship that sees 
technologies as the passive inventions of a rational project (as reinforced by the avatar, 
the hacker, and the nanotechnological swarm) is ruptured by the caring computer, and 
the deterministic, quasi-eschatological trajectory of singularity thinking associated with 
that project is short-circuited: the caring computer foregrounds in its becoming the 
highly materially-contingent nature of all participants in the constitution of subjectivity, 
whether conventionally viewed as human or as ‘artificial’. 
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This chapter finds the primary evidence for its claims mostly in fiction—where questions 
of the relationships between humans and artificial subjects have been very thoroughly 
examined—but it does so in a manner informed and inspired by Haraway’s recent work. 
To establish the shape of this new figure, I first look briefly at the conventional 
representation of the AI in fiction, and how (and indeed why) it has been almost 
overwhelmingly positioned as a belligerent, destructive force or a threat to the very 
existence of humanity. Then, I outline the caring computer as an alternative figure. To do 
this, I first account for work that has uncovered problems with normative 
understandings of ‘care’. Then, reading the science fiction film Moon through Haraway’s 
theorisation of companion species and the “touching” of material histories and 
contingencies, I show how some of these problematic, prescriptive roles in caring 
relationships may be unravelled: Moon depicts what can only be described as a 
relationship of care and responsibility between a (cloned) human being and an artificial 
intelligence. In short, I argue here that allowing the unusual, unexpected intimacy of 
putatively artificial ‘carers’ to form the (partial) basis of subject formation confounds 
humanist exceptionalism and re-embeds the human into its material contexts. The figure 
of the caring computer represents a capacity for affective impact upon human subjects 
that is not normally ascribed to ‘cold’, ‘emotionless’ technological subjects. It animates a 
disruption of the linear, instrumental relationships of power between humans and 
technologies by showing the ways in which ongoing processes of co-constitution are 
responsible for bringing each participant in the relationship into being (or becoming). 
Care here is a manner of activating and making conspicuous those processes and the ways 
in which they unravel, rather than prescribe, the roles and positions into which respective 
participants in those relationships are assigned. 
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Artificial Belligerence 
I am making a distinction between computer-instantiated AIs (such as HAL 9000 in 
2001: A Space Oddyssey [dir. Stanley Kubrick, 1968], the Master Control Program of 
TRON, the WOPR war computer in WarGames, or Wintermute in Neuromancer), and 
artificial intelligences as installed into androids, cyborgs and the like: as I will 
demonstrate, the non-anthropomorphic mode of embodiment taken by most AIs in 
fiction assigns them a particularly belligerent character. Unlike humanoid, more 
recognisably-embodied robots (such as C3PO from the Star Wars series of films [1977-
2005] or Commander Data from Star Trek: The Next Generation [1987-1994]), these 
intelligent, self-aware, linguistically conversant subjects exist as free-floating essences, 
nevertheless bounded within the more recognisable, traditional shape of the immobile, 
statuesque computer system—and they almost always seem to inspire a certain 
discomfort, or even outright paranoia. But there are more specific tropes that repeat 
themselves continuously through narratives containing these AIs: the fact that these 
particular subjects lack a cohesive, visible body is deployed as a constant source of fear. 
The peculiar, potentially unsettling way in which these AIs are embodied is exploited 
through a reduction of their presence to the objective observing tool par excellence of 
Western thinking—the human eye; represented almost invariably by camera lenses that 
may or may not be modified to look like human eyeballs. HAL9000’s single red ‘eye’ was 
and is a definitive, striking image of vision backed by an unseen, artificial agent, while the 
player of System Shock 2 is constantly forced to either avoid the multiple security cameras 
that are hunting them down, hack them, or even destroy them completely. Likewise, in 
the game Portal, each room the player inhabits is dotted with silent, roving cameras, and 
any attempts to interfere with their operation draws abuse from GLaDOS, the AI upon 
whose advice the player is reliant. Where the camera-as-eye is not present, such as in 
WarGames, there is a proliferation of monitors and screens. While the bodily presence of 
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the AI character is limited in the physical sense by this reduction to a series of eyes, this 
presence is effectively an omnipresence—the saturation of disembodied ‘eyes’ 
throughout the spaces in which the influence of these AIs can be felt creates a constant 
sense of literally being watched—but with the supposedly fractured nature of an AI’s 
subject, the long-known paranoia of panopticism is amplified into a sureness that one is 
definitely always being observed. 
 
 
Figs. 14 and 15. HAL9000’s distinctive red ‘eye’, and a camera-eye of Portal’s GLaDOS. 
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As well as these ‘eyes’, the presence of the AI is often supplemented with some kind of 
voice. This is, of course, a useful device within film in particular to avoid the need for an 
audience to read lines and lines of text on a screen-within-a-screen, but the particular way 
in which the ‘voice’ of an AI is presented within these texts has certain effects in terms of 
producing a sense of fear or unease. HAL9000 speaks in a kind of monotonous, calm, 
but unsettlingly disaffected manner. Advances in special effects between the 1960s and 
the 1980s, though, mean that Wargames AI WOPR’s voice could even more clearly 
embody the personality of a cold, socially dead machine. Similarly, SHODAN of System 
Shock is even more frightening, her voice layered, stammering, corrupted, pitch shifted, 
timewarped, compressed, modulated and overlaid onto a persistent background electrical 
hum. GLaDOS of Portal seems to achieve a level of supposedly realistic intonation and 
emotion, but does not quite manage it. The almost-voices of these AIs are chilling, 
particularly when coupled with the lonely settings in which they are heard – a spaceship 
millions of miles from earth; a darkened bedroom, or a deserted underground laboratory. 
Perhaps more importantly, though, many of these fictional AIs want to harm their 
human creators, or even wipe them out completely. HAL9000 of 2001 successfully 
murders all but one of the crew of the spacecraft it administers, the Skynet defence 
system of the Terminator franchise starts a global thermonuclear war to extinguish 
humanity altogether as soon as it “becomes self aware”. TRON’s Master Control 
Program wishes to infiltrate government computer systems and take control of one or 
both of the superpowers, and the WOPR war computer of Wargames nonchalantly begins 
the countdown to global nuclear holocaust when it is hacked by a teenager, apparently 
just as an idle experiment for its own edification. The AI antagonists of both the System 
Shock series and Portal attempt to murder the player-character either explicitly or with sly, 
yet increasingly obvious intent. Both AIs taunt and goad the player throughout—and in 
the case of Portal’s GLaDOS, who is written for both horror and for laughs, rather 
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passive-aggressively. There is at least one possible historical explanation for this: 2001, 
WarGames and TRON, three of the texts that helped consolidate the terms for how AIs 
are portrayed in cinema, are Cold War era texts. These 1980s texts in particular resonate 
with a fear of nuclear holocaust renewed in the 1980s by the instantiation of hardline 
conservative heads of state Ronald Reagan and Yuri Andropov. The increasing 
encroachment on Western life of the computer reflected by a proliferation of microchip 
technology and the increasing influence of the digital may have provided a conduit 
through which concerns over the faceless, automaton-like governments of the 
superpowers could be expressed.137  
 
There are other ways in which the AI figure has been used to stand in for the 
emotionless onward march of a much more complicated set of social processes. In an 
assessment of “computer as character” in these films, Fred Glass focuses upon the AI 
partly as a representative of the unbridled, runaway capitalist as he writes: 
As anthropomorph, the human qualities of the computer [Master Control 
Program] in TRON are the negative characteristics of a technocrat; power-
hungry, ruled by profit, authoritarian, unscrupulous—the qualities of a modern 
captain of industry. Unlike earlier capitalists, this one has the functional narrative 
advantage of literally lacking a heart. (1984: 18) 
The powerlessness of the everyday human being to reason with an emotionless machine 
could equally relate, then, to feelings of an inability to influence potentially apocalyptic 
government policy in the nuclear sabre-rattling 1980s, and the same decade’s perceived 
widespread roboticisation of labour to improve efficiency and profit (and the attendant 
                                                 
137 For a discussion of the specific impact of nuclear politics on prominent cultural representations of 
technology in North America in the 1980s, see Shail and Stoate (2010: 55ff). 
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consequences for employment, “replacing” human jobs).138 The two concerns are even 
interconnected. Glass points out a fundamental collision between nuclear technologies 
and the very technologies by which the spectacular graphics of TRON were facilitated: 
Today, the new technology contains the ability to destroy not some symbolic 
representative human character, but all of humanity itself. That’s why in these 
films computers and ‘the bomb’ appear on neighboring pedestals in a modern 
pantheon of sign and myth. Ironically, the founder of MAGI (Mathematical 
Applications Group, Inc.) was inspired to create the computer graphics program 
that figured prominently in the visuals of TRON while a nuclear physicist in the 
mid-sixties. This bit of biographical trivia reveals one clue to the success of the 
film in establishing its hold over the viewer’s imagination: the confluent 
relationship between nuclear and microchip technologies, embedded not only at 
the narrative and ideological levels of contemporary popular culture, but even in 
the history of its image-making. (16) 
What the above concerns both recapitulate, though, are the terms of the most popular 
vision of the fictional human/AI relationship: this interface encounter works to police 
the boundary between the human and the technological by establishing the technological 
subject to be one of unreal hyperrationality, distance, coldness and lack of emotionality. 
All of these depictions dramatise calculation taken to its logical conclusion by AI subjects: 
putatively vulnerable human beings become numbers to be crunched (the WOPR war 
computer sees the real nuclear destruction of humanity as an ideal opportunity to gather 
data: “would you like to see some projected kill ratios?”, it asks). The AI subject emerges 
                                                 
138 This is a decade where the Soviet Union had pulled out of arms control talks, and in 
which the United States had instigated a huge NATO exercise that the USSR almost 
misinterpreted as the prelude to a nuclear first strike against them. This anxiety is registered, too, 
in a crop of films that address those fears explicitly, such as Threads (1984) and The Day After 
(1983), both of which depict realistic portrayals of nuclear conflict (in Britain and America 
respectively), in an overt attempt to awaken public and government awareness of the true stakes 
of this posturing. 
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here as a figure upon which a number of specific historical anxieties are inscribed, but 
also as another example of a fear of the object of rational technoscience reaching back 
out into the world and compromising the human subject—not as a subject that always 
already has implications in the construction or constitution of that human subject as it is 
invented itself.  
 
This instrumental yet perpetually threatening vision of the AI is the one which the caring 
computer is, perhaps, capable of overturning. Despite the vast amount of cultural work 
done to establish the AI subject as a radically emotionless other to be kept in its place, it 
is possible to theorise a way in which computers can care—and this caring dimension to 
interactions between human subjects and these types of computers activate a new 
visibility in the material contingencies of the substantiation of both (all) actors involved.  
 
Constructions of Care 
The meaning of care is a complex one: care is one term amidst a cluster of connotatively 
resonant other words. These include, but are not limited to, compassion, 
sympathy/empathy, help/helping, responsibility, contact, investment, and sharing. Care 
is not conflated with these terms—when I use the word in this chapter it is important to 
emphasise that I do so in the context of it and its most immediate common 
connotations. Always lurking too is the shadow of a more instrumental understanding of 
care: if we consider care to be not just a motivator or participant in economies/ecologies 
of feelings or affects between personally-invested individuals, but also a set of more 
tangible embodied practices with a certain structural social shape and meaning, then we 
need to account for that version of care, which is congealed as a socialised and 
biopolitical enterprise. In other words, as well as care being something that somebody 
does for someone else on an individual level, it is also a state apparatus, a site of medical 
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interrogation and intervention, an industry and focus of capital exchange and 
investment—and often a complex convergence of all of those things. Care for the 
elderly, the unwell, the disabled and so on are the clearest examples of this conventional 
instrumental understanding of care. Both of these understandings of ‘care’–the personal 
and the public–overlap. As shown by a plethora of (mainly feminist) writing on the 
subject, there is potential in investigating the collision of the public sphere of capital, the 
state, the biomedical/pharmacological industries (and so on), with the private and 
putatively “personal” sphere of individual care, driven by interpersonal connection and 
responsibility, but, importantly, obscuring the labour of subjects—particularly  women—
who are expected to carry out this labour as a “natural” responsibility.139  
 
Amongst the most prominent writing on this topic is the work of Joan Tronto, whose 
Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (1993) is widely cited in work 
interrogating the social functions of care and caring. As well as highlighting the 
emotional dimension of care as a potential mode of understanding ethical engagement140, 
Tronto points out the ways in which those existing within relationships of care are 
pushed into roles with very specific cultural connotations: 
[…] care-receivers are viewed as relatively helpless. On the most general level, to 
require care is to have a need; when we conceive of ourselves as autonomous, 
independent adults, it is very difficult to recognize that we are also needy. […] 
Because neediness is conceived as a threat to autonomy, those who have more 
                                                 
139 The introduction to Janet Finch and Dulcie Groves’ A Labour of Love: Women, Work 
and Caring (1983) sets out clearly this latter problem: “the fact that real, but unpaid, labour is 
hidden under the emotive rhetoric of ‘caring’”, they write, “is part of the designation of women 
as the ‘natural’ carers” (4). 
140 She writes: “Care is a common word deeply embedded in our everyday language. On 
the most general level care connotes some kind of engagement; this point is most easily 
demonstrated by considering the negative claim: ‘I don’t care’ […] Care seems to carry with it 
two additional aspects. First, care implies reaching out to something other than the self: it is 
neither self-referring nor self-absorbing. Second, care implicitly suggests that it will lead to some 
type of action” (1993: 102). 
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needs than us appear to be less autonomous, and hence less powerful and less 
capable. The result is that one way in which we socially construct those who need 
care is to think of them as pitiful because they require help. Furthermore, once 
care-receivers have become pitiful by this construction, it becomes more difficult 
for others to acknowledge their needs as needs […] Those in the disabled rights 
movement have long acknowledged how difficult it is to get so-called able-bodied 
citizens to recognize them as people who are equally deserving of dignity and 
respect. (120) 
The social denigration of “care-receivers” is one symptom of the manner in which caring 
is constructed as work undeserving of material recompense. Accordingly, Tronto 
appends an analysis of how this ghettoisation of caring labour is rooted in assumptions 
and contexts that are coded as feminine: 
I have portrayed care as a marginal aspect of our society. Surely, a critic might 
argue, my reading must be wrong; we accord great importance to mothers, for 
example. I have suggested, however, that even those aspects of care that do 
receive value in our society receive a value that is tainted by an association with 
lesser social values: with emotion, the private household, and the relatively weak. 
Care has little status in our society, except when it is honoured in its emotional 
and private forms. (122) 
The conventional understanding of care, then, is concerned with ensuring the 
stratification of participants in such relationships are kept subjected in predetermined 
roles, and that the emotional character to the labour of caring marks it as inferior to 
other (more rational, ‘masculine’) forms of work.  
 
Tronto’s mention of the disabled rights movement’s dissatisfaction with the concept 
resonates with the later observation of Teppo Kroger: 
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[Many] disability researchers have rejected the concept of care, claiming that the 
notion carries an understanding of disabled (and older) people as passive and 
dependent recipients and that this kind of perspective makes it impossible to 
really comprehend and promote empowerment and an independent life. […]the 
concept of care locates power with the caregiver and promotes patronising 
attitudes towards the recipients of care, who become portrayed as a burden, 
(2009: 399-404)  
Theorists of disability in particular have felt it necessary, in fact, to jettison the possibility 
of care as a useful concept of any kind: as Kroger goes on to establish, researchers of 
disability have long since considered the body of work on care that has emerged since the 
1970s “conceptually contaminated” (404). Both Tronto and Kroger mobilise 
understandings of care in order to develop very different projects, ranging from the 
ethical to the political. However, the common feature of readings of care upon which I 
focus is their identification of two roles: the ‘carer’, and the ‘care-receiver’ (though I call 
this the role of the ‘cared-for’). These positions, as shown, embody a number of claims, 
assumptions and possibilities. As they are commonly understood, they rehearse 
fundamental discourses that stratify the participants in these relationships into specific 
roles, with all the attendant connotations of power over and alienation from the cared-
for subject for the carer (as well as the latter being forced into the carer role by social 
assumptions regarding gender), and the abjecting connotations of vulnerability and 
disempowerment for the cared-for. The cared-for agent is frequently inscribed as the 
object of rational management, in a way that helps to reinforce the objective distance of 
the carer, though that carer is compromised as a political subject by the emotional 
character to their labour.  
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It should be noted here that my intention is not to condense, reduce or even account for 
the entirety of the vast sub-field of work on relationships of care. The theorists I 
mention here are only a sample of that area of thought (which in itself straddles several 
disciplines), and while I mobilise a version of care as an inspiration for discovering new 
ways of activating transgressive, co-substantiating relationships between putative human 
and technological subjects, I do not do so in a way that is meant to denigrate the 
complexity of this huge question by offering an all-encompassing theory or ethics of 
care. Such a move is, of course, beyond the remit of any one chapter. I also hasten to add 
that these theorists of care do not give any definition of care as prescriptive–indeed, many 
are engaged in a project of trying to map visions of care that do not fall into such 
normative categories. My own approach shares this need to rethink care, and I ally myself 
with many of the same political objectives, though as my work concerns the specific issue 
of technological agency, my trajectory for conceiving of such relationships moves 
through different theoretical territory. To that end, I refer to these theorists’ work as a 
way to establish the broad shape of conventional relationships of care, rather than to 
transplant their own responses and reconfigurations into my thesis. 
  
AI characters have been established to lack a dimension of care in their interactions with 
humans, as evidenced by their absence of emotionality and their tendency to act out the 
arguable opposite of gestures of care (harm). And the notion of care itself is, 
notwithstanding considerable efforts by several prominent theorists, still deeply 
problematic in its most everyday understandings. So how can we possibly be permitted to 
imagine subjects—carer and cared-for—that are both putatively artificial, and what could 
this unlikely collision offer to both visions of human-technological interfaces and the 
notion of care itself? Interrogating a fictional relationship between cloned human beings 
and an advanced artificial intelligence – two figures of as-yet fictional modes of near- but 
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non-human agency—in Moon, I now advance a mapping of some of the tangled possible 
alternative trajectories of understanding relationships of care. Bringing this fictional text 
into contact with Haraway’s vision of companion species, I am here participating in 
asking the increasingly vocalised questions of what care does, what is done to care, and by 
whom or what, in a manner that has striking implications for the assumed roles of 
technological agents and their propriety of their ability (or inability) to have an affective, 
material impact on their human counterparts. A continuous turbulence of co-
substantiation and contingency is implicated in Haraway’s work on the production of 
individuals and networks of substantive influence, and the aim of this chapter is to 
uncover some of the turbulences implicated in relationships of care, what they might 
mean for its shape and position as a cultural notion, and how they may be used as a way 
to advance an alternative understanding of relationships between humans and 
technologies. The “haptic-optic” experience of actual or visual contact with “another” 
subject allows–or demands–the acknowledgement of the embeddedness of that moment 
of contact in a vast entanglement of recent and ancient histories. Putative relationships of 
care animate the shapes and implications of these histories in particularly lively ways, and 
force reassessments of both the implicated agents and the relationship itself. Fragmented 
and sometimes contradictory trajectories of care and empathy can play a significant role 
in undermining conventional understandings of categorical boundedness and the notion 
of care itself, as well as undermining the assumption that encounters at the interface must 
leave each participant in the encounter clean and unchanged. 
 
What do I touch? 
The understanding of care that can be mobilised via Haraway’s work is based primarily 
upon a central idea from her monograph When Species Meet. A significantly instigating 
question central to Haraway’s study—“whom and what do I touch when I touch my 
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dog?”—is instrumental in mine  (2008: 1). As outlined in my Introduction, the asking of 
the question of “what” is touched is, for Haraway, the instigation of a genea-/archeo-
/bio-/socio-logical unravelling of that one dog’s contingency within the interrelated 
fields of becoming that constitute it, and which it helps to constitute. Referring to a 
moss-covered treestump resembling a dog, a picture of which was emailed to her by her 
friend Jim, Haraway embarks upon a consideration of multiple histories and material 
trajectories, which traces the irreducible circumstances that conspired to produce that 
temporary mutt and bring it into the range of her perception: 
In this camera-begot canid’s haptic-optic touch, we are inside the histories of IT 
engineering, elecTRONic product assembly-line labour, mining and IT waste-
disposal, plastics research and manufacturing, transnational markets, 
communications systems, and technocultural consumer habits [...] the leisure-time 
promenading practices of the early twenty-first century in a university town on 
the central California coast [...] the labour practices of late nineteenth-century 
loggers [...] the greenbelt policies of California resisting the fate of Silicon Valley 
ensured that Jim’s dog was not bulldozed for housing... (6) 
This analysis goes on: as Haraway admits, “[t]he rich naturalcultural contact zones 
multiply with each tactile look” (7). But in this small snippet, we can see the shape of 
what it means to “touch” within this model. For Haraway, our moment of tactile contact 
is one that demands response to the accumulation of material-semiotic circumstances that 
led us to that contact. Response here is the process of opening up and acknowledging 
our temporary place within that accumulation, and our capacity for being shaped by 
other agents with which we engage. We are not, in other words, subjects in pursuit of our 
domination over objects. Every touch is, or should be, a reminder of those great wounds 
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to humanist exceptionalism, and our co-constitution with the world as it exists and 
becomes.141  
 
Clearly, the practice of “touching” that Haraway propounds does not have to be physical, 
immediate, or actual, in the most mundane senses of those terms. The boundary 
breakdowns she desires include those between touch and sight; body-subjecting 
ocularcentrism is defied in the wake of what she variously refers to as the “tactile look” 
(7), “haptic-optic touch” or “visually fingering” (6). This “tactile look” is crucial for 
locating tangible practices of care: if we are to be affected by our shared contingency with a 
caring or cared-for subject, the reach of affect cannot be limited to the modal bounds of 
privileged, essentialist notions of immediate physical touching.142 We can, therefore, 
touch those histories even if we are, loosely speaking, distant from them: the 
temporal/geographic dislocation from the object/companion of our touch is not, here, a 
radical removal that allows viewing from a distance. Our participation in systems that 
allow us to touch with “fingery eyes” (6) is in itself an animating of implication that 
collapses the distinction between representation of that object/subject and the 
experience of our touching of it. For Haraway, one of many ways by which we as human 
beings can enter into a more embedded relationship with the world is by attempting to 
                                                 
141 For Haraway this vision of becoming is not just another rehash of the Deleuzean 
position of “becoming-animal” – in fact, she takes aim at Deleuze and Guattari’s position on the 
animal, lamenting their “scorn for the homely and the ordinary” in preference for deploying a 
fetishised vision of wild animality encompassed by the figure of the wolf (29). She has much 
more time for Derrida’s work on his “little cat”, but also highlights his failure to ever really 
consider the cat as an agent whose responses were worthy of philosophical inquiry at length 
(19ff). 
142 The haptic-optic breakdown is also important on a methodological level, for the 
multi-layered practice of reading, feeling and unravelling the film itself: not only am I compelled 
to map the “touching” that happens between characters within the film’s story space, but my 
own place in the experience and my basis for analysis is a haptic-optic one, outside the diegetic or 
even the semiotic framework. I touch the film’s fictional histories by my witnessing of, and being 
affected/shaped by, the film. The ‘real’ histories and practices inherent in my being in a position 
of spectatorship, as well as an influence on the text’s existence and its fictional remit, are, too, all 
being touched. 
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understand and participate in, in an embodied and affective way, the experiences of those 
whose suffering and labour we rely upon to help produce the conditions of our 
continued (and comfortable) existence in the world.  
 
Referring specifically to laboratory animals, Haraway gives an account of a scene from a 
novel wherein a Zimbabwean scientist slips his arm into a cage where tsetse flies are 
placed deliberately to bite guinea pigs for the purposes of research: 
The animal caretaker is engaged not in the heroics of self-experimentation (a 
common trope in tropical medicine histories) but in the practical and moral 
obligation to mitigate suffering among mortals—and not just human mortals—
where possible and to share the conditions of work, including the suffering, of 
the most vulnerable lab actors. Baba Joseph’s bitten arm is not the fruit of a 
heroic fantasy of ending all suffering or not causing suffering, but the result of 
remaining at risk and in solidarity in instrumental relationships that one does not 
disavow. (70) 
This sharing of suffering does not, here, emerge from an imperative that strains for the 
vain possibility of a clean, painless ethical encounter. The embeddedness of Baba Joseph 
within the networks of relationality and co-substantiation that produce all subjects is 
inescapable; he is not claiming to “feel the pain” of the guinea pigs so much as to assert 
his implication within the tangle of substantiation responsible for it, as well as the 
possibility that those “unfree” subjects can exact back upon him a similar, if less acute, 
painful experience – which in turn further informs the ongoing constitution of his 
particular agency. The lack of “heroics” here is significant: there is no possibility of 
extending, mimetically, the category of the human onto the suffering animal subjects in 
Haraway’s example by trying to claim that the same suffering is “felt”, because to do so 
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would be a reiteration of the unidirectional instrumentalising of the animals in question. 
She goes on to pose the questions: 
What happens if we do not regard or treat lab animals as victims, or as other to 
the human, or relate to their suffering and deaths as sacrifice? What happens if 
experimental animals are not mechanical substitutes but significantly unfree 
partners, whose differences and similarities to human beings, to one another, and 
to other organisms are crucial to the work of the lab, and, indeed, are partly 
constructed by the work of the lab? What happens if the working animals are 
significant others with whom we are in consequential relationship in an 
irreducible world of embodied and lived partial differences, rather than the Other 
across the gulf from the One? (72) 
Thinking through Haraway’s relational understanding, the possibility of caring emerges 
only from the moment of acknowledgement of a caring subject’s embededdness within 
the processes of co-substantiation with the erstwhile other subjects being cared for.  
 
The asymmetry of the experience is crucial, too, to the avoidance of hopeless relativism: 
the roles of “carer” and “cared-for” are still tangible within this relationship, even while 
their fractured boundaries are disruptive and reciprocally influential. Sharing suffering – 
not miming it or pretending it is possible to avoid it, or even to take it away – is a way of 
animating, both figuratively and literally, the carer’s implication not only in the process of 
mitigating that suffering, but in the fields of constitution producing the conditions of that 
suffering and the generative outcomes produced as a consequence of it and its 
circumstances. The ‘carer’ here is not the enactor of a preordained set of practices 
intended to minimise suffering for a perceived majority by the sacrifice of individuals. 
Importantly, Haraway eschews any utilitarian calculation of this kind as the basis for a 
response to a significant other: “Calculation, such as a risk-benefit comparison weighted 
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by taxonomic rank, suffices within relations of bounded self-similarity, such as humanism 
[...] answering to no checklist, response is always riskier than that. [...] calculation takes 
heart from the primary dualism that parses body one way and mind another” (2008: 
71).The possibility of making a calculated judgement as the basis of the mitigation of 
suffering only reinscribes the division between the carer and the cared-for. Suffering, 
though, through its being shared, is capable of animating the relationality at the basis of 
subject formation. The possibility of care emerges here from the need to touch, and by 
touching, to re-embed oneself more deeply in the co-substantiating processes that 
produce subjects. To care, one must not calculate, objectify or hold at arm’s length the 
cared-for—and to be cared for, one must not, and indeed cannot, be only the passive 
victim of cruelty and/or just the recipient of the hospitality of the carer. Care is the 
entanglement of these roles, even as they remain tangible, tactile and influential in their 
singularity. A relationship of care in this mode is one where inter- and intra-action 
illuminates the contingency of the actors involved, and diminishes the dualistic impulses 
of a pre-ordained ethics of response, empowering the carer and the cared-for by ejecting 
them from the binary roles to which they were previously affixed, along with the grid 
upon which the putative ‘values’ of those roles are ranked.  
 
We’re Not Programmed... 
Moon follows the story-arc of Sam Bell, a man whose job it is to supervise the largely 
automatic harvesting of Earth’s future fuel source Helium 3, which is found in relative 
abundance on the moon. Working for Lunar Industries, the American-Korean 
corporation that is responsible for supplying “over 70% of the world’s energy”, Sam lives 
alone in the Sarang moonbase facility for the duration of his three-year contract, with 
only an artificial intelligence called Gerty and pre-recorded messages from home for 
company. His partner, Tess, lives back on Earth, with their young daughter, Eve, born 
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while Sam has been on the moon. At the beginning of the film, we meet Sam at the end 
of his contract, with two weeks remaining, and very much ready to go home. However, 
over the course of the film, Sam discovers several shocking truths: that he is actually a 
human clone, that his replacement clone has already been awakened, and that each clone 
only lives for three years, meaning that he has only days left to live. Gerty, the AI, has 
been complicit in the operation all along, and instrumental in hiding the conspiracy from 
the respective Sams. 
 
I look primarily here at the representation of the relationship of care in the film between 
Gerty and the Sams: the first Sam we meet (whom I call Sam One) and the newly-
awakened clone (Sam Two). What marks this as a relationship of care is related to the 
understanding I outlined above. The AI is charged with the explicit task of “helping” 
each Sam clone, ensuring that they stick to their programme and get through their three-
year contract without discovering the truth about their role. Gerty is gentle, 
accommodating and proactive, and even faintly patronising, in his offers of help. He 
manages the Sams’ meals, collects and accounts for his possessions, cuts his hair, dresses 
his wounds, and offers emotional support: when Sam One appears distressed by 
something, Gerty says to him, “you don’t seem like yourself today”, and that “it might 
help to talk about it”. It is difficult not to see this as a conventional relationship of care, 
with Gerty in the role of carer, and each Sam clone in the role of cared-for. The 
relationship between Gerty and the clones, too—at least at first—appears to rehearse a 
discourse of the management of a vulnerable (but dangerously marginal) body-subject, as 
does keeping the clones alone on the moon and not ever allowing them live contact with 
Earth. The technoscientific corporate entity of Lunar Industries uses the clones in a way 
akin to working, food or laboratory animals, and their strategy of responsibility is limited 
to the model of minimising the suffering of the clones’ sacrifice (from an instrumental 
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and controlling position), and not sharing it. Their approach is a calculation: expending 
one clone every three years is, for them, a small price to pay to ensure supply of 70% of 
the world’s energy. This minimising of suffering (by implanting the Sams with memories, 
supplying an AI for company, building in a three-year lifespan and euthanizing each 
clone before the degradation becomes too acute) is all part of that calculation, which has 
the added effect of keeping the artificial subjects in a position of subjection and 
victimhood.  
 
The clones are thus the passive objects of Lunar’s inquiry—not significant, affecting 
others—and Gerty is ostensibly the reliable, controlled, hyper-rational and calculating 
barrier keeping them at arm’s length. However, the relationships of care in Moon, along 
with both the trajectory of its story and mise-en-scène, rather than reinscribing this 
discourse of subjection and victimhood, with clearly divided roles of carer and cared-for, 
instead dramatise the “touching” of histories and their constitutive effects/affects, 
refusing to endorse the singular humanistic model of selfhood generated by a 
conventional understanding of care. The film also—beneath the instrumental 
“minimisation” of suffering already mentioned—evinces a vision of the mitigation of 
suffering that has resonance with Haraway’s model of “sharing” suffering. The 
occurrences of “touching” evoked by the relationships of care in Moon make visible the 
effects of those processes that constitute individual subjects, and, in turn, override the 
problematic conventional roles of carer and cared-for, as each becomes more clearly 
invested in the other. Any possibility of a calculated, a priori ethical framework for 
crystallising the specific responsibilities of care is denied, too, by the film’s dramatisation 
of a failure of calculation as a basis for a relationship of care. Moon is full of subjects, 
objects and markers that each serve as the node for a number of different but related 
histories and material-semiotic trajectories of substantiation, and collisions of those 
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nodes are brought about by the enacting of putative practices of care. Moments of touch 
or contact between those nodes—literal and figurative—dramatise the acknowledgement 
of those trajectories either through implication or through explicit narrative exposition. 
The most obvious of these nodes are Gerty and the clones themselves, and the most 
obvious collisions are the literal ones between the AI’s robotic body and the clones’ 
organic ones—all of which are constructed commodities. There is an explicit crafting or 
affecting of the Sams’ bodies by Gerty. Gerty engages in frequent physical contact with 
the Sams while meeting their needs. We see Gerty’s robotic appendages cutting Sam 
One’s hair, helping to dress a burn that he sustains from boiling water, and, at one point, 
accidentally bumping into Sam One while he loads a container of Helium 3 into a 
conveyor. Gerty even lays a clumsy robotic claw on Sam One’s shoulder and ‘cries’ in 
apparent empathy when the latter discovers that he is a clone.  
 
Fig. 16. Gerty ‘crying’. 
 
Gerty’s mode of embodiment is somewhat peculiar given the history of representations 
of AI in science fiction cinema. While he is reminiscent of earlier cinematic AIs – 
director Duncan Jones says that HAL9000 from 2001: A Space Odyssey was a major 
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influence – there are some immediate and significant breaks with the cinematic 
convention of ‘artificial belligerence’ in Gerty’s representation.143 Gerty’s relationship of 
care with (the) Sam(s) is set up as a rather unconventional one for an AI; it is very much 
about contact, both physical/actual and in terms of mutual response. While it may be 
limited, Gerty has the ability to move; his “main” body is a chunky white computer 
mounted on overhead rails. While HAL’s panoptical omnipresence is expressed by the 
presence of multiple red eye-like cameras, Gerty trundles around the Sarang base so that 
he can be in the same place as each Sam, and engage with him face-to-face. Gerty is a 
located, temporally and spatially-individuated and contingent agent, not a distant 
distillation of the ideal calculating subject, observing from some other plane of abstract 
objectivity. Where HAL’s social engagement with the crew of the Discovery extends only 
to such intellectualised pursuits as playing chess (by monotonously giving out the 
positions for each piece in play), Gerty continuously engages the Sams with emotional 
and practical support of the most domestic kind: “Two weeks to go, Sam”; “how’s the 
hand?”; “would you like some hot sauce on your beans?”. Finally, while Gerty does 
indeed possess the HAL-style camera-eye, he also has a face. This face is a screen that 
displays a very limited number of facial expressions, based on smiley face emoticons with 
which we are most familiar from the Internet. With this small cluster of facial caricatures, 
Gerty can smile, frown, look shocked, puzzled, and, as evidenced in one scene, cry.  
 
I do not want to take too literally Haraway’s point on this, but the resonance with her 
idea of our need to recognise significant others as “having face” is illuminating (24). 
Haraway references the experience of primatologist Barbara Smuts, whose practical 
investigations into baboon communities initially started with her trying to become 
invisible by being unresponsive to the baboons, but soon proved impossible without 
                                                 
143 See the Director’s Q+A feature on the Moon DVD (2009). 
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responding to the baboons’ behaviour – “acquiring a face” in their social order (25). 
Affixing a face to Gerty, who in so many other ways appears the absolute distillation of 
abstracted technoscientific enquiry, is significant; his is not the pure and dis-/unaffected 
gaze of the perfect agent of rational projects. His gaze comes at the necessary price of 
acknowledging and asserting a specific affecting presence and role in the substantiation 
of the subject with which he interacts. His interactions with the Sams are necessarily 
substantiating, and the Sams’ actions and responses affect Gerty, and are reflected in 
both those respective facial expressions and the shifts in his behaviour that defy the 
intentions of his programmers. They also register in later decisions, such as that to erase 
his own memory. 
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Figs. 17 and 18. An enthusiastic Gerty, and Sam touching Gerty. 
 
Crucial to the film’s comfort in embeddedness is the lack of a convincing sense of 
paranoia over the protagonists’ artificiality, along with the film’s ability to help us 
sympathise or empathise with the radically-constructed agents of Gerty and the Sams—
even  while performing their artificiality in both plot and image. Both the Sams and Gerty 
are the imprinted recipients of recorded memories, implanted (as seen in Blade Runner) to 
help maintain control over them. Both are emblazoned with corporate branding – Gerty 
on his body and screen, the Sams in their clothes, almost all of which display the “Lunar 
Industries” logo. The constitutive effect upon bodies of the circulation of transnational 
capital manifests in these memories and logos, and reminds or informs us of the ways in 
which both Gerty’s and the Sams’ bodies are expensive property; the outcome of rational 
inquiry, motivated by investment, copyright, trade and exchange. Perhaps the most 
striking example of this is the moment where we see the hidden basement where the 
sleeping clones are kept: each one has with it a collection of clothes and personal 
possessions exactly the same as those of the awakened clones. However, the viability of 
these supposedy artificial subjects is continually recouped by the film. It does this partly 
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by distancing the ‘true’ human subjects: we never encounter a ‘true’ human subject in the 
film except behind a gulf of distance, both topographical and temporal (again, the staff at 
Lunar are recordings and images on screens, Sam’s family is the same). Again, Gerty and 
the clones’ artificiality is final and absolute—but not a ‘problem’ in and of itself. The 
film’s source of tension is not—for long, at least—over whether we will discover the 
‘true’ Sam. The clones are just that: clones—but they are ‘genuine’ subjects.  
 
This is not a film about discovering or even questioning which subject is the ‘real’, a 
common trope in science fiction cinema, and the story does not seem to panic for long 
over the notion of lost authenticity, and indeed the ‘real’ original Sam, while he does turn 
up in the film, is only ever perceived off-screen during a phonecall to Earth, confirming 
finally one of the clones’ suspicions of his own constructed nature. Neither is this an 
ethical inversion, though—it is not the impossibility and arrogance of claiming to see and 
represent the point of view of the other. These distant human subjects are still 
constitutive of identity; they are not elided as important even if they are far away. Their 
impact is still felt, even at a distance, but their influence has been fragmented. Each 
touch is one of partiality and embeddedness. Moon does not just dramatise and lionise the 
lived partiality of each subject—indeed, the film shows the impossibility of maintaining 
literal (and thus figurative) distance from these marginalised but needed subjects. 
Promotional material emphasises the “paranoia” and “isolation” intended by the film, as 
does the clinical design of the set and the suffocating disconnection from Earth—but 
this isolation is arguably only set up to be destroyed.144 As well as being disrupted by the 
aforementioned affinity between Gerty and the Sams, this failure of distance is also true 
in a literal sense: while Lunar do everything they can to keep Gerty and the Sams isolated 
on the moon, including jamming real-time communications with Earth and not 
                                                 
144 See the back matter on the packaging for the DVD of Moon (2009). 
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delivering the Sams’ recorded video messages to the woman they each believe is their 
wife, this distance fails to hold. By the end of the film, the jammers have been smashed 
and at least one of the clones has managed to make a live phone call to ‘his’ now 
fourteen-year-old daughter. These lively artificial subjects have acted unexpectedly and 
individually, and have forced the controlling agent of Lunar Industries to reacknowledge 
its place in an economy of co-constitution.  
 
As well as dramatising the assertive and localising touch of a relationship of care, the film 
evokes the notion of sharing suffering, also enacted within that relationship, to be 
another way in which subjective contingency could be reaffirmed. There are no moments 
of sharing suffering as exquisitely evocative of the notion as that seen in Haraway’s 
example, but some moments do come very close. Towards the film’s climax, Gerty offers 
to erase his memories so that the record of events so far will not endanger the lives of 
new clones. This serves as a contrite admission by Gerty of his being implicated both in 
the current Sams’ predicament and in the future killing of clones, even as it mitigates 
potential harm to the clones that will follow—rather than as a transcendentally heroic act 
of impossible selflessness. His role of carer is reinforced by this decision, as is the Sams’ 
position as cared-for, but the strengthening of this relationship is not victimising or 
subjecting, but rather empowering. It is also an acknowledgement of reciprocal, if 
asymmetrical consequence: Gerty’s offer constitutes an admission that his project of care 
cannot remain unidirectional. To fulfil his task of ‘helping’ the Sams, Gerty must be 
affected and significantly changed. He would reboot, but he would have lost fifteen years 
of ‘memories’.145 Finally, the film uses the relationship of care as a way to show a 
rejection of calculation as an adequate model for ethical decisions, as well as being 
                                                 
145 The film’s use of implanted memories is, of course, another example of the notion explored by 
Landsberg in her monograph: it remains a persistent, widely-accepted and robust trope in science fiction. 
See Chapter Four on the fursona for a discussion of this concept. 
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another means of re-embedding each agent in their respective histories and material-
semiotic contexts: Gerty shifts from being the unidirectional instrument of rational 
control (by Lunar) to being another significant actor: he has been programmed to ensure 
the safety of Lunar’s considerable investment, and the aporia he encounters in his 
programme—unable to decide which Sam he is supposed to be caring for—serves as the 
basis for his caring for both. As he remarks: “Sam, helping you is what I do”. Unlike in 
2001, where HAL’s hyper-rationality brings about the deaths of most of the crew of the 
Discovery, Gerty’s logical short-circuit leads him to a more prosaic decision to continue 
and intensify his responsibility of care towards Sam—both the clones—to the detriment 
of the subject/object relationship between Lunar and the company’s putative 
‘inventions’.  
 
Gerty’s logical short-circuit does not, in other words, lead to Sam’s being harmed, but the 
opposite. Gerty—who, within the aforementioned conventions of AIs in cinema, one 
would expect to go mad and/or attempt to kill Sam—does have a kind of breakdown. 
This break from cinematic convention was highlighted by the director – he claimed that 
he deliberately set up Gerty as reminiscent of HAL in order to later defy those 
conventions. Gerty may have a similar logical breakdown to HAL, but Gerty’s 
breakdown does not bring about a murderous rampage: instead, it generates an 
intensification of a responsibility to care for Sam. This decision arguably endangers the 
energy security of 70% of planet Earth (the potential disruption to the planet is 
dramatised in the film’s closing moments, which dub recordings of several media reports 
of the Lunar/Sarang cloning scandal). Thus the film eschews calculation as a singularly 
adequate model for this kind of ethical responsibility by embedding a failure of logical 
control into what is conventionally considered the most logical subject possible—the  
computer—and yet not making this a disastrous outcome (as an audience, we are clearly 
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expected to feel sympathetic to the Sams). While he says outright that he was not 
intending to make any kind of “academic” statement with Moon, Jones does acknowledge 
that his being a graduate in philosophy informed the film. He says  that he was partly 
inspired by reading work by the philosopher of cognition Daniel Dennett on the 
question of what Jones calls “trying to apply ethics to artificial intelligence”.146 While 
there is a wilful absence of a stable a priori ethical system by which Gerty operates, the 
mere fact that the AI is himself an actor implicated in an ethical encounter is a significant 
shift from prior depictions of AIs, which tend to embody a role as agents for whom an 
ethics is fundamentally impossible, being replaced by cold calculation or the carrying out 
of orders from a taxonomically ‘higher’ power. 
 
...We’re People 
Sam Two’s final assertion to Gerty is perhaps emblematic of the willed (and wilful) 
ambiguity evinced by the relationships of care depicted in the film. When Gerty insists 
gently that his sacrificing of his memories—so precious to the Sams, even implanted as 
they are—will be a small price to pay, and that the AI and the new clone will return to 
their normal programming afterwards, Sam affirms: “Gerty, we’re not programmed; 
we’re people. Understand?”. There is a very obvious ambivalence here in the use of the 
word “we”. It is unclear whether the “we” encompasses just Sam Two and his fellow 
clones, or indeed includes Gerty as well. I would argue the latter: the Sams’ affinity for 
the AI, implicated as he is in the conspiracy, is clear, and Sam Two’s concern in the same 
moment that Gerty might be harmed by the reboot is genuine (“Are you okay with 
that?”, he asks, twice; “will you be okay?”). The use of the word “people” intensifies this 
ambiguity further: Sam Two does not affirm his ‘humanity’ in a way that would position 
the clone, a more recognisable human figure, as one that just requires inclusion into the 
                                                 
146 See the Director’s Q+A feature. 
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humanist paradigm. He does not say, “we’re not programmed; we’re human”, he says, 
“we’re people”. “People” is that much more inclusive a term than “human”, and is much 
more in the spirit of companionship that Haraway’s interrogation of co-substantiation 
requires. Sam One, Sam Two, and Gerty are all people, enrapt by each other’s influence 
and implicated in each other’s histories, labour, suffering and liberation.147 The 
enunciation of these constitutive becomings is compounded in this final affirmation by 
Sam Two by his claim that they are not programmed. They are not the passive object-
victims of a rational project of linear inscription or intervention, even as their bodies are 
the products of the technoscientific projects responsible, in the short term, for bringing 
them into material existence.  
 
The inscription upon the body of programming, in the form of the biopolitical control of 
their daily routines, is shown over and over again in the film to be an inadequate model 
for understanding how these lively artificial people come into being. Care here is the 
multi-faceted invocation of this kind of significant otherness, which has asymmetrical 
and somewhat unpredictable effects, but always enunciates the collapse of the Great 
Divides that mark the carer and cared-for as gridlocked victims of prescriptive relations. 
Any sense of some tangible, linear index of ‘quality of life’ or a taxonomic relationship 
between these companions is confounded in this kind of an exchange, as is the attendant 
depersonalisation and ghettoisation of the cared-for subject (e.g., the turning of both that 
subject and the carer into roles within a rigid discourse rather than individuals capable of 
accounting for their own trajectories of becoming). Suffering is necessary but can be 
shared, and illuminates the connections between respective actors, and the failure of 
calculation as a basis of engagement with those significantly unfree subjects upon whose 
participation we rely for our own continued existence. 
                                                 
147 Indeed, Haraway uses the term “people” frequently in When Species Meet for this very reason. 
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Crucially, the caring computer does not represent the pushing through of some kind of 
technological threshold, where futuristic computers are capable of affective, emotional 
impacts and earlier ones are not. This is not about claiming that in the future, processing 
power or programming or the like will pass some fictional radical boundary where 
emotionality and personality become accessible to computers, and that this is a moment 
we should anticipate as one where the boundaries between humans and computers will 
collapse. Instead, what Moon demonstrates is not that there is something special about 
Gerty, but rather that it is viable and even comfortable to imagine allowing such 
putatively artificial subjects to have such an intimate role in the constitution of human 
subjectivity. Here we see, then, the caring computer as a figure that concentrates 
previously popularly unconnected discourses of technology and care, emotion and 
rationality, in a manner that is productive, non-exceptionalist, and always materially and 
discursively contingent. Unable to be contained within the dualistic frameworks of any of 
the types of figures seen in Section One, the caring computer does not ratify any sense of 
radical separation between the human subject and the technological other. The 
conventional dualistic vision of the interface here is collapsed by the ongoing recrafting 
of subjectivity evinced by the complexities of these always-already-artificial relationships; 
the partiality of the subjects involved emerges not from construction or bricolage but from 
unwilled—but still willing—connections of an emotional, affective character. 
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CHAPTER SIX:  
THE DECAYING DIGITAL 
 
As discussed in the Introduction, for Hayles, information “lost its body” primarily as one 
of many outcomes from cybernetics research during and subsequent to the Second 
World War, with Shannon’s “Mathematical Theory of Communication” (1948) serving as 
a founding document of the field of information theory, and the most significant single 
moment of information’s theoretical disembodiment. As Hayles goes on to show, 
information itself—and particularly digital information—has since been essentialised as 
ideologically neutral, transhistorical, transmissible, discrete and capable of reflecting or 
distilling the platonic authenticities of subjects or objects, in ways their mundane 
phenomenal physicalities cannot. In other words, digital information has been popularly 
established to be both disembodied and permanent. Digital information is produced culturally 
as an entity dislodged from its material bases, reproducible and accessible perfectly and 
infinitely. Functioning as a kind of idealised rational essence transmissible between 
varying material bases, it reiterates and ratifies the culturally contingent and dualistic 
liberal humanist version of the human subject (a belief distilled and represented in 
fictional narratives describing the perfect digital reproduction of the human self).148 I 
argue in this chapter that this understanding of the digital is increasingly untenable in the 
face of continual reminders of the material bases of the digital. The failure of digital 
information to live up to the transcendental promises of its putatively disembodied 
nature activates the need to scrutinise that failure in a way that re-embeds it within its 
physical contexts. It is possible, even necessary, to understand digital information itself as 
contingent and slippery—but rather than this compromising the role of the digital, it 
                                                 
148 See my discussion of Altered Carbon in Chapter One, on avatars. 
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opens up new possibilities for understanding digital information and its relationship to its 
material conditions of instantiation.  
 
Haraway identifies in “The Cyborg Manifesto” the tendency or need for late capitalist 
economies and ecologies to recuperate a version of the dualistic subject-self that can be 
encoded as a (digital) essence. The purpose of this drive is to generate a universal language 
for capital exchange; literally everyone and everything must be subject to penetration by 
the instrumentalisation of a standard code:  
Human beings, like any other component or subsystem, must be localized in a 
system architecture whose basic modes of operation are probabilistic, statistical. 
No objects, spaces, or bodies are sacred in themselves; any component can be 
interfaced with any other if the proper standard, the proper code, can be 
constructed for processing signals in a common language. […] information is just 
that kind of quantifiable element (unit, basis of unity) which allows universal 
translation, and so unhindered instrumental power (called effective 
communication). (1991: 163-4) 
For Haraway, reproducing human subjects as vessels for information, with that 
information commodifiable and saleable without material boundaries, allows an 
accounting-for of difference that renders it the known object of rational construction and 
interrogation. That this informational essence is a digital one is implicit; Haraway points 
out that all of these systems of instrumental control “depend intimately upon 
electronics” (ibid.). However, this desired vision of the subject is fundamentally 
untenable: as I demonstrate, even the most perfectly preserved digital information is 
subject to decay and finitude. This “decaying digital” embodies a figure for re-examining 
the role of digital information in our society that does not reprise its role as this 
essentialised “common language”, circulating perfectly and ethereally through bodies in a 
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manner reminiscent of the quasi-spiritual subject-self of the Enlightenment. 
Compromising the digital’s transcendental quality in this way allows us to seize it away 
from those kinds of fundamentally marginalising discourses, resisting their attendant and 
ongoing (re)inscription of lines of access and restriction of access to technological 
authority, whose rules of engagement are, as demonstrated in Section One, arranged in 
highly exclusive ways. It also points to a reading of the relationship between technology 
and culture that is not technologically deterministic: the engineering of digital fidelity 
registers here as an ongoing and regular reassessment of aesthetic mores or 
knowledge/aesthetic experiences of digital technology within a society, rather than as the 
generational advancement of a radically dislocated technological agent invented and 
controlled by a rational subject.  
 
Like the digital itself, my method of showing this phenomenon moves with fluidity 
between various ostensibly different texts, but unlike that idealised, transcendental 
fantasy essence, I pause at each text to unravel and trace its role as a node of social and 
material contingency. I first interrogate the material contingency of digital information 
itself, by interrogating, respectively, the technical phenomenon of “digital decay” (the 
highly limited lifespan of digital information based upon its instantiation in eventually-
deprecated and unusable physical devices), and the tendency for digital information to 
“decay” in the cultural sense: “perfectly preserved” digital images/sound from earlier 
generations of digital devices actually look very “old” because they are artefacted, of poor 
resolution, or are smaller than would be expected in the present day. Further to this, I 
examine a slipperiness in the digital’s ability to fulfil a modern biopolitical project to 
reflect a stable, essential but transmissible bodily identity, as made visible by instances of 
fundamental failures in biometrics. After establishing this inherent tendency for digital 
information to “decay”, I examine—particularly through work on the aesthetics of sound 
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and music recording—how this tendency can be harnessed to rethink the position and 
role of digital information in ways that are less disembodied, transhistorical or 
biopolitically marginalising/normative. To show this, I examine first Brian Massumi’s 
Deleuze-inspired work on the “real-material-but-incorporeal” body and its relationships 
to analogue and digital information respectively, along with Aden Evens’ work on the 
material quality of musical implication. At stake in particular here is a reading of how the 
digital may be more capable of explicating experience from the virtual than generally 
thought. While both Massumi and Evens have argued for the “superiority” of the 
analogue in affecting the body, I resist decrying the digital as an inadequate agent in the 
process of transducing sensation into embodied experience. I use their writing to 
examine the work of electronic musicians who foreground the slipperiness and material 
contingency of digital information as an aesthetic decision, in order to produce music 
that engages with, rather than attempts to hide, the interference in digital information by 
its physical bases. The foregrounding of the formerly invisible/inaudible material, 
background or ‘noise’ character to sound, made possible by digital technology, permits an 
embodied transduction of potential into affect that is as constitutive of the real-material-
but-incorporeal physical body as other affective experiences. 
 
I contend that the quasi-immortal digital artefact itself, even if reproduced perfectly from 
the ‘source’ at a later time, is subject to a transformation of meaning and ‘quality’, rooted 
in the influence of its newly-altered cultural and material contexts. The transcendental 
continuation of a digital artefact as a unique spectral essence, radically disjointed from an 
interchangeable material base is, thus, punctured: contrary to the fears elucidated by 
representations of the grey goo scenario, the digitisation of the material (or indeed the 
materialisation of the digital) does not collapse the possibility of difference into an 
indistinct field of homogeneity, but instead uncovers more opportunities for 
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understanding the material contingency that has always been present in the embodiment 
and representation of digital information. In turn, this unstable image of the decaying 
digital helps us to understand the ongoing constitution of embodied subjectivity at the 
interface, with digital information forming one strand of co-substantiating influence that 
is not separate from bodies (ours or its own), but which is both inextricably embedded in 
and contingent upon and productive of them: the putative collision between the human 
and the technological here cannot, in other words, be resolved into a subject-object 
dichotomy, even with the imposition of the encoded presence/pattern of the digital. The 
decaying digital thus constitutes a figurative opportunity both to map some of the 
subject-constituting effects of digital information (so, its overflow from the conventional 
object position into the subject), and to discover a body for information, replacing—or, 
perhaps, recovering—the one that it has lost. 
 
How the Digital Decays 
The most common understanding of digital data’s tendency to ‘decay’ is one based in a 
tangible and well-known technical problem: making that data permanent and indefinitely 
accessible. In a keynote address to the Preserving the Immaterial conference held at the 
Guggenheim Museum in New York in March 2001, Bruce Sterling outlined several 
tangible issues faced by those aiming to preserve and archive digital information for the 
future. The situation outlined was a direct challenge to the dream of digital immateriality, 
whose discursive power Sterling highlighted in his ironic enunciation of the major tenets 
of that fantasy, evoked in response to the problems of preserving works of art: 
Thanks to fantastic breakthroughs in modern technology, we’ve got a cure for 
[material disintegration]: digitalization! Flawless computer memories! Lightning-
fast chips! Fat fiber-optics! Massive storage facilities! Bits not atoms! It’s 
immaterial, so it needs no preserving; it’s escaped from the python coils of 
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history; time harms it no more; it’s up there at the pearly gates, spotless and 
radiant, right next to Saint Peter. (Sterling n.d.) 
In opposition to this dream (and marking a departure from his earlier, more dualistic 
cyberpunk claims about technology), Sterling produced an account of the phenomenon 
of digital decay: the tendency for supposedly immaterial and permanent digital information 
to become gradually inaccessible and/or unusable as its material bases (computers, and 
other devices, as well as optical and magnetic storage media) wear out over time. “Bits 
are moving electrons, moving photons, or they are magnetized clumps of atoms, laser 
burn marks in plastic, iron filings stuck together with tape,” Sterling asserted, “we  have 
no way to archive bits that we know will be readable in even fifty years. Tape 
demagnetizes. CDs delaminate. Networks go down.” (ibid.) One of the key promises of 
the digital—its putative uncoupling from the risks and vulnerabilities of the material 
realm—is shown here to be fundamentally untenable for very practical reasons. Pointing 
out the parallels between preserving indefinitely a “top of the line iMac” and “some Van 
Gogh sunflowers”, Sterling made clear the need for both to be continually maintained, 
protected and supported in order to sustain them: “number one threat, sunlight. Bad for 
oils, quite bad for plastics too. Ten years of hot sunlight on that glossy iMac console, and 
our candy-coloured iMac is a lot less yummy [...] Next, water. Glass of water onto the oil 
painting. Oh my. Glass of water into the computer? A catastrophe!” (ibid.). The need to 
keep digital information protected by the sheltering of its necessary physical bodies 
animates the limits of the logic of digital immateriality—the finitude inherent to material 
bodies also applies, fundamentally, to seemingly weightless digital information. If it was 
invulnerable to decay in its mythical immateriality, the re-embodiment of digital 
information—its being brought back down to earth—makes it subject once more to all 
the contingencies (and ravages) of physical instantiation. 
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Despite the escape from the fervour of supposed digital infinity, there is still a none-too-
faint air of technological determinism about these claims: one major assumption here is, 
ostensibly, that digital technology will continue to develop exponentially over time, and it 
is we obsolete humans who must rush to keep up.149 Indeed, the terms of Sterling’s 
conference address were rooted in a war against entropic dissolution of order that had 
ongoing recourse to information theory, rather than intervening in any fundamental way 
to unseat its discursive influence. However, what Sterling identified in this speech is still a 
concrete and inescapable problem, and, accordingly, a demand to rethink the nature of 
digital information’s relationship to embodiment. By demonstrating the very practical, 
real-world material contingencies of that information, Sterling highlighted primarily the 
fallacy of assuming digital information to be disembodied—but he also set the terms for 
a wider discussion of digital’s tendency to decay than just the eventual physical 
degradation of its material instantiation. The problem of compatibility (solved, 
conventionally, if temporarily, by software emulation) evokes further questions about a 
digital artefact’s being tied to a cultural, historically-specific moment.150 The idea of the 
digital’s free-flowing motion between interchangeable electronic device-bodies (the 
transfer of a digital text from one machine to another) collapses: frequently, the new 
computer bodies reject, repel or just cannot process or comprehend the digital artefacts 
leftover from the past: “It can’t run off that operating system. It can’t run on that make 
of computer,” Sterling pointed out, “it may be making lonely system-calls to some piece 
of equipment or some data that no longer exists [...] It’s an emulator of an emulator’s 
emulator.” (ibid.) As a digital artefact is migrated from one system to another, its 
                                                 
149 Recapitulating this technologically deterministic view is not a necessary outcome of 
this argument: the idea is less that an onward march of digital technological development is 
inevitable, and more that technological change that does happen (for whatever complex social, 
economic and cultural reasons) underscores the fragility and material contingency of digital data.  
150 In this chapter, I use “artefact” to refer to a (putatively) singular digital item—so, for 
instance, a text document, an executable file, an image, a recording of a song, et cetera. The 
common encoding of the digital assigns these different kinds of texts functional equivalency, and 
accordingly all are equally subject to the phenomenon of digital decay. 
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permanence is compromised by the increasingly tricky task of enabling that it can 
interface productively with the machine on which it has been installed.  
 
However, this problem of compatibility goes beyond the mundane technical question of 
basic functionality and access. Even if the digital artefact at hand is reproduced flawlessly 
on its own, then it fails largely to function satisfactorily outside of the very specific 
material conditions within which it was originally conceived, necessitating a whole new 
set of practices to decode and support access to that artefact. In fact, I argue that rather 
than the digital mode of instantiation helping to make an artefact transhistorical, the 
diminishment of compatibility in particular demonstrates how even the perfect 
reproduction of data greatly intensifies the importance and visibility of a digital artefact’s 
connection to its material contingency. Beyond the problems of its mundane material 
degradation, even if a digital text is somehow perfectly preserved, its material 
underpinnings protected and maintained, the artefact’s very “perfection” embeds it more 
firmly in the moment of its substantiation, and enacts, with each viewing/reading/et 
cetera, a performance of that embeddedness.151 Digital artefacts which can be both stored 
and accessed later, with all technical compatibility problems solved, suffer from a more 
mundane and culturally-instantiated form of eventual incompatibility: their perfection in 
reproduction of their “originals” means both that they gradually fail to represent 
effectively their intended object of signification, and instead represent increasingly the 
conditions of their instantiation.152  
                                                 
151 This also resonates with Haraway’s model of moments of “touching”, as I examine in 
Chapter Five on the caring computer: the encounter with the old, often overcompressed, low-
resolution, (so “decayed”) digital artefact forces a confrontation with its material, social, 
economic and discursive histories that is more acute than we get with a digital artefact whose 
format, dimensions, resolution and so on are more clearly in line with those we expect in the 
present day. 
152 Assuming a 1:1 ratio of representation of some kind of stable ‘authentic’ object in 
digital photographs is not, of course, easily tenable—this is something troubled by a number of 
thinkers, most obviously Baudrillard. However, as digital texts ‘decay’ in the manner I describe, 
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A simple example might be digital images as reproduced on the web at different points in 
time. The December 1996 banner logo for the search engine Yahoo.com is saved as an 8-
bit GIF format digital image (fig. 19). This format limits the palette of colours to 256, 
something which can be seen in both the error diffusion (the ‘stipple effect’ in the 
colours) and the aliasing (‘jaggedness’ of lines at angles other than ninety degrees). The 
2010 logo for the same website, however, is rendered more smoothly, in lossless 24-bit 
(16 million colours) PNG format, with antialising (a softening of jagged lines allowed by 
the high colour depth of the format), and no error diffusion in the colours (fig. 20). 
 
 
Fig. 19. The Yahoo! search engine’s web banner from December 1996.153 
 
 
Fig. 20. The Yahoo! web banner from August 2010. 
 
The 1996 logo is reproduced (notwithstanding inevitable minor differences as a result of 
printing in this document) perfectly as a result of its digital instantiation and proper 
archiving. It is a flawless copy, technically speaking, of the logo that a user in 1996 would 
have accessed. But its very perfection in reproduction (re-)animates its being situated 
within the period and technical context in which it was conceived. The dimensional and 
                                                                                                                                            
they increasingly fail to maintain even an ostensible connection to their supposedly signified 
objects. 
153 http://web.archive.org/web/19961227005023/http://www2.yahoo.com/ 
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resolution compromises that are obvious to tech-savvy present-day Internet users mark 
the 1996 logo as technically obsolete; less a banner for a website, this image steadily 
becomes a historical artefact of the earliest days of the World Wide Web. It looks, in 
short, old. The 2010 logo, though, its aesthetic finish comparable to any major website of 
today, arguably does not (yet) mark it primarily as anything other than such a title banner.  
 
While this is, of course, something one could argue about almost any shifting of styles in 
design history, the crucial point here is the manner in which the absolutely perfect 
replication of the digital artefact intensifies its historical contingency—that is, rather than 
the artefact being immune to such contingency as a result of its supposed ethereal nature. 
This GIF image file from 1996 has been collected by a crawler bot, copied and saved 
within the Internet Archive, and now reproduced again in the RAM and on the hard drive 
scratch files of the various computers I have used to write this thesis. It has been 
displayed on monitors several inches larger and a foot thinner than any that would have 
displayed it at the time it was current—and in at least twice the screen resolution (most 
computers in 1996 would have been displaying around 800 pixel wide displays; the 
computer I use now has a monitor running at a resolution 1600 pixels wide). The GIF file 
is, theoretically speaking, exactly the same as it was when it was first uploaded to Yahoo!’s 
servers nearly fourteen years ago, down to the individual byte of information, and yet, its 
representational value has shifted. The putative perfection of the digital artefact fractures 
itself by its own unavoidable performances of material contingency. The wholly-
preserved digital artefact is deprecated, fragmented and obsolete as a direct result of its 
being flawlessly reproduced in 2010 exactly how it was first stored in 1996. Decay here 
thus happens not in spite of attempts to preserve and reproduce digital artefacts perfectly, 
but because of them. Like a faded Polaroid photograph, the digital image implicitly 
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highlights the material signifiers of its own place in history in a manner that goes steadily 
beyond the function of representing the depicted subject.154 
 
Further examination of the inescapable embeddedness of digital texts (and their 
attendant tendency to decay) can be enacted by interrogating contemporary biopolitical 
projects intended to use digital information to ‘fix identity to the body’ (as seen in 
biometric projects of stabilising a digital essence that can be easily transmitted or 
exchanged). These projects perform a deliberate obfuscation/amnesia of the cultural 
contexts within which their ensuing technologies were developed, but this obfuscation 
itself serves, in fact, to make those contexts and informing elements more apparent. In 
other words, as with the rotting iMac of Sterling’s example, or the overcompressed, lossy 
GIF of my own, the digital decays here in its continual highlighting of the very mundane 
material and cultural contingencies it is developed to transcend (and indeed obscure). In 
an article which seeks to reclaim the social history of biometric development away from 
the assumption that such technology was simply seized fully-formed and deployed after 
the attacks on the World Trade Center, Kelly Gates cites a quotation describing a widely-
held belief that facial recognition technology could have somehow averted the events of 
World Trade Center attacks. According to Alexandra Stikeman of Technology Review, “face 
recognition technology that’s already commercially available could have instantly […] 
sounded the alarm before the suspect boarded his flight” (cited in Gates, 35). As Gates 
observes, this “regretful yet strangely hopeful assertion” seems a massively reductive 
approach to an event whose causes are rooted in a vast network of social and other 
causes, and yet it was a claim that appeared “simultaneously from multiple sources” (35). 
                                                 
154 This occurrence—the foregrounding of a digital artefact’s historical contingency over 
its putative content/denotative function—is something further borne out by web exhibits such as 
Internet ‘96, which presents snapshots of websites from 1996, and then uses each one to take an 
askew look at changes in design standards over the last decade (rather than what any of the sites 
are actually “about”). https://www.msu.edu/~karjalae/internet96.htm 
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Gates determines this to be a claim betraying what Pat Gill has called “‘Technostalgia’: 
the desire to revise the past to redetermine the present, at the same time admitting the 
impossibility of this endeavour” (qtd. in Gates 36). This phenomenon separates the 
technology in question from the networks of its construction (which are “black boxed”) 
and places it on a kind of pedestal, whereby blame can more easily be placed on those 
bureaucrats, institutions or forces apparently responsible for being simply too ignorant to 
appropriate and apply the technology. This is not just a matter of the benefit of 
hindsight: the “whole set of social actors” implicated in the production and deployment 
of the technology is elided, and in doing so a certain historical pattern describing a wide-
reaching socially-motivated project to attach identity to the body becomes obfuscated. 
This project of affixing some stable (but transmissible) version of identity to the material 
body is one whose authority is founded upon the supposed perfect reproducibility and 
sustainability of the digital (as well as its technological neutrality). But despite these 
discourses of immaterial perfection, the digital records created are subject to a kind of 
decay both equivalent to and in excess of the decay of conventional analogue records of 
identity. 
 
Gates shows several of the ways in which identity was tied to the body before 
contemporary technologies of biometrics matured, as well as the reasons why a digital 
solution was mooted as the mode in which they would be instantiated in a contemporary 
context. Many of these methods originated in the nineteenth century, and some of them 
are still in heavy use today, such as photography and fingerprinting (39). The example of 
photography is one that Gates focuses on in its attempt to “modernise” identification 
systems, owing to its supposed “realist representational capacity” (ibid.). These “late-
nineteenth-century ancestors to biometrics”—early photography, fingerprinting, and 
anthropometry (an extensive series of bodily measurements)–provide, for Gates, a 
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starting point for reopening a discussion on the historical background to these 
technologies, and an opportunity for interrogating the origins of what she terms a 
contemporary project to “create a universal digital representation of human essence” (ibid 
37). With this digitized human essence in place, it would be easier to “control access to 
the benefits of citizenship, to the national territory, to information, to computer 
networks themselves, to transportation systems, and to specific spaces of consumption 
and safety” (ibid.). She notes a tendency to try and locate “individual constituents” of 
identity to the body, but the problem that “the seemingly natural connection between the 
body and the identity of the person reveals itself to be in perpetual slippage” (38). The 
photograph, for instance, is not a definitive marker of bodily-affixed identification, as it 
poses a number of fundamental, simple problems. People’s appearances can change 
drastically over time, or depending on what facial expression they hold, the light in a 
room, and so on. Photographs also deteriorate and are easily misinterpreted based on 
social bias or prejudice, or basic misjudgement. Further to this, the number of 
photographs would require a vast indexing and archival system along with an extra level 
of human expertise (40). These are, though, features common to both analogue and 
digital photographs: I argue that this slippage goes a step further in a manner unique to 
the invention/intervention of the digital artefact. The deterioration of a photograph may 
appear to be alleviated or removed by the digital by its perfect reproducibility, but it is 
only ever dislocated—in a way that intensifies the effect of this decay, and illuminates the 
social and cultural contingency that that digital artefact was developed to overcome. Like 
the Yahoo! logos, a ‘perfect’ digital photograph will, over time, come unstuck from the 
context in which it was produced, and thus betray its material and symbolic reliance on 
that context: not only will it be subject to the same mundane storage/retrieval problems 
that Sterling outlined, but its function as a perfect record of its moment of inception 
undoes its ability to represent, by activating a new role as a ‘relic’. Older digital 
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photographs decay steadily by their being (in relative terms) of increasingly poor 
resolution, small dimensions, and high compression and ‘lossiness’ (the loss of clarity 
caused by some forms of image compression). Furthermore, as well as the digital 
photograph’s substantiating material bases, the physical object documented within the 
photograph will decay in the most straightforward, entropic way: the photograph’s 
perfection, again, is responsible for its increasing failure to represent. 
 
This decay goes further still, though: digital information has an absolutely inbuilt 
tendency to undo its own permanence of representation by opening up new venues and 
stages of interrogation for which it has not (yet) been coded to account. The problem 
with the digital artefact’s supposed ability to stabilise representation beyond doubt—by 
delegating both the interpretation of meaning and the archive of memory to 
technologies—is that the increased scrutiny and accuracy afforded by the technology 
reveals hitherto unknown areas of representational failure. Moving beyond the example 
of photographs and to another avenue of digital identity stabilisation—that of human 
DNA records—we can see how the digital undermines its own effectiveness as a marker 
of essential but transmissible identity by highlighting more areas where its systemic 
implementation fails to account for the body supposedly being known. A 2006 television 
documentary reported the case of Lydia Fairchild, an American mother of three whose 
separation from her husband forced her into claiming welfare. On having to provide 
routine DNA evidence that her children were, in fact, hers, the results from the tests 
came back and ‘revealed’ that she was not, in fact the mother of her own children: her 
DNA did not match that of any one of them. This had remarkable legal consequences: 
she was charged with running a surrogacy scam, and the government also charged her 
with claiming benefits to which she was not entitled (five.tv 2006). Even hospital records 
of the birth and witness reports were disregarded as evidence, as the DNA test was 
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judged to be infallible (ibid.). Eventually, the only thing that saved Fairchild from 
prosecution and having her children removed by the authorities was her enlisting of a 
lawyer who had heard of a similar case, where a woman named Karen Keegan had, 
during tests to determine a close family match for a kidney donor, been shown to share 
no genetic material with her adult sons. It had been discovered that Keegan was a 
“chimera”:  she had started off in the womb as one of twins, each with a unique genetic 
makeup, but one embryo became fused with the other, creating a mix of two sources of 
genetic code. Despite carrying this with her for her whole life, it did not affect her in any 
way until her DNA was challenged as a base of identification, at which point that identity 
became unviable.155 A New Scientist article also highlighted that these cases may be far 
from a minority: 
[…] 80 to 90 per cent of women carry their children's cells or DNA in their blood during 
pregnancy and up to 50 percent carry them for decades after giving birth, a condition 
called microchimerism[…] If your mother then had more children, some of your cells 
could in principle slip back through into your younger sibling's body. And twins can end 
up swapping cells in the womb, especially if they share a placenta. So a single person can 
be a veritable menagerie of different cell types from different generations (Ainsworth 
2003: 34). 
Clearly, visible cases of these chimeras are few, but what this illustrates is that the 
abstraction of biological embodiment into digital data, with the attendant systems to 
manage and archive that data, participates in the uncovering of areas for which the 
system cannot account—which would not have been revealed without the implementation 
of that system. Here, the digital is instrumental in reproducing its own finitude by its very 
perfect mode of reproduction: the reliance upon DNA data as the de facto witness of 
                                                 
155 This, in itself, arguably illustrates an organised structure of intended identity 
stabilisation undoing itself through its own modes of surveillance: if her DNA had remained 
untested, her disruptive example would not have been uncovered.  
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individual identity—which is vulnerable to quite catastrophic failure—produces itself the 
limit cases that expose the contingency of that information. 
 
The decaying digital, then, here registers the clustering of digital decay (as a technical issue), 
the intractable slipperiness of digital identity when trying to affix it to the body—and a 
tendency for these projects (i.e. to mark digital information as permanent and reliable 
artefacts of representation) to undo the very conditions of the digital’s permanence. The 
digital decays even as various social bodies attempt to stabilise it for communication and 
exchange, and its decay is partly a direct result of those attempts. Significantly, this 
decaying digital returns a recourse to the bodily-material to the previously dualistic and 
ethereal nature of the digital, dragging it back into the physical domain of temporary, 
contingent instantiation. The ensuing argument outlines both the rest of the decaying 
digital’s makeup as a figure, as well as how it can be ‘used’ both aesthetically/artistically 
and as a means to recoup a non-dualistic understanding of the digital. This non-dualistic 
understanding allows us to imagine the digital not as an ‘essence’ equivalent to the 
idealised Cartesian cogito-self, but as an entity with historically-situated material 
consequences, and as a materially-embodied and finite entity in itself, emerging from 
complex conditions and completely dependent on those conditions for its existence. This 
constitutes a human/technological interface encounter that is dependent upon, rather 
than obfuscating of the body, while prompting the reconfiguration of what constitutes ‘a 
body’ in the first place. 
 
Real-Material-but-Incorporeal: the Digitally-Affected Body 
In order to examine the most explicit ways that the digital can be seen to be embodied, I 
examine the physically constitutive effects of digital sound. Sound represents a domain 
within which theoretical discussions over both analogue and digital representation occur 
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with considerable frequency and alacrity. It is also where these debates enter the territory 
of considering the respective impacts of analogue and digital sound on the body. The body 
as I define it here is one rooted in radical materialist conceptions of the “real-material-
but-incorporeal” body, rather than the ‘finished’ ideal body (harbouring a discrete mind-
self) of liberal humanist conceptions. There are a number of precedents for reconsidering 
the embodied human/technhological relationship in terms of sound. Most of them, as I 
show presently, focus upon the affective character of sound. In this section, I consider a 
number of perspectives that may recoup the role of the digital in embodied rather than 
disembodied experiences at the interface: while (as I demonstrate) the status quo on 
debates over sound seems to be that digital sound cannot ‘express’ affectively in the way 
that analogue sound does (because of the digital’s moment of abstraction into code, 
which interrupts its affective link with its material bases), I argue here that the digital can 
allow access to domains of physical experience currently excluded by the analogue: this 
digitally-mediated sound can impact on the body in affective ways. 
 
Before outlining the difference between analogue and digital, it is necessary here to set up 
first a brief understanding of what sound actually is, in both its analogue and digital 
instantiations. Sound is a mechanical vibration of matter, on any scale. When matter 
vibrates, the organisation of these vibrations is endlessly transmitted in waves through 
the medium in which it is instantiated – in our everyday experience, the complex milieu 
of gases and particles that we label “air”, and is differentiated from light by its occurrence 
in matter rather than electromagnetic waves (Roads 2001: 6). This is, in the purest sense, 
“analogue” sound. When it is recorded with an analogue medium, such as vinyl record or 
magnetic tape, it is transferred onto the medium through basic mechanical and electrical 
processes. For instance a dynamic microphone contains a diaphragm which vibrates as it 
is hit by the pressure waves of ‘real’ sound, and this diaphragm, collared with a magnet, 
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generates through induction an electrical pulse which is then transcribed directly onto a 
physical medium, either etching a vinyl groove on a record or rearranging microscopic 
magnetic particles on a surface of a magnetic tape. This groove or arrangement of 
magnetic particles is a direct transcription of the mechanical wave of the original sound, 
and playback happens effectively by reversing the process (Evens 2002: 174). The 
physicality of the mechanical, analogue sound wave figures strongly in its aesthetic 
importance, especially when compared to ways in which sound is stored digitally. Digital 
sound operates on the principle of taking regular (tens of thousands of times a second) 
samples of a sound picked up (for instance) with a microphone, instead of mechanically 
reproducing the whole wave. Those samples are then transposed into binary values and 
stored as data, to be retrieved by a software process and decoded for output through 
speakers (ibid.). The advantages of digital audio include the ability to make infinite 
‘perfect’ copies of an original with no generational degradation between them (because 
copying does not introduce any kind of “noise” into the process), the decrease in size 
between an LP record player and a compact disc player, the incredible signal-to-noise 
ratio, and the lack of conventional degradation over repeated playback when compared 
to tapes and records, which wear out the more they are played due to the erosion effect 
of tactile friction. Digital instantiation also allows, of course, for music to be compressed 
for the purposes of downloading onto portable MP3 players such as iPods. However, 
despite its many practical advantages, the digital has come under heavy fire from critics 
and audiophiles alike as an adequate means of containing the experience of music, mainly 
due to its basis in the notion of sampling and abstraction into the digital code that allows 
its storage and transmission.  
 
This process provides, for example, the point of contention in digital aesthetics for both 
Brian Massumi and Aden Evens. As outlined in the Introduction, Massumi’s project is to 
Robin Stoate (Student No. 069063233) 
Reading Cyberspace: Fictions, Figures and (dis)Embodiment 
230 
 
theorise the body’s ecological relationships with ‘virtuality’: the field of material 
implication from which all affective experience is drawn out in acognitive, sensate 
encounters, which are retrospectively ordered by cultural conditioning into meaningful 
experience, emotion, memory and so on (Massumi 2002: 35). The chapter of his book 
(tellingly) entitled “On the Superiority of the Analog” is dedicated to criticising the 
digital’s inability to access that virtuality, because of its reduction of experience to a 
sequence of sampling (134). Digitality reduces potential to possibility by taking 
approximate measurements at certain points and leaving empty gaps in between: 
Digital technologies in fact have a remarkably weak connection to the virtual, by 
virtue of the enormous power of their systematisation of the possible…Equating 
the digital with the virtual confuses the really apparitional with the artificial. It 
reduces it to a simulation. This forgets intensity, brackets potential, and in the 
same sweeping gesture bypasses the move through sensation, the actual 
envelopment of the virtual. (137-8) 
Massumi deploys the notion of topology—non-Euclidean shapes that maintain a 
qualitative homogeneity of organisation despite their ability to be bent or reshaped—to 
demonstrate the transductive inadequacy of this reduction of potential to possibility. 
Topological shapes maintain a certain organisation that is relative only to itself, and has 
no empirical basis of comparison with any other shapes.156 Massumi describes the 
transformation of potential into explicated perception as a topological change, stating 
that it is “impossible to diagram every step in a topological transformation…practically, 
only selected stills can be represented” (134). And it is in the reliance on “stills”, and the 
illusion of motion between those stills, that digital fails in providing any kind of access to 
virtuality. This position is taken up by Massumi in a way that has even further 
                                                 
156 An often-cited example of a topological organisation is the London Underground 
map: it will not tell you how far apart stations are, or even where they are in relation to each 
other in terms of compass points – but it tells you how the lines connect together. It provides 
topological, rather than geometric information. 
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implications for the body’s position in relationships with the virtual: his consideration of 
the digital aesthetic must necessarily be read alongside his Deleuze-inspired discussion of 
affect. This is, broadly, the idea that the body is in a relationship of constant encounters 
with potential experience, and that these encounters are organised into culturally-
determined senses after being intercepted and certain aspects selected for explication into 
emotion or perception by an acognitive, indeterminate but distinctly embodied organ of 
sensation – half a second after the encounter, in fact (28). In this context, the digital code 
is a red herring, standing for virtuality but only really containing at best out-of-date 
snapshots of it, while the analogue sound wave, on the other hand, being already firmly 
instantiated in matter, is supremely fit for vibrating through the “body-as-transducer” 
(135). The analogue domain constitutes what Massumi describes as: 
a continuously variable impulse or momentum that can cross from one 
qualitatively different medium into another. Like electricity into sound waves. Or 
heat into pain. Or light waves into vision. Or vision into imagination. Or noise in 
the ear into music in the heart […] Variable continuity across the qualitatively 
different: continuity of transformation. (135) 
Digitality lacks the continuity that Massumi seeks in considering the virtual, and wants 
for the depth of potential expression that Evens expects in a live musical performance. 
Code indeed cannot contain the virtual or constitute in itself a field of material potential, 
reducing, as it does by its very nature, the potential into the possible.  
 
Similarly, Aden Evens problematises the digital mode of sound recording as purely an 
“engineering challenge”; “[reducing] fidelity to physics” (171-3). He points out an issue in 
digital sound recording that is often raised by critics of the digital: the fact that limitations 
in technology mean that the detail of the “sampling” undertaken in digital recording is 
limited to only capture a certain range of frequencies and amplitudes: “Complex real 
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world sounds almost always have components above the cut-off frequency of the CD, 
and below the noise floor or maximum resolution of the CD. Sound varies faster and 
more subtly than CDs can capture” (175). Music recorded onto a CD is effectively 
limited in its maximum frequency to about 20kHz, or 20,000 samples per second of 
recorded audio. This means that the maximum frequency of sound it can capture is 
20kHz, generally considered to be more than adequate, as it is also considered to be the 
upper reaches of even the sharpest human hearing (175). However, Evens points out a 
widespread unease with the CD as a recording medium, with many digital listeners 
complaining of a “coldness” about the sound; there is supposedly a loss of subtlety, a 
failure to “express” (176). In attempting to resolve why this might be, he both points out 
the fact that frequencies beyond our consciously-perceived range can and do register in 
our bodies and as such affect our understanding of sounds. He goes on to outline “an 
ethics of intensity” (ibid.). This is a notion of musical/sound experience which places 
noise at the privileged end of the long-standing signal/noise dichotomy: according to 
Evens, noise does not modulate signal, but the opposite is in fact true (177). Noise 
constitutes the raw material, a field of implication from which musical aesthetic 
experience and perception are drawn out (and exhausted) by performance. For Evens, 
there is no such thing as silence when considering music:  
The background of noise means that the air which a sound vibrates is not still to 
begin with, and silence is never total. Every string plucked, every throat cleared, is 
vibrating a vibration, modifying an existing difference without dampening it or 
squelching it…Noise is the uncontracted, the depth from which these 
contractions of perception are drawn, and though senseless and insensible, it 
makes sense or gives sense to sound, by providing sound with its direction and 
by focusing sound to a point of clarity. Noise is the reservoir of sense, the depth in 
which sounds connect to each other, the background, the difference whose 
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modulation is signal…What rises and falls is already a field of difference, an entropy of 
difference, a noise which is the problematic substance of sound, the obscure reserve (177, 
emphasis mine). 
By removing noise, and isolating everything except the ‘pure’ signal in the process of 
recording, and in combination with its inability to record frequency ranges that, while not 
directly perceptible, may psychoacoustically affect the ‘quality’ of a listening experience, 
the digital falls short of capturing the infinitely complex realm of acoustic spatiality 
implied and explicated in a live performance, or even an analogue recording of a 
performance. The milieu of the implicated is filtered out by digital technologies obsessed 
with removing everything apart from signal, and by extension these technologies are 
responsible for removing expression from the recording (182). As he says at the end of 
the article, “expression exceeds fidelity, so hold on to your LPs” (185).  
 
The above positions are strong criticisms of the digital’s ability to express, and constitute 
a reiteration of that sense of the digital’s disembodiment. However, I argue that it is 
possible for the digital to play a role in creating a material milieu, previously inaccessible, 
that draws out some kind of access to virtual experience, and that this constitutes an 
activation of its position as a local, contingent, material entity, rather than a 
transcendental essence. In other words, harnessing the digital’s ability to intensify rather 
than obscure its connection to material contingency, we can rethink the effect (and 
affect) of digital code on the body, and as such, rethink all such interface encounters. It is 
true that it is initially difficult to see how digital technologies may be useful for increasing 
our understanding of, access to, or incorporeal ecological relationship with the virtual, 
and by extension any reconfiguring of embodied subjectivities. Massumi’s persuasive 
treatment of the gaps and lapses inherent in the “sampling” nature of a digitised aesthetic 
clearly position it as a shallow illusion of the virtual, pasting together snapshots of the 
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already-exhausted into a zoetrope of potential-turned-probability, which must then in 
turn be reinstated into the analogue in order to even be perceived. A discussion of ‘glitch’ 
music and Curtis Roads’s understanding of ‘microsound’ will provide some way of 
recouping the digital’s relationship with the virtual.  
 
Microsound is one of nine time scales that Roads maps in his text of the same name. He 
argues that digital technology has allowed us access to a level of sonic space that would 
be previously untouchable (3). Microsound is the time scale on which events are at the 
very threshold of human aural perception; perhaps the tiniest events, in other words, that 
we can hear, just milliseconds in duration. “Glitch” music, such as that pioneered by 
artists such as Oval, who painted images on the undersides of CDs to make them skip, 
and then sampled the results—uses this microsonic level of sound to expose something 
between notes that just cannot be captured with analogue; Kim Cascone calls it “creating 
artefacts and exposing them as timbral content” (15). Cascone also points out a practice 
some artists undertook to transform non-audio code into audio; taking image files and 
opening them up with wave editors, and sampling the sound that this process produces 
(17). Similarly, the avant-garde electronic musicians Autechre create digital music based 
on microsound tones generated in software and programmes of their own creation. What 
the something between the notes of glitch music is, exactly, is not “the virtual” itself—
but it is certainly a level of audio experience that would have been inaccessible prior to 
digital sound technologies. In concert with an instantiation in the analogue (through 
speakers or headphones) microsonic music mimics what Massumi describes as the 
transduction of potential: “as sound passes from one time scale to another it crosses 
perceptual boundaries […] it seems to change quality […] this is because human perception 
processes each timescale differently” (Roads: 4, emphasis mine). The function of the 
digital, here, is not to escape the material conditions of its inception, but to foreground 
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them. Glitch music boosts and aestheticises the influence of its nature as emerging from 
code; it makes no attempt to hide the conditions of its production but exposes them and 
forces them into the foreground. There is no escape from the ‘body’ of the digital here; 
every glitch song is a celebration of its particular system and the specificities of its 
material bases. 
  
As well as glitch music, there are other burgeoning practices of electronic music-making 
that celebrate rather than try to avoid the failures and systemic limitations of the digital. 
‘Circuit-bending’ describes the practice of taking cheap electronic devices—often toys 
with inexpensive, tinny speakers and sound processing chips—opening them up, and 
randomly rewiring their insides. New connections and interfaces are also added; many of 
these circuit-bent ‘instruments’ are augmented with inputs and outputs that allow them 
to interface with recording, sequencing and performance equipment. As self-professed 
‘bender’ Reed Ghazala describes it: 
Circuit-bending is an electronic art which implements  creative audio short-
circuiting. This renegade path of electrons represents a catalytic force capable of 
exploding new experimental musical forms  forward at a velocity previously 
unknown. Anyone at all can do it; no  prior knowledge of electronics is needed. 
The technique is, without a  doubt, the easiest electronic audio design process in 
existence. [...] the circuit-bent instrument, often a re-wired audio toy or game, is an 
alien instrument: alien in electronic design, alien in voice, alien in musician 
interface. Through this procedure, all around our planet, a new musical vocabulary 
is being discovered [...] Circuit-bending's anti-theory approach to electronic design 
makes accessible to all audio explorers an endless frontier of original sound-forms 
[...] Within these adapted devices, along with the unusual voices of circuit-bending, 
are often found aleatoric music generators; that is, chance-music composers that 
Robin Stoate (Student No. 069063233) 
Reading Cyberspace: Fictions, Figures and (dis)Embodiment 
236 
 
stream unpredictable audio events: elements shifting and re-combining in 
fascinating ways. (Ghazala n.d.) 
The sound produced by circuit-bent devices vary from twittering flutters to terrifying, 
inhuman shrieks. As Ghazala remarks, though, the emphasis here is not on the conscious 
and instrumental (in both senses) design of an instrument, but on the possibility that the 
digital allows discovery of new domains of sonic influence; each circuit-bent device is a 
new and unique item, situated as a result of its being deliberately vandalised, turned from 
its intended purpose and the very teleology of its design brief—presenting a 
representative sound—overturned in favour of discovering what lies in the background 
to that representative sound. It is also a thoroughly embodied encounter: as Ghazala 
adds: “Body-contacts are also found through circuit-bending. These allow electricity to 
flow through the player's body, flesh and blood now becoming an active part of the 
electronic sound circuit. This interface extends players and instruments into each other” 
(ibid.) The ‘lost’ connection to embodiment that Massumi, Evens and others perceive in 
the digital is restored here in the most literal sense; circuit-bent devices redirect the 
current of input and output through the body, using it as a transducer of the signal; a 
signal processor without the conscious encoding or decoding of the digital. 
 
So, despite Evens’ and Massumi’s concerns, it is possible to imagine, at least to some 
extent, the possibility of an affective character to the digital, by finding ways that digital 
incursions and interventions can generate new milieux from which embodied experience 
can be explicated. Altering the balance in the signal/noise ratio—in a direction that 
would infuriate most communications engineers—appears to account for a large 
proportion of the creation of these digital aural milieux, from which the listener then 
stretches out what ‘means’ the most to them. As Evens writes about live music, the 
implicated exists in potential during, before and after the performance (177). It is a 
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macro-historical milieu and the driving force behind the affective impact of music, and 
can only be accessed when it is explicated, exhausting its potential. It may then be more 
useful to consider the relationship between digital sounds and noise as one of a 
topological stretching apart of two interrelated and non-discrete entities, creating an 
illusion of separation but never making the Euclidean break. Signal to noise is always a 
ratio, never a dyad or dichotomy, and arguably not bound by a kind of Derridean 
economy of supplementarity either. Signal is stretched out of noise topologically; nothing is 
cut and nothing is glued. When this signal becomes stretched out to the point of 
perception, its potential is exhausted, but it is a full exhaustion; an exhaustion of 
transduction rather than an internalised database reduction to possibility functions. 
 
 
The Dying Digital 
It is necessary to understand digital data as an entity that is completely reliant on its 
material contexts. Criticisms of the digital’s failure to ‘express’, to some extent, reiterate 
the mythology of disembodied information, of a transmissible essence that has no 
relation to the contexts in which it first arose. To return briefly to Hayles’ project of re-
embodying information, these decays, glitches and errors generate momentary lapses in 
the belief of this disembodied information myth, and reveal to us the equally momentary 
and finite nature of the form and representative capacity of the digital itself. The digital, 
like everything else, has a lifespan: digital texts decay, and eventually even ‘die’, either as 
their literal physical bases are eroded or as their cohesion as representative texts is 
disintegrated by time and social change. The disintegrating, burned out computers of 
Sterling’s museum; the gauche, pixellated Yahoo! logo from 1996; the impossible digital 
‘essence’ of Gates’ critique of Technostalgia; the failed DNA match of Lydia Fairchild; 
and the glitching, stuttering music of Oval, Autechre and the circuit-benders all 
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demonstrate the same thing: that the digital can only really be understood as something 
intimately connected with its body, whether that body is of a discrete technological 
device, or something more abstract and all-encompassing, such as the acorporeal 
churning of affect and transduction exemplified by Massumi’s theory. 
 
The decaying digital is, then, a different way of conceiving of digital information: not 
pure, essential, commodifiable and discrete—but noisy, contingent, error-prone and 
physically consequential for embodied, subjective experience. Decay here is a feature of all 
things that are subject to contingency, physical materiality, mortality, and finitude, and 
the experience of decay is both representative and generative of those entropic, transient 
properties. The digital does not escape these properties, but its being implied in them 
provides, fortunately, more opportunities than may be conventionally suspected.  
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CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis has been to trace the cultural functions of encounters between 
human beings and technological agents: first, the ways in which those relationships are 
depicted in order to shore up a fracturing sense of originary humanist authenticity in the 
mind-self, and then ways in which we might understand similar (but different) 
relationships between putative humans and machines that do not reinscribe those same 
anxieties and strategies of bodily disavowal. Across the chapters, I have examined two 
groups of figures representing and constituting embodied encounters at the 
human/technological interface. While the second is not a linear shift from the first, the 
two groups express two divergent visions or sets of possibilities for understanding 
relationships between human subjects and machines, and the attendant possibilities for 
those relationships to recraft or unseat the post-Enlightenment vision of humanity that 
causes so many catastrophic political problems. In my Introduction, I outlined that I 
would return to the question of cyberspace when I reached my conclusion, having spent 
the six chapters unravelling figures whose varying encounters with various forms of 
cyberspaces form part of the various informing contexts for their constitution. Through 
examining these figures, I have made a number of observations about cyberspace, how it 
is conceived as a conceptual backdrop for interface encounters, and how those 
relationships between humans and technologies may be re-thought or re-figured to 
overcome the endemic problem of liberal humanist subjective reinscription. Before 
drawing my final conclusions, though, I recap briefly what the examination of each figure 
has brought to the foreground. 
 
What is evident by the first group of figures is that in many cultural representations of 
such, interface encounters are kept normative: their boundaries are policed by figures like 
the avatar, the hacker, or the nanotechnological swarm, and the encoding of the 
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boundary threats as feminised, or the conflation of putative female (over-corporeal) 
embodiment and the risk that technological agents will over-reach with the same kind of 
leakiness. Each of these figures does indeed demonstrate the clear tendency, as identified 
by Hayles and Haraway, for the human/technological encounter to disrupt and threaten 
the boundary logic of the normative liberal humanist subject—but they only do so in a 
way that reproduces the interface as a stage upon which those disruptions can be 
contained or rejected, in a manner elucidated by the body theory of Grosz or Shildrick. 
And, as I outlined in the Introduction, while cyberspace itself has not been the direct 
object of examination in any of my chapters, it has haunted every one of them. The 
avatar rebuilds a digital version of the perfect Cartesian mind-self in cyberspace as a way 
to keep technological agents in the object position, and those (women) whose bodies 
make them putatively liable to suffer interference with their clarity of perception are 
never given more than lip service in these interface encounters; they are equivocated with 
the technological agents being (re-)subjected. The avatar is a quasi-spiritual weightless 
alternative body in a clean and pure mind-space. This is the space within which the 
hacker mind is ascendant, finally in a form that is not as bulky, finite and limiting as the 
organic body. The figure of the hacker, too, which often operates hand-in-hand with the 
avatar, sits at the meatspace end of the offline/online dyad, and ensures that crossovers 
of material influence from the technological into the human(ist) remain minimised and 
inconsequential. It does this by performing, re-performing and reiterating continually the 
normative parameters of access to and control of technological others, in a way that, 
again, conflates that object of inquiry with female subjects. The nanotechnological swarm 
dramatises less of an explicit foray into a typically recognisable cyberspace in Gibson’s 
terms, but performs much the same function: it shows the dangerous overflow of a 
putatively-passive technological object into the realm of active agency, facilitated by a 
character of thought that is constructed as feminine, and deploying the image of a 
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monstrous female fecundity as a device to express its anxieties. The nanotechnological 
swarm, while not depicting an explicit cyberspace as such, imagines technoscience as the 
other space in which rational inquiry takes place, and where putatively inadequately 
rational subjects (such as women) threaten to push that object into the subject domain. 
This understanding of cyberspace marks it as the outcome of generational projects of 
scientific progress; cyberspace is both the object of rational invention and the very object 
that defines the liberal humanist subject by supplementarity. It is a reductive, normalising 
space that simultaneously gives room for and reconstitutes binary logic. So if an effective 
and full understanding of cyberspace experience is not to be found the quasi-spiritual, 
transcendental, disembodied mind-space of Gibson’s writing, nor the glossy Metaverse of 
Stephenson’s Snow Crash, nor the formulae-filled supercomputer space of Hackers, nor 
the clearly-delineated cityscape of The Matrix, then where is it to be found?  
 
As the figures in Section Two demonstrate, the question of ‘where’ to find cyberspace 
may well be a teleological dead-end. These figures represent three unstable, asymmetrical, 
materially-embedded experience of technologically-mediated embodied subjectivity. 
Unlike the figures of Section One (though, as pointed out in the Intersection, a totally 
clean break cannot and must not be drawn between them), the relative novelty and 
diffuse/dispersed nature of the Section Two interface figures draws them as outside the 
linear transcendental encounters depicted by the avatar, the hacker, or the (containment 
of) the swarm. The fursona is a tangled project to rebuild individual identity using the 
Internet as a prime collaborator, but is a project that escapes and overflows any 
individual’s instrumental control. The overflow of memory without originary experience 
into the archive of selfhood of the user is not a deliberate project; it just happens, 
informing the constitution of their subjectivity and disintegrating the cohesion of the 
category of ‘user’ itself. The fursona is not like an avatar, which contains the disembodied 
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mind-essence of an otherwise offline subject—the lines of influence are curved into 
overlapping concentric circles; they ripple from the material technologies outward to the 
self even as those material technologies are influenced in turn. The caring computer first 
overturns a long-running cliché of cultural representations of ‘artificial’ subjects, by 
ascribing a computer an emotional character, and then goes so far as to advance a partial 
reconfiguration of the notion of care itself—a notion that, as the scholars referenced in 
that chapter point out, requires some reconfiguration in its difficult, often pejorative 
connotations. Mobilising Haraway’s work on companion species, rediscovering ways of 
ejecting the humanist-exceptionalist view of the human subject, we can understand care 
differently. Haraway’s inter-relational model of co-constitution—or companionship—
iterates the need for every encounter between like and unalike agents to be one in which 
their material contingency is evoked and used as a means to disrupt instrumental, linear 
relationships of control and exceptionalism. Care can emerge from both the very 
animating of material contingency and co-substantiating need, and the possibility of 
“sharing suffering” rather than claiming a morally superior position of alleviating or even 
reducing it. The role of the technological is in its striking highlighting of the inherent 
artificiality of all agents involved in the process, and the interminable, ongoing co-
constitution being effected. And, perhaps most widely of all, the decaying digital gives us 
a means of understanding digital technologies—the de facto arbiters of the reconstructed 
liberal humanist vision of a distilled subject-essence, decoupled from its material bases 
and radically disembodied—as firmly, inescapably embedded in the physical world. The 
ability to both see the ways in which the very perfection of the digital artefact animates 
its fragile cultural function (and thus its cohesion as an artefact at all) and to hear the 
unpredictable, microscopic operations taking place beyond the easy rational 
comprehension of a Cartesian subject, is the ability to recoup digitality as not being 
essential, transcendental or immortal. This latter point is crucial: one of the most acute 
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ongoing problems with the mythology of the digital is that the digital allows the 
distillation of ‘the consciousness’ into an essence that can be unproblematically passed 
between bodies that are empty, interchangeable vessels. The digital’s tendency to decay in 
the manners I have described confounds this vision in a simple, but robust way. 
 
Any conception of cyberspace as a singular ‘space’ at all is misguided, as far as 
overcoming liberal humanist logics of identity are concerned. This is despite this being 
the simplest, easiest way to conceive of cyberspace: a neutral plane, dislocated from 
(hovering above) the conditions of its conception. This space is the space inhabited by 
avatars, controlled by mythologically discrete hackers; it is the space that threatens an 
undifferentiated overspill into the ‘real’ world within narratives of grey goo only to 
dramatise the triumphant defeat of such an attack by a brave masculine subject. It is, in 
short, the space whose rules of engagement are so thickly stratified that movement 
between points on the prescriptive grids of normative identity is rendered utterly 
impossible there: if it is thought of as a ‘space’ at all, cyberspace functions as a means to 
hold at arm’s length contemporary technologies’ potential to uncover fundamental 
fallacies at the basis of the humanist subject. Alternative visions of cyberspace make its 
form and function so entirely contingent upon the material milieu and actors involved in 
its constitution/explication that it is (or should be) indistinguishable from them. If 
cyberspace is to be ‘found’ at all, it is in the technological components of that milieu; the 
material bases of the multiple sensate experiences of affecting and being affected by 
technology, and in the ways in which, as Haraway argues, our encounters with the 
putatively artificial activate the need to account for those material bases (i.e., by 
‘touching’ them in a manner that reveals their histories of becoming). In fact, this latter, 
overall comparison is well served by a brief appeal to some further writing on virtuality 
itself. I draw attention once more to the figure of the decaying digital: there is a reason 
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why I placed it last in the sequence of chapters. It leads relatively neatly into the ensuing 
vision (if such is even an adequate metaphor any more) for a more embodied, alternative 
cyberspace, based on its relationship between the body and virtuality.  
 
The radical materialist conception of virtuality—theorised extensively by Massumi, and 
inspired by Spinoza, Bergson, Deleuze and Guattari and others—is one that stands to 
rethink the reductive vision of the virtual as conflated with the commercial (and largely 
failed) technologies of “virtual reality”. A useful and rigorous interrogation of virtuality 
must ensure that it neither simply dislocates the task of determining the condition to a 
fetishized technological agent, nor reifies some kind of pre-existing ‘real’ as the yardstick 
against which virtual instantiations must be measured. Marcus Doel and David Clarke 
strongly criticise this “impoverished understanding of the real and the virtual” (1999: 
261). Drawing (cautiously) on Baudrillard, Deleuze and others, Doel and Clarke set out 
to demonstrate that assessments of the virtual commonly “collapse” into questions of 
“quality”, rather than interrogating qualitative differences in “power” and “affect” (261). 
In other words, they express dissatisfaction at the way that the virtual is understood in 
terms of direct comparisons to some kind of essentialist notion of the pre-existing “real”. 
What they believe to be the main contemporary modes of (mis)understanding virtuality 
are criticised in their respective tendency to consider the virtual as a flawed 
representation of a platonic and pure real (“simulation”, or “discourses of false 
approximation” [264]), to claim an augmentation of the pre-existing real and an ability to 
perfect its “flaws”(“suppletion” [268]), and to offer the ability to pre-generate and 
exhaust all fields of possibility, ending with catastrophe or the end of the world 
(“seduction”, [272]). They subsequently offer that a Deleuzean reading of the simulacrum 
remains the most feasible model for understanding the virtual, (although they do not 
guarantee its “adequacy”). “Confusing the virtual with the possible” (277)—that is, 
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reducing the question of virtuality to one of quantitative and comparative degrees of 
Platonic representation – fundamentally misunderstands and places a value judgement on 
the virtual. The ontological/epistemological ramifications of virtuality are only 
addressable, for Doel and Clarke, in terms of becoming; these ramifications become 
visible only in the temporary exhaustion of potential, rather than as a serial playing-out of 
finite possibilities stored within and linked to an essential and stable “real”: 
Instead of reducing reality to a tangible actuality, and expelling virtuality in the 
process, we wish to argue that reality is the actual and the virtual. This “and” is 
not a one that is directly lived. Rather, it is the “and” of folding, unfolding, and 
refolding. Reality is the immanent twofold of actuality-virtuality. Such a twofold 
is never given in advance, like the matrix of possibility is supposed to be; it always 
has to be created and worked over in situ. The badly thought-out notion that the 
real realises a pre-formed possibility rests on a retroflex movement according to 
which the existent is assumed to precede itself and the creative act that 
constitutes it. (279; emphasis in original) 
This assessment of the virtual resonates with that of Massumi: it is no para- or extra-
normal space which can be ‘accessed’ as such, but the sum total of material potential and 
implication from which embodied experience may be drawn out. This informs the 
direction in which my understanding of cyberspace begins to advance: assessing the 
virtual as some kind of plane of representation into which we can project a 
consciousness, or from which we can extract some kind of experience, whether artificial, 
inferior, or improved, is an arguably inadequate model for accounting for the 
complexities of the embodied experience itself. Like the virtual, cyberspace is not 
something that can be located in the manner of a geographical plane, and technological 
instantiations of any such plane cannot claim to embody or even represent what 
constitutes cyberspace. There is no representation at all here: cyberspace emerges 
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between and as an inherent part of all explicated bodies and affective experiences enacted 
in interaction with technologies.  
 
Here, of course, is a fundamental danger that I have not, fortunately, overlooked: in this 
article, Doel and Clarke are arguing against a conflation of virtuality and cyberspace (albeit 
the cyberspace of ‘virtual reality’). However, I think that to a certain extent this 
conflation must take place—just not in the direction against which they argue. If virtuality 
constitutes a field within which the possibility of embodied experience can be drawn out, 
then cyberspace is a vast concatenation of material components that forms an inherent 
part of that same milieu. Cyberspace is not the virtual, but it is absorbed into the virtual, and 
only makes itself felt or noticed when it erupts from implication into affect, from the 
indeterminate acorporeal material substrate, through transduction, into experience that 
can be felt (rather than known) by the putative individual in interaction. Here, if 
anywhere, is where we can locate the intersection between the human body and the 
technological other in a way that collapses the distinction between the two. Moving 
understandings of embodiment at the interface beyond the conventional, dualistic, 
finished body-subjects of the Enlightenment, where any impingement of the body upon 
the mind is coded pejoratively, can only be done by an ongoing recourse to the material 
conditions of digital (and other) technological entities. 
 
Finally, I return briefly to the two frameworks that instigated my study, being the main 
formulations for imagining and (re)thinking the human subject at the interface. Donna 
Haraway’s cyborg is a figure that has given us unprecedented opportunities for theorising 
the changing intersections between the category of the human and the technological 
agent. That interface, which accounts for more and more intimate encounters, requires 
examination that overflows any one figure. N. Katherine Hayles’ posthuman builds upon 
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Haraway’s work (though is not a ‘figure’ in Haraway’s sense, and is certainly not 
conflated conceptually with the cyborg) aiming to re-embed the posthuman subject 
within its material history rather than see it as a transcendence of history, and show the 
ways in which the altered relationship with technology emerging out of cybernetics and 
information theory transforms the liberal humanist subject rather than armouring and 
continuing it. Both of these responses constitute powerful arguments against the 
tendency for the human/technological interface to be reclaimed for the liberal humanist 
subject as a neutral stage upon which to rebuild binary logic and all its attendant 
prejudices and exclusions. But these two frameworks cannot account for some of the 
ways in which the same changing relationships have already rejected any possibility of 
overturning the liberal humanist subject, nor the ways in which technologies are being 
used that did not exist or were not widely deployed at the time of their writing. This 
thesis has been an attempt to respond to and augment those limitations. Though indeed, 
the six figures I have examined here represent just six further nodes of interface between 
those two categories, and my assessment of their cultural functions in turn only 
represents a relatively small proportion of their considerably broad dimensions: much 
work still needs to be done to delineate more fully the scope and depth of these figures, 
and to explore more fully their political or ethical implications, if any are to be found. In 
this thesis I have demonstrated that some conclusions about the interface can, at least, be 
drawn from unravelling or reconstituting these figures, as well as conclusions about what 
those figures do to the notion of cyberspace.  
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